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In his novel “The Flame Alphabet” (2012), Ben Marcus depicts a reality that can no longer be 
conveyed through speech, because language itself has become toxic. Every utterance that 
comes out of a child’s mouth bears an increment of poison to the adults listening in. Among 
the notable symptoms is how the faces of those exposed to language gradually starts to 
decrease; the exposure to words, whatever their content, lead to seizure and fever, they set off 
internal bleedings and cause the collapse of organs. The government and health authorities 
are at disarray, assuming that some sort of advanced and extreme allergen has taken 
possession of all languages known to mankind. Great measures are taken, then, to shield and 
retreat the whole adult population from the audibility of words spoken by children.  
In response to the “modern epidemic” of stress, language seems to be afforded a similar 
function, as a source of ailments emerging in the midway between perception and reality. In 
contemporary stress management, stressful individuals are conceived of as captives of a 
language that make them sick. Stress management therefore seeks to intervene into 
individual’s very experience and description of their own surroundings and themselves, so as 
to locate how their sense of reality becomes distorted and twisted by negative thoughts and 
emotions: “The point is to avoid becoming a victim of your own negative thoughts. If you find 
that your thoughts are filled with negative content, try turning your attention to what's good 
at the moment and become more aware of what's right for you. From thinking that you 
cannot manage something, move your attention to what it actually takes, what resources you 
have, who you can contact, etc. This way you may experience better internal control and 
greater influence on your thoughts and actions, while strengthening both your self-esteem 
and self-image. Here is a basic question for all those who think their boss and colleagues are 
asking too much of them: Are you sure that they are actually expecting this much or is it just 
something you imagine?”1 (Personal og ledelse [Staff and Management], no. 6, 2008: 20). 
Putting the reality into words – perceiving the world – comes at a high price if you voice it in 
a language of self-resentment and affect. Subjects under stress are therefore exhorted to 
release themselves from their own tragic and self-imposed narratives of themselves; a number 
of “language-exercises” are purposefully seeking to filter reality differently, by way of 
voicing other words than those of the tragedy, that is, by producing alternate accounts in a 
positive and self-affirming voice.  
                                                          
1 All following quotes from Norwegian journals and books have been translated into English by myself.  
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In these arrangements of the boundary between perception and reality, there’s also another 
striking oddity at play. When stress is made into such a weighty concern in working life 
today, it is a problem that at once both indicates illness and health. Phrased differently, we 
might say that the burgeoning industry of stress management courses and occupational health 
promotion relies on a paradoxical notion of the problem it seeks to solve. Stress is on the one 
side, unlike other ailments, often perceived as intrinsic for the performance of work, as a 
necessary motivational force for the employee. However, at the same time, stress is viewed as 
having a potentially strong negative impact on employees, as a source of serious health 
problems, which also affects organizational productivity. Occupational stress is considered 
both harmful and productive, it calls for measures of prevention and treatment, but must not 
diminish completely, because that would endanger the employees’ motivation and drive for 
work. Stress management is therefore not only concerned with encircling threats towards 
employees’ health, but also revolves around outlining strategies for “turning stress into an 
asset”, as one management-expert phrases it, for both the organization and the employee 
(Gallo 2011).   
Within the social sciences, there are by now a wide range of different causalities offered, as 
to why stress has emerged as one of the strongest threats towards the well-being of 
individuals in our present working life. For the time being, sociological inquiry is accordingly 
in the trenches over what constitutes the actual cause of stress, wherein gender, acceleration 
and technology are among the competing explanatory models (see Duxbury et al. 2014; 
Green 2002; Wajcman 2008). For instance, the increasingly blurred boundaries between work 
and private life, due to the proliferation of devices such as the cellphone and laptop, are one 
of the common frameworks of clarification (Chesley 2005; Towers et al. 2006). In this thesis, 
I want to unlock the problem of stress from the notions of plain cause and effect found in the 
“work-life balance”-perspectives that permeates a notable part of occupational studies and 
stress research (Roberts 2007; Robey and Cousins 2015). This also indicates that, as far as the 
current analysis goes, the subject matter cannot be sociologically explained according to any 
given structural circumstance.  
Here, I will for the moment leave aside the causal question of how there is something “out 
there” (in society) affecting a state “within” (the individual) and the following account does 
not provide an answer to why people are stressed, but pursues how this “why” is, among 
other things, directed towards subjects as a means of self-assessment. Up until this point, 
there have been few efforts to pin out an analysis of the paradoxes contained in this identity. 
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My intention is to offer such an analysis here. For this reason, I do not seek to arrive at a 
conclusion on stress as an ontologically determined problem. I am not concerned with stress 
as a problem of cause and effect, but how it is made into a problem in the first place.  
The medical historian Mark Jackson has pointed out that the term stress probably first starts 
to circulate in the English language in the sixteenth century, referring to notions of hardship 
and affliction. He quotes from the famous “Dictionary of the English Language” by Samuel 
Johnson, published in 1768, wherein stress is afforded a double function as both a noun and a 
verb. As a noun it designates a force which is “either acting or suffered”, as a verb it connotes 
“to put to hardship” (Jackson 2013: 37). During the 20th century, the term is diagnostically 
advanced by physiology, whereby it starts to disseminate throughout a number of European 
languages, eventually gaining a position as a “modern epidemic” (Wainwright and Calnan 
2012).  In this thesis, I will examine this supposedly rampant and yet vague disease by asking 
what is behind the problem of stress and its management. This question cannot be answered 
properly by coupling stress with an already set diagnosis of society. The subject of stress 
cannot, then, from the onset be bundled together with “widescreen” diagnostics such as neo-
liberalism or individualization without an investigation of the “stress problem” in its specific 
historical emergence and intertwinement with, among other things, occupational health and 
management. It has, for instance, been suggested that the “stress epidemic” must been seen in 
relation to broader “socio-cultural” changes, in which “problems of work are no longer seen 
as collective issues to be fought over through industrial action or political activity, but as 
individualized threats to the mental and physical health of the worker, to which therapeutic 
intervention is the response” (Wainwright and Calnan 2002: 161). Such conclusions tend to 
predispose a particular narrative, in which a (previously) politically conscious workforce has 
fallen victim to the individualizing lenses of therapeutization. The suggestion of “stress” 
being tightly knit to a fragmented workforce no longer capable of claiming their rights or 
engage in battles on behalf of political collectives, seems to be more founded in a political 
indignation than in a sociologically motivated historization of the field. What is behind the 
case of “stress” must be opened sooner than enclosed in the self-assuring diagnoses, offered 
by both critical positions of sociology as well as the organizations themselves. Rather than 
placing stress in an already diagnosed terrain, such as blurring boundaries between work and 
home or neo-liberalism, my ambition is to re-describe this “epidemic” by centering in on the 
articulation of the problem itself and the tensions found herein, by asking, among other 
things, how stress emerges as one of the most pressing health issues in working life today and 
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how this requires a “new” language and a quest to improve our abilities to cope with our 
surroundings and ourselves. To borrow the words of Armin Nassehi, the point is to obtain a 
“distance from the self-made stories of organizations (and their traditional sociology) to 
achieve off-key observations” (Nassehi 2005: 179)2.  
The interest in this thesis is not driven by a wish to decide on which side stress can be placed 
in the distinction between illness/ health or individual/ collective, but by an interest in the 
paradoxical communication emerging when stress becomes the center of attention in working 
life. My curiosity in the “stress problem” revolves around how it enables an incessant 
uncertainty of what the problem “really” is, that is, a form of uncertainty that the 
organizations seem to desire and communicate through. The problem of stress – from the 
organization’s point of view – is laced with a paradoxical craving for being both illness and 
health and both scarcity and resource, at the same time. It is an epidemic that must be fought, 
yet the “infection” offers a welcoming opportunity. Among other things, organizations 
respond to this state by formulating stress policies and sending off staff to courses on 
mindfulness and other self-help programs in order to learn how to handle the “pressure”, 
acquire “balance” and turn their ailments into a positive force. What kind of consequence this 
has for those employees who experience stress, burn-out, anxiety etc. will not be left 
unanswered, but will be pursued by looking at a) the intervening mode of stress management 
(for instance, what form of agency is sought re-instated in the stressful employee and by 
which means) and b) how employees themselves report on the experience of stress.  
Accordingly, the question here is not whether the label “stress” in reality serves to conceal 
exploitive conditions or asymmetrical power relations at work, but how the problem seems to 
composite the self as a peculiar instance of powerlessness, which can be directly linked to his 
or her illness and productivity. Among other things, it does so by bringing the employee into 
a performative confrontation with himself, by asking “who are you when you choose to 
experience your illness like this?” or “could you perceive of this in another way?”. I want to 
make it less obvious how and why stress appears as a problem that relies on the self-
assessment of individuals. 
In order to get a proper hold of this peculiarity, it is not sufficient to just systematically 
pursue the notion of stress as it emerges and develops within organizations, because that 
would make us blind for its historical character of being one “health issue” among others and 
                                                          
2 Nassehi here refers to Luhmann and his organizational sociology  
7 
 
for how it today is sought resolved as a health problem that at the same time can bring about 
vast resources for the organization. A lot of effort seems, in this process, to be put into 
making the individual decide for himself how to ascribe pathological experiences to himself 
and/ or his circumstances. It might seem obvious that no one else can decide whether and 
why you feel “sick” on your behalf. The point of inquiry in this context is, however, not 
whether experiences of illness and difficulties at large today have become increasingly 
“individualized” in organizations but how the employee’s illness has become a source of such 
great concern as a self-relationship. Organizations today seem to invest in a problematizing of 
the self, in such a way that also illness now offers an opportunity for both the organization 
and the employee. How has this emerged as a problem for the organization, when and how 
did the “self” start to appear as a problem and solution to its own self-produced 
“pathologies”? To get a grip on this, I will therefore enlarge the scope of inquiry and 
historicize the observation of illness and health as such in organizations. How has illness 
been mapped and prevented previously? How has the employee appeared as a potential risk 
or hazard to his own health or to others’? How has his health been sought safeguarded or 
improved? What epistemological status has been ascribed to the problem of health/ illness 
and what kind of knowledge has this acquired? These are among the few questions that will 
be raised in order to clarify the historical development of this problem. The strategy for this 
problematization will be elaborated in the forthcoming pages.  
The systems theory of Niklas Luhmann offers a rewarding possibility to deal with these 
questions, because it consequently requires a clarity on distinctions. From this theoretical 
angle, it becomes clear that underneath seemingly indistinct and thoroughly ambiguous forms 
of communication, there are still boundaries marked up, that make it impossible to let such 
indistinctness maintain itself. Systems theory provides a second glance at things, albeit a very 
ambitious one, which I basically will use as a strategy to confront the empirical material with 
its own impossibility. For instance, what form of communication is at play in the oscillation 
between illness, power and “self-transformation”; what communicative expectations are 
folding out in a pathology that seems to contest its own character as pathology by also 
becoming a recourse and source of “growth”? An observation of illness cannot be continued 
as an observation of economy or pedagogy or law without displacing the communication, that 
is, by pursuing the problem by the means of a different logic. Systems theory provides a point 
of departure to systematically detect when such shifts are made and ask how this happens.  
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Furthermore, systems theory assumes, in complete divergence with the interventions made 
towards stressful employees, that the self - our consciousness - is simply inaccessible to its 
environment. Our minds and perceptions are always out of reach for communication. This 
perhaps controversial postulation obviously requires an elaboration and will be conducted in 
the coming pages, but it does under all circumstances offer rich theoretical possibilities to 
irritate a practice which so unremittingly is centered on opening and transforming our “inner 
vaults”.  
Against this backdrop, the following questions will be pursued in the thesis: 
1. How is the distinction between health and illness set in work life and how does 
health-issues assume their character of problems, that acquires different forms of 
action from the organization? How and where is illness marked, mapped and resolved 
in organizations, historically and today?  
2. How does language and emotions appear as recourses to handle issues of health and 
illness at work?  
3. How does the problem of stress emerge as a problem in work life? How does stress 
management and the implied transformation from “stressful” to “balanced” involve a 
strategic shift of language and perception?  
4. How are different forms of communication such as power, performance and illness 
interlinked and problematized as a self-relationship, in which the organization seeks 
to intervene?  













Theoretical framework: Communication in society as society 
In systems theory, communication is considered to make out the basic entity of society. This 
sets the theoretical entry somewhat apart from a variety of other offers in sociology, in terms 
of how society at all can be understood. Max Weber, for instance, is among those who has 
held a long-lasting influence by invoking “social action” as the primary reference of 
sociological analysis, linking it explicitly to the behavior of human beings (Weber 1964: 88-
90). When communication is proposed instead, as the point of departure of sociological 
inquiry, it has a few consequences for how society can be grasped as a sociological object, 
which I will briefly sketch out. 
The concept of communication forwarded by systems theory is understood as a process 
synthesizing three components: information, utterance and understanding (Luhmann 2012: 
45). The snow falls heavily (information), someone remarks (utterance) and people turn their 
heads to look outside (understanding). One can easily imagine how communication would 
not emerge in a similar scenario: Someone sees the snow but does not care to mention it. This 
banality marks a crucial difference, namely that between consciousness and communication. 
The thoughts that run through our minds do not communicate, because they are not 
communicatively present in communication. No one has access to the vast ray of images, 
perceptions and feelings taking place within the consciousness of others and this 
inaccessibility is simply the reason why we continually select pieces of information (such as 
the weather) and treat them as objects worthy of utterance. Had psychic systems been 
mutually transparent, so that everyone at all times could read the consciousness of everyone 
else, communication would be superfluous and most likely impossible, because of the 
relentless cacophony of voices and perceptions bleeping towards us. Since we are not granted 
any such form of transparency, we are left with ascribing, for instance, context, motivation 
and intention to utterance’s we are exposed to. The meaning of communication can therefore 
never be firmly established when the intention behind it is disclosed (if there is any intention 
to begin with), because this remains unknown – even in cases where individuals explicitly 
seeks to unveil them. The reason is, quite simply, that also such efforts of disclosure requires 
a recipient who cannot but interpret what is being said. The meaning of communication is 
rather to be found in the communication itself. Somebody mentioned snow, and then 
someone else mentions skiing. Perhaps this sets off a plan to venture up into the mountains 
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later on and a sociality of planning-a-trip emerges, unrelated to the intentions of the person 
mentioning the snow in the first place. Noteworthy in this regard, is that communication 
cannot be conceived of as a transference of meaning or information from one actor to 
another. Systems theory proposes on the opposite that such a transference cannot take place, 
since we are unable to make copies of our consciousness and forward them to others 
(Luhmann 2012: 116). Unlike Max Weber’s concept of social action, there is therefore no 
form of equation between the sociality of communication and human beings. 
This holds true for all of society, which implies that human beings are not necessarily in 
charge of societies. In fact, systems theory goes beyond this assumption and completely “de-
privileges” the common location of human beings in the midst of society through the quite 
daring claim that human beings make out the environment of society rather than actually a 
composite part of it. Unlike the economy or science, human beings do not make out a system, 
but are composed of different systems such as the consciousness and biology, but these 
systems cannot take part in, for instance, political disputes, paradigm shifts or economic 
transactions. They have no access to form the meaning of communicative events, but remain 
on the outside, unable to participate in communication as communication (Luhmann 2012: 6-
10, Luhmann 1997: 89-91). It is perhaps easier to imagine how, for instance, our digestion or 
bloodstream is unable to reach into communication than it is accepting that the same goes for 
our minds. However, if we are willing to let go of the assumption that our mind is directly 
transferable, the “middle-ground” does not really seem to be an option, because human 
beings under all circumstances lack a “final” and all-encompassing address in society. When 
we come together for supper, the event will be processed differently in the various systems 
that together adds up to the human being. We might (interactionally) make enquires about the 
recipe, while the hand (mechanically) grabs the spoon and brings it towards the mouth. 
Meanwhile, the psychic system starts to think of tomorrow’s appointments at work and the 
biological system sets off a process of digestion. There is no unity holding these systems 
together; the consciousness cannot proceed with our bodies digestion and our heartbeats are 
unable to feel delight or embarrassment. Therefore, the human being cannot be present or 
really represent itself in society, since, for instance, neither our consciousness nor biology is 
able to constitute a human being that is accessible to society or, for that matter, empirically 
observable to sociology. When parts of sociology still tend to appoint the behavior of human 
beings to the driving force of society it is, or so would Luhmann claim, because old-habits die 
hard. We tend to associate and connect what we can perceive of other people, such as their 
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“actions” and utterances, with the representation of human beings in society. However, most 
of the time we might not even say what really is on our mind (and it is always a lot more than 
what can be spoken or expressed), due to context, “norms” or efforts to keep the conversation 
going. When we do speak out, there is always a vast range of possible meanings that can be 
ascribed to what we say, so that the mentioning of “snow” does not result in cross-country-
skiing, but perhaps in a heated discussion of climate change. Due to this fact, the concept of 
communication deployed in systems theory requires us to discard the idea of communication 
as a distribution of meaning between a sender and a recipient, for instance, as a discourse in 
which participants can offer their rational arguments (Habermas 1981: 43-44). People are 
never in control of communication, it lives a life of its own unreachable for the ideals of a 
“deliberative” exchange of opinions or even “human intervention” as such (Luhmann 2002d: 
155-168).  
Therefore, instead of bringing human beings and their behavior to the center of the 
interpretive schemes that can allow for an analysis of society, systems theory centers in on 
different forms of communication, on the assumption that everything which is observable to 
sociology is observable only as communication. So far, I have briefly sought to clarify the 
nuts and bolts through which systems theory arrives at such a hypothesis, which can be 
summed up followingly; a) communication is not transferred between actors, but is a 
synthesis of three components – information, utterance and understanding,  b) people do not 
communicate, only communication can communicate, and c) society is not the sum of its 
individuals, as Norbert Elias proposed (Elias 1991: 3-7), but the sum of its communication. 
Society is therefore a communication system and can only be assessed accordingly in systems 
theory. 
 
From first order to second order observation 
The objects of the world do not themselves necessitate how they are to be observed. For this 
reason, they do not themselves establish the observations making them appear in the first 
place, whether they are sexual encounters, bureaucracy or unruly behavior. The oceans 
cannot tell us that their biodiversity is endangered. Instead, we rely on patterns that can 
enable us to distinguish, for instance, critical pollution from that of less critical. The pollution 
does not convey itself, neither does any other topics in the vast realm of communication that 
is available to us. To an oncologist, this hardly matters of course, since no improved 
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treatment can be extracted from such an insight. To a sociologist it cannot but matter a great 
deal, because the point of departure in sociology is the observation of society. If the qualities 
embedded in the objects of social reality are not possessed by these objects themselves, this 
leads to the question of how the relation between the observer and the observed can be 
assessed from a sociological perspective, that is, beyond the mere assumption that social 
reality is “constructed”. The suggestion afforded by systems theory is that of second order 
observation, which emphasizes that the observation of society must be trailed and questioned 
as observations of society. Reality does not realize itself, as “facts” and solid “empirical” 
foundations, but must be, from any point of view, observed as reality in order to become 
reality. No matter how indisputable or conflicting its subject matter, this goes for all of 
society, as well as the sociological assessment of it. Any sociological inquiry can only take a 
foothold once it has decided how to observe society – no matter where its exact objects are to 
be located – and posits in this regard a certain amount of resources, for example “capital”, 
“network” or “anomie” to name but a few. Via observational devices such as class and 
ideology, Karl Marx could, for instance, show how the enterprise of capitalism comes to 
present itself as an objective knowledge – that is, observation – of society, in the form of 
political economy. The concept of observing observations is not exclusive to systems theory 
but can be found throughout a wide number of theoretical propositions forwarded in the name 
of social science and sociology. The difference between these various approaches and 
systems theory is, however, that systems theory goes further than merely consigning 
sociology to the task of “observing observations” of society but offers an epistemological 
point of departure for elaborating how the venture of analyzing society as observations of 
society can come about. Above anything else, this encompasses how “theory” and “empirical 
reality” can be identified along the same threshold of sociological investigation, so to irritate 
each other. This means, for instance, that a sociological analysis of society must take into 
consideration how it can avoid shielding itself in an external or critically “advanced” position 
vis-à-vis its subject matter. The theory must make itself visible and put itself on the line, so to 
say, within the scope of the sociological inquiry at play. In systems theoretical terms we are 
here dealing with the “autological” capacity of theory (Luhmann 2013a: 335-337). In this 
regard, the sociological gaze must include a reflection of itself when it reaches out and tries 
to make sense of whatever excerpt of social reality that is summoned to sociological 
enlightenment; not only by sketching out how the theoretical approach provides new 
knowledge on its empirical subject matter, but also how the theoretical approach co-produces 
the object of its investigation. The disclosure of observational criteria must therefore include 
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the sociological observation itself and not only the criteria used to distinguish the observed 
object, as if these designates two separate units, wherever the object is found, be it “elite”, 
“conflict of interest” or “learning disabilities”. This will be described in the next few pages.  
As we have stated, no objects of social reality can extract a singularity of meaning by the 
means of their own existence. There is always an option to see a problem differently. Of this 
follows that when the enactment of observing changes, it changes the object which is 
observed (Luhmann 1994: 133). Foucault has, for example, described how the practice of 
punishing criminal offenders in the late Middle Ages enables an enterprise centered on bodily 
torments and deprivation, according to principles of symmetric retaliation and public 
spectacle. During the late 18th century and onwards, however, the criminal becomes the target 
of a new type of intervention, requiring a range of techniques that seeks to reform his 
criminal dispositions and turn him into an improved citizen of the state (Foucault 1995). The 
observation of criminality and punishment changes, whereby the criminal appears according 
to a host of topics previously ignored or unknown, attached to his newfound individuality and 
humanness. Instead of pinning out an ontological explication of the phenomena of crime and 
the attached perpetrator, Foucault centers in on the observations of crime and punishment – 
within judicial, scientific, administrative and political realms – in order to analyze its 
emergence and gradual change as a societal problem. This approach can be generalized to all 
forms of second order observation; one cannot obtain access to or solve the problems of 
society directly. Instead, the second order observation shadows the often numerous and 
contradictory ways in which an object of social reality is made into a problem, in the broadest 
possible sense of the term. “Marriage”, for instance, can actualize a variety of possible 
meanings, such as marriage/ commitment, marriage/ economic incentive, marriage/ tradition, 
marriage/ gay rights etc., but a sociological investigation on second order cannot determine 
one of them being more in line with reality, more “just” or unreasonable than any other. The 
same piece of information, such as “divorce”, will be processed differently depending on 
who, where and when it is observed. To law it is observed as a change of status concerning 
rights and duties, to science it is a statistical fact, to economy it cancels out old transactions 
and sets off new ones (mortgage, child payment, etc.), to mass media it might – provided a 
“pattern” can be detected – evoke a possibility to alarm and cause concern to society, and for 
the couple involved it can be perceived as a tragic or relieving life event. All of these 




The second order observation is centered on how a difference makes a difference once it is 
marked (Bateson 2005: 374). This enterprise, of observing observations, is largely based on 
George Spencer-Browns work on the calculus of form (Spencer-Brown 2011). According to 
the calculus, there must be an indication of difference, in order for any observation to take 
place. To begin with, Spencer-Brown remarks, we must draw a distinction, to perceive the 
world. Any trivial activity and any statement, whether it is a traffic sign, a remark from a 
colleague or a medieval hymn, always indicates something in one direction or another. The 
traffic light says “stop” as opposed to “go”; there are always two sides of an observation, the 
indication itself and its difference. When the indication is marked, it makes a world of 
difference! Spencer-Brown formally outlines it like this:  
m ┐u 
There is, accordingly, a marked side and an unmarked side. The figure above visualizes the 
distinction which constitute the possibility of observation. It might, at first sight, seem as if 
this boundary establishes a basic asymmetrical condition at play between the side of the 
marked and the unmarked. However, it is not necessarily the marked side that draws our 
attention, while the unmarked side is left in the shadows for itself. The unmarked side is just 
as significant to the emergence of communication as the marked side; there are no boundary-
less forms to be identified in communication. To take an example: When looking at the 
crescent moon, we cannot see the shadows cast from earth, giving the moon its momentarily 
“shape” and at the same time also see the moon, even though both have to be present in order 
to form a “sickle”.  
The second order observation is not superior to other observations, it does not offer a 
privileged position of “higher” insight but is simply a position on another level. In fact, a 
second order observation is also a first order observation, because the second order 
observation obviously also has explicate and distinguish something in order to observe 
(Luhmann 2013a). The difference between an observer on first order and an observer on 
second order is primarily a difference between “what” is observed and “how” it is observed 
(Esposito 1996: 593-596). The observation sees what it sees, but it does not have the ability 
to question the foundation of its own axioms; it cannot reach back to its own conception and 
is therefore unable to trace how it observes as it observes. This constitutes the blind spot of 
all communication. As long as the observation observes, it cannot conceive of its two-
sidedness, but only work on one side of the distinction at a time. As Luhmann phrases it: “the 
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observer cannot see what he cannot see – and fails to see this as well” (Luhmann 1994: 137). 
This blindness, however, is at the same time what enables the observation in the first place -  
it is a precondition for seeing. This is far from rhetorical playfulness, and for the sake of 
clarification I will provide one more example. The pedagogical gaze conceives of a child as 
(more or less) apt to learn, it can detect progress and obstacles for learning; within the child, 
its environment, the educational system etc. The assessment of the pupil’s ability to learn (for 
instance, how does he or she interpret and acquire information, solve problems and 
“develop”) can only be performed as long as the constitutive moment of the pedagogical 
enterprise, clustered around the difference between learning and not learning, is not taken 
into account. It might seem obvious that a pedagogical critique, for instance, of the content 
found in a curriculum or of outmoded methods used in classrooms are centered on learning, 
and not whether the school is economically feasible. However, exactly because learning so 
obviously is the matter of fact, it is impossible to ask where this “fact” derives from without 
leaving behind, at least momentarily, the pedagogical gaze, in which learning takes its shape 
as a problem. Why is this impossible? It is because the question of how the difference 
between learning and not learning emerges is not constituted by an interest in learning, but by 
an epistemological interest in the emergence of learning. The difference is crucial. With a 
point of departure in how the difference between learning and not learning unfolds itself, one 
is not able to provide, for instance, improvement of learning, to make it more effective or 
skilled or even take responsibility for learning as such. Rather, a second order observation 
can investigate how the “problem” of learning affords a world in which children can be 
distinguished as potentially knowledgeable and skilled subjects. That is the where the 
epistemological difference between a first order and seconder order observation lies.  
With this in mind, I will proceed to elaborate how this perspective can be made empirically 
fruitful, inspired by Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen (1999). Drawing mainly upon Luhmanns 
work, I will present three analytical strategies; a form analysis (clarifying how social reality 
is seen when it is distinguished as illness, by asking how illness paradoxically forms 
communication), a semantic analysis (clarifying how employees’ illness is individualized as a 
self-relationship, by asking how the problem of illness is conceptualized) and a coupling 
analysis (clarifying how different forms of communication are coupled in programs and 





At a second glance: Analytical strategies  
The first analytical strategy: Form 
A form divides, it is the boundary that can make a distinction appear and, at the same, the 
form also contains the two sides of this distinction. In the form analysis I am concerned with 
how such a distinction can be investigated by the means of a second order observation. When 
I make the question of form a starting point in this thesis, it is because such an inquiry will 
enable me to investigate how a communication on illness is brought about in the first place, 
that is, by asking through which difference does this communicative form hold itself 
together? The point is to make it clear how and what is communicated, when health and 
illness is at the center of our attention. First, by outlining the form of illness, I aim to provide 
a framework that can enable an analytical accuracy unfettered by the commonplace notions 
of health and illness that we all share to a certain extent in our daily lives. One such 
“commonsensical” assumption could be the typical opposition between health and illness 
itself, which also is conveyed semantically in the realms of “health care” and “health service” 
that most often is dealing exclusively with prevention, injuries and (potential) ailments of all 
kinds.  
Second, I also want to pin out a foundation for a sociological inquiry that is detached from 
the conceptualization of health and illness found, for instance, in the mentioned health care, 
medicine or psychology. Across these institutions and disciplines, illness is observed directly 
as a first order phenomenon, through assessments of the biological and psychological “state” 
found in individuals, groups and populations; blood cells are analyzed; x-rays are made; 
stethoscopes placed on the chest, all in order to consider whether and what kind of treatment 
is required. Sociology, however, is not itself faced with any patients and must make itself 
aware of this fact. Therefore, a sociological investigation of illness (and health) must 
carefully distinguish its own observation of illness as communication from the observations 
of illness found across other domains of society, wherein illness is observed directly as a pure 
empirical fact. The form analysis provides the first step in this regard and asks, quite simply, 
what designates the specificity of illness as a communicative form? How does 
communication emerge, when illness is indicated?  
All communication has to establish itself through a differential mode of observing, it cannot 
come about otherwise. A form analysis centers in on the unity of such a difference, that is not 
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taken into account by the observation itself. In Spencer-Brown’s sense the form holds 
something else, that is, a different – but not better – quality altogether, for the observer on 
second order than what it does for the first order observer. The crucial difference is that a 
second order observation has access to both sides of the distinction, whereas a first order 
observation only can handle one side at a time. Between these two sides there is a boundary, 
from which the distinction emerges. The first order observation cannot see the form it 
establishes through its boundary and how it thereby splits up the world in two sides. As an 
analytical tool, the form analysis is therefore designed to get a sense of how a boundary is 
drawing up one side of the distinction from the other. It is, as such, a tool that can generate a 
genuine curiosity and fruitful “un-knowingness” in the further investigations of empirical 
phenomena because it is geared towards the thresholds of meaning in communication, 
through an assessment of how boundaries are fixated, in such a way that it make things 
appear natural and obvious to us; money, intimacy, education, trust, algorithms and 
everything else that makes itself known in society. The analysis of their form is intended to 
disturb their ontology.  
Once a form has established itself, there are few restrictions on what kind of objects that can 
be formed in its mode of communication. A wide range of relationships can be taken up and 
assessed in the code of payment/ non-payment, between an employer and employee, between 
family members or between the state and its citizens. The form is not confined to a specific 
domain of society but can actualize itself and often provoke irritations across different parts 
of society. Elena Esposito has shown how fashion, for instance, emerged as a communicative 
form in the late Middle Ages, causing shock and disbelief, because it turned the whole social 
reality, from customs of faith and clothing to family, into an imperative of contingency 
(Esposito 2004b; Esposito 2011b). Fashion communication appears eventually in treatises of 
theology and natural history, it links seemingly unconnected discussions of poetry and eating 
habits and serves above all to recast old certainties in light of a new temporalization; when 
God could be viewed as fashionable, he could just as easily become old-fashioned. As such, 
the form can set in motion vast communicative resources, because it has “an open reference 
to the world” (Luhmann 1999: 17).  
The form analysis asks how communication is paradoxical, when both of its sides is taken 
into consideration. Think of a political leader standing in front of a party congress, which 
seeks to invoke her own loyalty to the party. A difference between loyalty and disloyalty is 
established and the congregation to whom the appeal is made, is told that any suspicion of a 
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disloyal behavior is unwarranted. However, only someone who is perceived as disloyal can 
be summoned, by herself or others, to act and behave in accordance with a code of loyalty, 
otherwise no appeals to loyalty would have to be made in the first place. A form therefore 
contains a paradox, since it unifies the difference from which the communication emerges to 
begin with. All communication is invested with such paradoxes. Going shopping involves 
transactions formed as the unity between payment and non-payment and a prayer to the gods 
is oriented towards the difference between immanence and transcendence. The 
communication cannot, as already mentioned, perceive how it perceives as it perceives and 
has therefore no immediate access to its own paradox. The law cannot not judge whether the 
distinction between right and not right itself is a rightful distinction and science cannot decide 
whether the difference between true and false itself ultimately is true or false.  
On the other side, a form has the capacity to handle its own distinction by re-entering its own 
difference into itself. During the cold war, for instance, the difference between peace and war 
re-enters the distinction, so that the gearing towards a possible “war”, in the form of nuclear 
arms race and military advancement, simultaneously appears as a condition for “peace”: 
     peace ┐war 
       peace ┐war 
When looking into the form of a communication we examine the constitutive conditions of 
the communication itself, or as Luhmann phrases it, “the condition of possibility of 
operation” (Luhmann 1999: 17). To confront a communicative form analytically, therefore 
means to look into how the unity of a differentiating operation is possible as a paradox. I am 
thus concerned with how social reality appears, when it unfolds as illness. As a starting point, 
I ask how this form brings together the two sides, which makes the communication possible? 







The second analytical strategy: Semantics 
The starting point of this thesis is, as already mentioned, positioned epistemologically by an 
interest in the present. As a tool for a historical sociological enquiry, the semantic analysis 
enables us to reach “into” history from a specific perspective. This is decisive. It implies that 
the historical account guided by the semantic analysis is motivated by a problematic, an 
irritation, found in the “order of things” as they appear for now. The history that I aim to 
reconstruct bears with it this irritation as a precondition, from which it hopefully will enable 
us to shed a different light on the present moment. I emphasize reconstruct because of this 
reason exactly; it is written backwards, starting off from a sociologically informed 
problematization of a contemporary situation. It is a history constructed recursively from the 
present. Hence, it is not a history that in anyway represents itself as history, but a history 
guided by a present-day “twitch”, unfolded through the lens of systems theory. Of this 
follows also that there are no “ready-made” histories out there, only waiting for their dust to 
come off and to be put into a book; the historical material itself does not in itself narrate a 
specific historical account. On the contrary, the material is gathered and arranged into an 
archive with an eye on the specific requirements of an analysis, that seeks to detect, among 
other things, the interplay between the points of continuity and discontinuity in an evolving 
semantics. Certain sources will obviously be favored above others and only a specific part of 
these sources’ various and manifold semantic register will systematically be traced and 
“mapped”, while numerous others will be left un-shadowed for now. What these sources 
consist of and how they have been selected will be elaborated in closer detail, but the point is 
that this archive only can emerge as an archive once a strategic rehearsal has been made, 
considering how a sociological problem of the present can be handled by way of historical 
inquiry.  
However, while the material of this archive is gathered with the purpose of constructing a 
specific analytical account of a period ranging over a century and a half, the material itself 
would obviously also be tinted in other colors had, for instance, Bourdieu’s concept of a 
historical sociology been applied to it, or a Marxist framework. In other words, the same 
material would produce completely different accounts, possibly another history altogether, 
had other analytical entries been deployed. When a semantic analytical strategy is favored in 
this context, it is closely related to the already stated epistemological purpose of this thesis, 
which is to provide another perspective on the self-assuring causalities and connections 
between pathology and employment within organizations today. In other words, the problem 
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of this thesis cannot be described with and through the same problems in which the field co-
currently describes itself. Such an account would merely add another layer to and possibly 
reinforce the self-description of the organizations that, for the time being, calls upon various 
forms of self-intervention to improve and restore the health and wellbeing among its 
members. Furthermore, the semantic analysis (alongside the form analysis) is also mobilized 
in order to avoid motivating the analysis with an external variable, for instance by pointing 
out scarcity of time, “blurred boundaries”, “work-life balance”, gender or technology as the 
key explanatory scheme, in which “stress” and other work-related ailments often find their 
clarification today. As already mentioned, such perspectives can easily miss “the thing in 
itself” and instead end up narrating a history of a gradual deterioration, observed from an 
immobile critical position on working life, technological “colonization” and so forth. Our 
analytical point of departure cannot, then, “treat discourse as document, as a sign of 
something else, as an element that ought to be transparent, but whose unfortunate opacity 
must often be pierced if one is to reach at last the depth of the essential in the place in which 
it is held in reserve; it is concerned with discourse in its own volume, as a monument. It is not 
an interpretive discipline: it does not seek another, better-hidden discourse. It refuses to be 
“allegorical”” (Foucault 2010: 138-139). Lastly, these problems can neither be explained 
“instrumentally”, for instance by pointing at the arrival of psychologists in occupational 
health promotion and “human resource” in working life -  that is obviously a symptom of a 
development, but it cannot help us explain it. Instead of trying to detect, underneath 
seemingly different regulations, strategies, conducts or everyday practices, a shadowy matrix 
from which everything is really connected and arranged (such as the interests held of neo-
liberal capitalism), the problematization itself must be turned into an object of investigation. 
The semantic analysis seeks to expand the attention towards the specificity and particular 
development of a problem - in this case illness -  by centering in on the struggles and disputes 
that lies prior to its current actuality. 
A semantic history is therefore also a strategic position, on how to avoid troubling the 
analysis with problems of first order, such as how and why some employees experience 
illness or how this more efficiently can be prevented. Instead, I will seek to gear the analysis 
towards the problem of how a certain concept such as illness attains its very character of 
problem and how the problem historically develops within organizations. How has the notion 
of health and pathology arrived at its current stage of “intervention-distinctions”, in the form 
of psychologized measures, prevention and treatment (Moe 1998)? How are some forms of 
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illness made into a problem for organizations to begin with? Why have, for instance, the idea 
of personality and individual perception for long periods been ignored in these 
problematizations, just to become an invaluable “asset” for the organizations as well as the 
individual employee, in the current working life?  
I cannot, to begin with, know how the employee, the self and illness is interlinked and must 
therefore historicize the development that today make these different variables appear 
“naturally” possessed by the same coherent problem. Who and what the employee is or what 
illness and health is, can therefore not be derived from any external criteria, but is a part of 
the analysis itself. Furthermore, communication systems, such as the organizations that 
observe their own relation to their employees or the state that intervenes in order to handle 
“social problems”, have a massive pool of semantics available for use and choose extremely 
selectively from this reservoir. What on the surface might seem as “buzz-words” or passing 
“fads” in the public sector or in working life, are therefore rarely only a stroke of pure 
chance, but constitute communicative events that are connected to previous communication. 
From a second order perspective, this makes it all the more thrilling to ask why one form of 
semantics is highlighted above others. 
Semantics is by Luhmann described as the “condensed modes of expression in language such 
as names or terms, sayings, situational definitions and formulas, proverbs and tales for 
saving communication worth preserving for reuse” (Luhmann 2013a: 32). Three dimensions 
of meaning can be appointed in these “condensed modes”: 
The factual dimension: The unity of inside and outside. The economy, for instance, conceives 
of the world in its relevance of transaction and nothing else. It arranges a relation between a 
social client and the state, or an employee and employer as purely conceivable in economic 
terms.  
The time dimension: The unity of past and future. The present is situated between a past 
already gone and a future that can never be reached. A budget forecasts a present economic 
perspective into the future, establishing a horizon of expectations which an organization can 
gear itself towards but never finally arrive at (by the end of the “budget-period”, the future 
has become something else). Another example could be social clients that are sent off to 
courses in order to improve their “employability”, in which their client-status is temporalized 
as a temporary status on the condition of the client’s gradual self-insight and skills. 
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The social dimension: The unity of ego and alter. The question is how utterances, in which 
“they” appear is understood by “us”? Sociality revolves around how identities are constructed 
by distinguishing “us” from “them”, such as criminal/ law abiding, mad/ sane or employer/ 
employee.  
Luhmann points out that the “meaning dimensions are asymmtrized from the start. What is 
distinguished cannot be exchanged. Inside is never outside, before is never after, ego is never 
alter, although the next observation to come (but only through the expenditure of time) can 
shift the distinction so that what had earlier been inside is now outside, and so on” (Luhmann 
2013a: 340). I will, in the next pages, describe how such shifts and alternations systematically 
can be grasped with the help of Reinhart Koselleck’s concept of the concept.  
 
The concept of concepts 
Just as no form of “history” can write itself, neither can a concept appear detached from its 
emergence and various stages of development, if we are to make it into the object of a 
semantic analysis. In other words, the enactment of conceptualizing a phenomenon, like 
“law”, “childhood”, “climate” or “sociology”, demands a careful historicizing that can allow 
us to map the trajectory of its current position. A concept has a particular status in the 
semantic analysis, as the principal point of reference in a historical account.  
To begin with, one might ask what exactly distinguishes a concept from all those other 
sayings, names or formulas underpinning a semantics? To answer that I will say a few words 
on what a concept is not. A concept is not equivalent with a word, a statement or a topic. This 
implies that there are different levels of “conceptuality” in concepts, but also that there are 
only certain modes of observation that be fit into an analysis of conceptualization. The word 
“bottle”, for instance, or the word “alcohol”, designates easily identifiable entities that are not 
levied with any form of internal contradiction and disturbance. They possess therefore no 
conceptuality. Our society does not contain any struggles concerning what a bottle or what 
alcohol is. The word “consumer”, however, can be ascribed to a number of heterogeneous 
meanings, for instance the “political consumer”, “anti-consumerism”, “consumer society” or 
“consumer policy”. The consumer can be linked to the emergence of a key audience in the 
economic system, invoking the central point of reference in sectioned markets (whether it is 
the military industry, families or institutions for elderly care), made visible through strategies 
of branding and advertisement etc. The consumer holds a history, it is made into an object of 
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strategizing, it allows for companies to perceive of their future and gear themselves towards 
competition. In other words, the consumer appears as a concept when we start to consider the 
variety behind its immediate presence. Of this follows also that a concept never holds its own 
singular representation above time and space, in which case a historical account of its 
emergence and development would be superfluous. The concept of reform has another 
content today than what it did in the era of Reformation, but what exactly the concept of 
reform entails will also today be a source of dispute, contestation and struggle. A concept is 
heterogenous, its meaning can never be unambiguously fixed, but remains open to struggles 
that exactly revolves around its fixation. One can, for instance, just think of how concepts 
like “discrimination” or “culture” are highlighted in political debates today. Their manifold 
potential of interpretation is what gives concepts their character of conceptuality and it is this 
that allows us to investigate how they are political and historical objects. Their defining 
feature is how they always-already slip away from all efforts of definition.  
The primary distinction in a semantic analysis is that between concept and meaning 
(Andersen 2006: 31). When we formalize this distinction by way of Spencer-Browns logic of 
form, it appears accordingly:  
concept ˥ meaning 
We have drawn a distinction! For our purpose, that is the semantic analysis, we must indicate 
the concept rather than the meaning of its content, which means that for such an analysis to 
get going, we must loosen ourselves from all presumptions of any grounded ontological 
linkages between the concept and its meaning. A concept such as “elite”, for instance, cannot 
be examined by any predefined criteria, but only according to the ways in which it is made 
into a source of political dispute, self-assessment, ridicule, critique etc. There is, as such, a 
number of competing and incommensurable meanings attached to the concept, but it is not 
possible to arrive at a conclusion as to who the elite actually is composed of or how their 
influence can be assessed when we ask into its conceptual status and history. Instead, the 
semantic analysis takes one step back and asks what is observed when a concept such as elite 
is attached to a specific group or segment in society? As with most other concepts, the variety 
of the concept of elite will become clearer if one considers the other side of the distinction, its 
counter-concept. The same relation can acquire vastly different meanings depending on its 
conceptualization. Is the elite opposed to “people”, the “working class” or the “uneducated 
masses”? What is at stake in such a variety is the relation between the singularity and 
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generality of concepts (Koselleck 2004: 75-92). The same relation can be conceptualized in 
very different ways, so that “passive recipient” and “job-seeker” both can point towards the 
status of the unemployed, albeit in contradiction. A group can in this process make claims to 
the generality of a concept, so that it becomes singularized and thus exclusively valid for that 
group. One example is how a state becomes singularly linked to its citizens, demarcated 
through national borders and citizenship or how “green” parties seek to take primacy in 
addressing environmental issues. It is, however, not possible for a singularity of meaning to 
obtain absolute possession of a concept. There is always a possibility for another 
actualization of its content, for instance if a traditional leftist party succeeds in advancing 
environmentalism as a question of redistribution of resources. On the other side, the singular 
can also be advanced as generality. One can think of how the European Union seeks to 
associate itself with a diverse notion of “Europe” or how different indigenous groups across 
the world join forces to politically advance the question of indigenousness as a universal 
claim. Nevertheless, the relation between the two sides of a concept, that is, the concept and 
its counter-concept, is necessarily conditioned by an “asymmetric opposition” (Koselleck 
2004: 156). The relation between concepts and counter-concepts are asymmetric because 
others are excluded by the definition of oneself. No concepts are immune against such 
tensions, one could, for instance, think of how a concept like “humanity” is invoked when 
people, due to “human considerations”, are sentenced to jail or capital punishment. The 
asymmetric structure between concepts and counter-concepts can be formalized as such:  
singular ˥ general 
As indicated previously, the meaning of a concept will to varying degrees evolve over time. 
Not all concepts are invested with the same level of intensity in terms of change and inner 
tension. The concept of madness is one example of a concept that for a period of many 
hundred years did not attract any significant attention, until it quite suddenly becomes a 
problem of intense scrutiny during the Enlightenment (Foucault 2006). This is a crucial part 
of analyzing “societal problems” from a second order perspective; the interest in a concept 
often sets off when it currently seem to be in some form of transition or rupture, which again 
can lead us to uncover the historically “hidden” debates and “buried knowledge” behind the 
present actuality of a concept. Among the concepts Koselleck investigated himself, was that 
of revolution. The history of the concept of revolution cannot be studied as a sort of general 
social mechanism, for example by looking into instances of rebellions and uproar against 
established orders across the centuries, because such an account would be charged from the 
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onset with a specific meaning acquiring a predetermination of the historical concept of 
“revolution”3.  We would, accordingly, not get a grip on its conceptuality as a concept. 
Koselleck shows how the concept of revolution initially designates a mechanical notion of 
circularity, in the form of a recurrent cycle of movements back and forth from an initial 
position. This meaning is eventually lost in the latter part of the eighteenth century, for a 
concept which is now familiar to us, invoking the event of an abrupt break and a following 
transformation, often in the form of forecasts of a political or social development, in which 
the concept becomes a political factor itself (Koselleck 2004: 43-57). In order to clarify the 
conceptuality of “revolution”, one has to take into account both its previous content and its 
current position as well as the interplay between its singularity and generality, if one is to 
avoid privileging one meaning above the other. These variables make out what Koselleck 
describes as the diachronic and synchronic features of the conceptual history.  
The diachronic feature attends the question of how meaning is condensed into a concept, in 
such a way that “revolution” at one point in time can signify circularity and abrupt break at 
another point. The diachronic questions are centered on: How is a concept sought to attain a 
singular content and thereby make exclusive claims to generality? How does the concept 
convey a heterogeneity of meanings struggling to possess it? How is meaning condensed into 
the concept?  
The analysis of the diachronic features is thoroughly interlaced with the synchronic features. 
The synchronic feature is concerned with how a concept inscribes itself in a semantic field. 
The concept of democracy, for instance, cannot be properly analyzed without considering 
how that concept is connected to other concepts and situated within a network of 
enunciations, procedures, and regulations, such as election, representation, legitimacy, 
majority rule, debate, parliament and so forth. The synchronic question is centered on how 
such a semantic field emerges as a difference between concept and counter-concept and asks: 
How is the relation between a concept and its counter-concept established? How is the 
asymmetric structure continued or displaced?  
                                                          
3 The same goes for stress as a topic that invites to pre-determined assumptions. One could, for instance, reach out for the protestant 
conception of time-waste as a deadly sin, pointed out by Max Weber, and from thereon formulate a critical assessment of culturally 
informed attitudes and habits that leads to the stressful condition of modern society (Weber 1995: 102-105). Another option could be to look 
for corresponding analogies throughout different periods of time and begin with the ancient Greek conception of crisis, which referred to the 
ability to act under the constraints of time-pressure (Koselleck 2002: 244). However, the “source” of the problem would then already be 




Throughout the semantic analysis, I therefore investigate how different forms of meaning 
have been condensed into the concept of “illness”, as it appears in the field of occupational 
health promotion. How come, for instance, does organizations start to concern themselves 
with the well-being of their employees rather than just merely preventing injuries from 
happening and diseases to develop? How does the “inner life” of employees start to emerge 
as a strategic asset for organizations trying to diagnose and treat their illness? In the semantic 
analysis, I will deal with these questions by, as mentioned above, looking into how the 
counter-concepts to illness vary and change and how different meanings struggle to possess 
its conceptualization.  
A second semantic analysis will follow from the first. From this point on, I will return to the 
initial problem of this thesis, which concerns the problematization of stress. This analytical 
part therefore adds a layer to the preceding semantic analysis, by specifically looking at one 
“health issue” among a number of others that also occupy the whole area of “occupational 
health”. I will mainly trace a figure that seems to be underlying the stressful individual, that 
is, a self opposed to itself. This second analysis will introduce a genealogical element into the 
semantic strategy by tracing the history of the subjectivity of the stressful individual. 
Genealogy is oriented towards the “rediscovery of struggles and raw memory of fights” 
(Foucault 2003a: 8).  
The analysis switches its attention from a concept-problem to a problem of subjectivity, in 
order to identify the lines of continuity and rupture that hosts the “self-opposed self” found in 
the stressful subject. This point of departure has certain consequences for how and what kind 
of sources that are actualized, because we are not dealing with a chronologically assessable 
problem, but with a problem of how certain discursive elements are transformed, whereby a 
practice can repeat and re-address itself across different realms. Foucault himself, for 
instance, pointed towards how examination allows for a disciplinary gaze which is repeated 
and re-actualized across the hospital, the school and the court (Foucault 1995: 184-194). 
Foucault’s point is not to detect direct causalities in the affinity between the examination at 
the school and the court, but to detect how one several elements are re-grouped from one (or 
several) realm to another, invoking a practice such as the examination as a necessary and self-
assuring conduct in the assessment of patients, pupils or witnesses. The purpose with the 
detection of such repetitions is not to reaffirm or impose new notions of progression that can 
break with the old: “Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken 
continuity; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it 
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continues secretly to animate the present, having predetermined form on all its vicissitudes” 
(Foucault 1991a: 8). Rather, this analysis is centered on identifying and following the 
dispersion of a certain gaze, a mechanism or a conduct and the elements that are joined, 
separated or re-joined throughout its lineage and descent.  
With this in mind I will move the point of observation from a conceptualization (in 
occupational health) to a problematization of a self-relationship, guided by a systematic 
tracing of the “problem of stress”. The point is to situate the “stress symptom”, not primarily 
as a concept, but along the axis of “problematization”: “how and why certain things 
(behavior, phenomena, processes) became a problem (…) how and why were very different 
things in the world gathered together, characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, 
“mental illness”? What are the elements that are relevant for a given “problematization”?” 
(Foucault 2001: 171). 
We can therefore summarize the semantic analysis thus (Andersen 1999): 
 
Problem:  Point of observation: Strategy:  Guiding difference: 
Concept (illness) Occupational Health Concept Concept/ counter-concept 
Subjectivity 
(stress)  













Third analytical strategy: coupling analysis 
The coupling analysis is guided by the difference between coupling and differentiation in 
communication (Andersen 2006: 42). This analytical strategy proceeds from a specific 
condition of communication systems, namely their operational closure and functional 
differentiation. I will therefore give a brief introduction to the functional differentiation of 
communication systems, before I move ahead to elaborate the strategic position of a coupling 
analysis.  
The systems theory formulated by Luhmann offers its own take on modernity, linking its key 
feature to the functional differentiation of different systems across society, such as art, 
pedagogy and law. In this account, there is no unity holding society together above its 
differences, such as “solidarity” or “integration”; there is no “glue” enabling society to persist 
despite of its injustice or suppression. Society simply is and has no manifest or latent 
purpose. Whereas Marxist accounts often assumes the difference in possession between 
groups as a defining feature of society, systems theory proposes that modern society can be 
assessed according to the unity of its functional differentiation, that is, a society assumed to 
contain a multiplicity of system-environment differences structurally reproducing themselves 
as differences. Therefore, instead of trying to locate a generalized mechanism of modern 
society in one place, in the way “class” typically denotes economy, functional differentiation 
designates a situation in which differently coded fields – systems - can co-exist independently 
of each other, with no rank or dominance between them. Systems can emerge as functionally 
differentiated exactly because there is no overreaching pyramidical order in society, that can 
allow for directives from above. Phrased differently, economy, love, art, politics, education, 
law and science are all systems unfolding non-coercively of both each other and society as a 
whole, since there is no centralized societal agency that can overrule and take charge of its 
different parts.  
Even though economy and politics often, within social sciences, are being privileged as the 
steering “engines” of change in modern society, the differentiation of systems entail a de-
centering of such assumed unities. Although the political system, for instance, allocates 
means to and thereby regulates a number of different societal institutions like the school or 
elderly care, it does not enable a political control of the direction of society. The political 
system continuously makes collectively binding decisions, in the form of laws and 
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regulations, concerning priorities of elderly care and schooling, but it does not itself take care 
of the elderly, educate schoolchildren or, for that matter, reduce the number of fatal accidents 
in traffic. The political system is cut off from intervening in its environment and relies on 
governing via other systems’ self-governance. On a practical level, this is often dealt with by 
way of proposing general guidelines to which schools or centers of elderly care are held 
responsible, rather than formulating direct orders that welfare institutions must comply to 
(Cour 2014: 109-111). Neither money, power, desire nor law hold exclusive access to 
society’s change and stabilization, just as no center or periphery can be pointed out for the 
whole of society. Each function system is simply at the center of itself, implying that society 
hosts a range of varying meanings across different systems, of which no one possesses an 
ultimate key. Briefly summarized one could say that the meaning of social reality is 
ultimately unstable, due to lack of a center from which society can observe itself.  
Accordingly, the functions of pedagogy, economy, law, politics etc. cannot be generalized to 
other parts of society; science does not have to obey the rules of the market in order to 
accomplish its research – even though it needs funding; medicine performs its treatment 
independently of political differences on which groups that are to benefit from health 
services; art can maintain its shock and innovation without any regard to the pedagogical 
implementation of its works in museums or art history books. A system can ignore the vast 
number of demands and challenges that is produced among other systems elsewhere in 
society, because it is able to distinguish itself as a system set apart from other systems; 
systems consequently observe their environment on the basis of their own operations and not 
anyone else’s. They are, as such, operationally closed. This does not mean that a system like 
economy only can perceive economy, but that economy only can perceive economically, in 
the form of an economic code, fleshing out a world consisting of either payment or non-
payment. For instance, a crucial aesthetic event in the system of arts cannot send shock waves 
to or alter the economy, but will, in an art market, be observed as a potential investment, 
assessed according to possible profit or loss. The court can likewise forbid a research project 
to continue if it breaches the law, but it does not concern itself with whether the scientific 
output lacks references to crucial works in the field of its topic or depends on outmoded 
theoretical models. The binary logic of the political communication system, between 
government and opposition, is distinct from the scientific communication system, whose 
difference is constituted through true/ false, or the religious system, which maintains itself 
through the distinction between immanence and transcendence and so forth. These two-sided 
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codes restrain the criteria of observation in such a way that it enables systems to strictly 
supply themselves with their own meaning when observing their environment. The 
consequence is, however, that they cannot adapt to or acquire the meaning produced in other 
systems.  




generalized media  
Code 
Law Abiding law Right/ not right 
Pedagogy The child Learning/ not learning 
Science Truth Truth/ false 
Art The work of art Art/ not art 
Politics Power  Government/ opposition 
Religion Passion  Love/ not love 
Economy Money Payment/ not payment 
Religion Belief Immanence/ transcendence  
Health  Treatment Healthy/ sick 
Mass media Information Information/ not information  
 
Just like human beings are unable to communicate with each other, so are communication 
systems. The reason is, as already stated, that there is no “meta-level” available in society, 
wherein communication systems can offer their multilateral perspectives and reach some 
form of “common ground”. The question is, if communication between systems is 
impossible, because this would cancel out the differences between them and thereby set off 
their collapse, how are they then able to notice each other? This is where structural coupling 
comes in. Communicative systems cannot understand one another but are geared towards a 
misunderstanding of each other’s communication. There is always an element of dissonance 
when systems perceive other systems. Misunderstanding refers in this case to how systems 
consequently interpret and understand their environments on the basis of their own codes, so 
that different forms of meaning can be extracted from the same event, like the “divorce” 
mentioned previously. Structural coupling designates the situation in which a system 
observes and lets itself be irritated by another system, when it becomes faced with a problem 
posed externally that must be dealt with as an internal problem. One example could be when 
a political communication system imposes increased taxes on flights in order to reduce the 
emissions of CO2. The economic communication system responds by hiring in flight staff 
from a country with lower wages, in order to keep the prices on a “competitive” level. The 
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political decision to intervene is perceived, in the economic system, as a market obstacle 
requiring economic adjustments; it does not adapt to the political codification of the problem 
yet cannot ignore it and proceeds to handle it economically (Borch 2011). In this way, 
structural couplings enable a continuous stream of disturbance and irritations between 
systems in society, to which they have to adjust themselves. It should be noted that structural 
couplings always happen internally, as the result of an actualization of a difference between 
the internal system (self-reference) and the external environment (other-reference), which has 
been provoked externally. The irritations conscripted from this dynamic between systems is 
an ongoing “translation” of other-references into self-references, on the condition of systems 
that are mutually excluded from understanding and intervening into each other: “In any case, 
the environment gains influence over the structural development of systems only under the 
condition of structural couplings and only within the framework of the possibility of self-
irritation they channel and accumulate” (Luhmann 2012: 67). Accordingly, structural 
coupling does not imply systems who provide each other with meaning, but with constant 
uneasiness.  
Against this backdrop, the coupling analysis is oriented towards the relational character 
between systems that are drawn to each other by way of mutual irritation. The point of 
departure is, from a systems theoretical position, the question of how systems, unable to share 
a “common ground”, relate to each other? How do couplings with other systems emerge, 
given their own closure? How this happens are always empirical questions, which cannot be 
provided from the “desktop”. Structural couplings must be observed in their momentarily 
specificity, because couplings between, for instance, science and politics – seen in programs 
of “evidence-based policies” or when statistical prognosis is used to support prioritizations of 
welfare – is different in its relational character from structural couplings between law and 
politics or religion and health etc. Theory itself does not grant us with any answers to their 
specificity, but it grants us with a specific attention towards how the relations empirically are 
folded out, enabling us to follow the concreteness of their relation.  
The coupling analysis, as with the other analytical strategies, is prompted by a “twitch”, in 
this case a puzzlement of how stress, as mentioned previously, both can appear as a 
“pathology” and a resource? How are different communication systems coupled in the 





The expressions, themes, sayings or words that are used to perceive and express the variety of 
experiences in the world, are not simply identical with the experience as such (Koselleck 
1989: 311—312). Words in themselves does not contain realities, the language used to 
express grief is not the same as the experience of this grief (the shortcomings of which is a 
common denominator and theme in the literature dealing with experiences of loss and 
atonement). When venturing into a historical account based on semantics or when 
contemporary “cases” are assessed, it also involves taking an epistemological position 
concerning how and what kind of knowledge it is possible to retrieve from the reality of 
written sources and the world at large. The cases are not cases in themselves but appear as 
such once they are invoked as objects in an analysis. The same goes, obviously, also for the 
sources that appear as “historical material” – they become “historical” at the moment when 
they are pointed out as a part of an archive.  
This means, among other things, that the various sources making up the archive of this study, 
ranging from sanatorium reports to self-help literature and human resource-strategies, do not 
themselves possess or grant us with a privileged reality, that can explain and reveal to us how 
things actually were. Neither can they disclose, for instance, the hidden mechanisms of an 
economic order of our present or a previous era. The texts are simply read as expressions of a 
semantics, that evolves and attains a variety of temporal, factual and social meanings as it 
evolves. The criteria of observation that has been described in the semantic strategy is what 
enables us to detect how this development comes about, but not why. Such a strategy poses 
certain requirements on what kind of historization that can be tapped from a problem such as 
“occupational health” and the concept of “illness”.  
For example, there are traces of various other histories in the semantic analysis. Another 
history could have been written taking its cue from the struggles between different 
professions seeking to define the “health” and “illness” of workers. Such a history would, 
however, terminate the observation of organization’s observations of employees and instead 
become an account of the contradictory interests held between, for instance, actors in the 
realm of medicine opposed to psychology. The professions are not insignificant but here I 
will only be concerned with them to the extent that the semantics they offer are made relevant 
by organizations themselves, to describe and handle the problem of health and illness among 
employees. The semantic struggles found across the field of “occupational health promotion” 
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are not corresponding with the self-descriptions of the various professions struggling to 
define the same subject matter in contradictory ways. Again, we must turn to the accuracy 
afforded by a semantic analysis, by considering what the point of observation is 
(“occupational health”) and how we can observe it (on second order): One cannot, before the 
analysis get going, decide where exactly the tension of a concept is located or to which 
counter-concepts it is attached. The whole point is to question the axioms wherein the 
problem of illness and health attains its obviousness and immobility today.   
The semantic strategy points, as already mentioned, towards two semantic analyses. The first 
will be centered on the concept of illness/ health found in occupational health promotion from 
1920 until today. At the beginning of this period, “occupational health promotion” or 
“occupational health” does not in any regard designate a set of institutions or a given field 
and are not even terms in common use. When I refer to “occupational health” I do it with an 
intentional anachronism and simply mean the sum of thematizations, whereby organizations 
actualize illness and health at work. A total of 390 articles make out the archive of this study. 
They are mainly gathered mainly from two sorts of journals, management journals and 
occupational health journals, the latter of which is also a form of management journal. In 
addition, I have also included approximately 30 books on the topic, also spanning from the 
1920’s onwards.  Even though I look largely at Norwegian journals and in a few instances 
Scandinavian, the semantics has an international orientation throughout the whole period, 
where a considerable number of articles originally published in English or German are 
translated into Norwegian or other Scandinavian languages.  
Most of these journals have a life-span that is markedly shorter than the hundred-year period 
made into the object of investigation here. Various journals are at the center of debate at 
different points in time and the semantic analysis follows the semantic struggles themselves, 
as they are unfolded in their concreteness, and not the constancy of other, external variables, 
such as that of specific journals (which would easily meet a dead end once the journal ceases 
to exist). In 1920, for instance, there are no journals exclusively dealing with “occupational 
health”; it is mostly debated in the traditional management journals, such as “Management” 
(Ledelse). During the middle of the 1930’s, however, a whole new journal genre emerges, 
dealing with “health” as both a vitalist imperative and management issue (among these are 
“Life and Health” (Liv og Helse). In this concrete example, these new journals can perhaps 
be seen as an indication of a semantics that is in some form of transition, but that must 
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obviously be investigated semantically and cannot be decided causally (“new journals appear, 
hence a new semantics also appears”).  
The continuous selection of sources to this study has followed what is sometimes referred to 
as the “snowball-method”, in which the sources are tracked down according to how they 
point towards other sources. When I find, for instance, a debate on “the humanness” of 
employees emerging in the material, I look at the themes and conflicts that are continued or 
left to lie follow during this debates’ rise and aftermath. In this case, it turned out that this 
debate was a crucial event and I continue its mapping by, among other things, taking a closer 
look at both the implied “enemies” and advocates of this newfound humanness. When I have 
found that certain articles become very relevant to the field of health and occupation, I have 
chosen to systematically review the complete editions of the journal. Among these journals 
are Management (Ledelse), The Employer (Arbeidsgiveren), Occupational Management and 
Technology (Arbeidsledelse og Teknikk), Life and Health (Liv og Helse), Life and 
Healthiness (Liv og Sundhet), The Daily Manager (Arbeidslederen), Protection and Welfare 
(Vern og Velferd), Staff and Management (Personal og Ledelse) and Working Environment 
(Arbeidsmiljø).  
I have chosen to deal with texts that in different ways point towards a practice, in the form of 
problems that should be acted upon; texts that reflect how illness and health is made into a 
question of long-term planning and strategy or an object of “uneasiness”; evaluated, re-
assessed, deliberately ignored, etc.; how illness is prevented, mapped and requires treatment; 
how health is sought improved and so forth. It does not follow of this, however, that I thereby 
can acquire access to the history of practices as such, because it remains unknown how this 
semantics has been translated into practice.  
The second semantic analysis sets off from the preceding semantic analysis by tracing the 
“problem of stress”. This introduces several other sources that are far beyond the 
management journals underpinning the first semantic analysis. Three linages will be 
investigated; a) the concept of neurasthenia emerging in medicine in the 1880’s, b) a branch 
of physiological research starting to appear in the 1910’s and c) the self-help literature on 
stress established and developed from the 1970’s onwards. In line with the analytical strategy 
of genealogy, these different realms are not considered to eventually cluster into a united 
wholeness, they do not represent a direct line of succession or a progressive series of events 
that orchestrate the singular coherency of our present. Instead, they all host and re-address 
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certain elements that point towards the subjectivity and management of stress. The sources 
consist of a) medical literature and sanatorium reports on neurasthenia from 1880-1914, b) 
physiological research on the concepts of homeostasis and stress from 1915-1980, and c) 
Scandinavian and international self-help literature from 1970-present. The sources are 
actualized according to their thematization of a self-relationship - which will be explicated 
once we reach so far – and are, as the entirety of the semantic analysis, understood as 
monuments in a development of a problem and not as documents of the past.  
In addition, I also make considerable use other sources, most notably cases, observation and 









Health and the form of illness 
In the following pages, I will outline the form of illness. The aim is, as already stated, to pin 
out a sociological inquiry that is detached from the conception of health and illness found, for 
instance, in health care, medicine or psychology, and thereby provide a framework that can 
enable a further analytical accuracy unfettered by the commonplace notions of health and 
illness that we all share to greater or lesser extents in our daily lives.  
The form analysis is concerned with how the world appears, when it is folded into a 
communicative form and ask, as a starting point, how this form brings together the two sides, 
which makes the communication possible. How does illness distinguish one side from 
another?  
 
Health and non-illness 
Before I move on this question, I will say a few words on why illness and not health is made 
into the point of departure here. Three aspects will shortly be entertained, before I turn to the 
form of illness. 1. Health as a concept that cannot be conditioned on its own terms, but serves 
to negate the appearance of illness. 2. The binary code of medical communication found in 
the differentiation between ill and well. 3. Illness as devoid of any specific content, which is 
successively ascribed its meaning through procedures of assessment, diagnose, treatment and 
so forth.  
 In a letter to his brother, Thomas Mann states that “the problem of what “health” is, is not a 
simple problem” (Mann 1987 [1918]: 314). Mann’s postulation very accurately points 
towards the endless grapples, which can be detected from the emergence of modern medicine 
to present day health care, with the efforts to afford “health” a positive gist. Perhaps Mann’s 
novel, The Magic Mountain, can be said to entertain this not-so-simple problem, approached 
from the sanatorium and its manifold intersections between life and death. The protagonist, 
Hans Castorp, arrives there for a visit to see his cousin, but is no sooner diagnosed himself 
according to symptoms that host endless possibilities for treatment, yet his illness remains 
conspicuously vague. The sanatorium cannot provide for his health unless something can be 
marked clearly as sickness – the protagonist must be identified as a patient so as for the 
sanatorium to make itself relevant for handling his “condition”. To all fortune, a doctor 
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cannot but notice Hans Castorp’s feebleness and eventually locate a peculiar “spot” in his 
lungs; death is actualized, and treatment can set in (Mann 2014 [1924]).  
The notion of health seems to be slipping away from most attempts to constitute it as a 
problem, and surfaces usually through its own negation, that is, illness. Nevertheless, many 
efforts have been made to find a solution to how health can be explicated as a paradigm on its 
own terms. Claude Bernhard, among the originators of physiology, sought to expound the 
difference between illness and health as the principle distinction between a physiological and 
medical gaze: “Knowledge of causes of the of the phenomena of life in the normal state, i.e., 
PHYSIOLOGY will teach us to maintain normal conditions of life and conserve HEALTH. 
Knowledge of diseases and their determining causes, i.e., PATHOLOGY, will lead us, on the 
one hand, to prevent the development of morbid conditions, and, on the other, to fight their 
results with medical agents, i.e. to cure the disease” (Bernhard 1957 [1887]: 1-2). However, 
once rules of steadiness and regular “order” are mobilized to assess the body, it is uncertain 
whether “health” or “mechanics” serves as the underlying reference. Already here it becomes 
clear, as Bernhard also points out, that the knowledge of a normal state only can conceive of 
the “normal conditions of life” as long as a deviance of some sort is made present. For 
instance, when a possible symptom of illness appears, such as a swelling or fever, “health” 
typically designates a condition found prior to the arrival of the symptom. Alternatively, 
health can be determined as the possible outcome of a treatment or it can serve to 
differentiate between different degrees of suffering if a patient is faced with the prospect of a 
fatal or permanently ill condition. In other words, “health” tends mostly to take care of the 
purpose of attaining a “before” or “after” the occurrence of an illness and to manifest variety 
and forecasts of treatments of disease. This strong primacy of negation has led Luhmann to 
ascertain the concept of health as “empty” (Luhmann 2008: 20). Health is merely a negative 
reflection strictly derived from the positive appearance of illness, which refutes the efforts to 
condition it on its own terms; illness negates health, but health does not negate illness. For 
this reason, in the absence of disease and deviation, health does not find any proper foothold. 
Luhmann compares the inadequacy of the scheme ill/ healthy to that that of risk/ security. As 
an unmarked side of risk, security does not provide a counter-concept, but merely a taken-for-
granted - and mistaken - assumption of there being a safe alternative to the risk in question. 
One could also compare it to the problems of conditioning “peace” as a positively marked 
phenomenon (as opposed to war), which a lot of peace research tends to run into. In a similar 
fashion, the notion of health can neither acquire a positive emergence nor, for the purpose of 
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this analysis, a sufficient analytical accuracy required to locate the “blind spot” in its 
communicative form, it is simply “form-less”.  
One might seek to contest this position empirically, by pointing towards seemingly “positive” 
practices such as health authorities’ campaigns directed towards the general improvement of 
the population’s “well-being”, typically concerning eating habits, exercise, alcohol 
consumption, sexual conduct and so forth. Or how pregnancy and “reproductive health” in 
health care likewise revolves around governing life as such. The question is, however, what 
“health” looks like when these practices and campaigns devote themselves to health. In all 
these instances, I will claim, “health” simply designates different variations of “non-illness”, 
or phrased differently, health is observed according to potential illnesses, such obesity, heart- 
and lung-diseases, psychic illness or child mortality. Health is thereby made visible via 
patterns of pathological deviances.  
 
A medical code 
Anyone who opens a medical textbook from the 17th century will soon find a number of 
seemingly familiar concepts, attached to connotations that to us seem uncanny or bewildered, 
such as the concepts of cure and treatment, for instance, which at this point still revolves 
around the possibility of a universal remedy, the magic panacea (see for instance Foucault 
2006: 300). Even though the images of disease, the cause of their infliction and required cure 
obviously has undergone a number of substantial changes since the beginning of modern day 
medicine, the modelling trinity of health, illness and treatment can be dated back to antiquity, 
with Hippocrates among the most well-known examples (Hippocrates 2010). Today, the 
enactment of localizing illness to facilitate treatment is a primary function in what Luhmann 
calls the medical system, where “only one distinction for this function of binary coding is 
relevant – sick or well” 4 (Luhmann 2009: 179). In other words, the medical system does not 
respond to criminal offenses, infidelity or the rapid growth of derivatives in the financial 
sector, but only reacts to disease, primarily found in the human body and mind.  
There are, however, seemingly few limits to what can be made into a sick or deviant physical 
condition, behavior or thought pattern. Happiness and depression alike offer possibilities of 
pathologization. Illness just as health can, in continuation of this, be viewed as “empty 
                                                          
4 Translated from German 
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signifiers”, which are successively sought attached to and filled with different forms of 
meaning (Laclau 2007: 36-46). Illness is not a condition that in any regards can convey its 
own meaning. Our bodies, for instance, do not actually communicate illness themselves, no 
matter how counter-intuitive this seems. What makes us feel dizzy or at unease, the strange 
rash or haunting insomnia that eventually takes us to the doctor’s office is not our bodies 
conveying alerts of possible ailments that might require treatment. It is rather a psychic 
system alerting itself based on perceived symptoms, whereby we might or might not choose 
to seek professional consultancy. For the body to be determined ill we rely on procedures of 
assessment and techniques and prospects of treatment, among other things. The body’s point 
of view cannot actually be reached, as to whether it is ill or not, but is determined via the 
stethoscope or thermometer, the progress of the medical treatment, our successive self-
evaluation and so forth. Illness can therefore not be seen as the body mediating signals and 
alarms to its environment. As Luhmann states, “no exchange of cells, no process of digestion, 
no nervous twitches, no intentional actualization of consciousness is communication as 
such”5 (Luhmann 2006: 57-58). When the medical system treats its patients, their bodies and 
minds rather make out the environment of the system, which can irritate and disturb the 
“medical gaze”, for instance, when treatment fails, or the improvement is ambiguous. The 
medical system does not communicate with the body or mind (or vice versa) but is 
nonetheless completely reliant upon having a body or mind “at hand”, which can represent 
the patient and allow for the articulation of symptoms and diagnoses. To this environment 
(the body and mind), however, illness is not a problem; it does not observe itself as ill, its 
irritation in the medical system does not correspond with an irritation in the environment. 
Illness is purely the outcome of symptoms and diagnoses (Luhmann 2013a: 118). Fritz Simon 
describes this followingly: “Distinguishing between sick and nonsick with respect to 
particular corporeal reactions and the constructions of “disease entities” hence is not 
determined biologically but socially. The distinction is a feature of observation (of the 
“map”) but not of the phenomena observed (not of the “landscape”). Moreover, the 
localization of causes for those observed phenomena in a biological, psychic, or social 
system or in one of its environments is a socially determined “punctuation” of the 
corresponding system/ environment interaction” (Simon 1999: 186).  
 
                                                          




Illness as form 
We have, so far, pointed towards the “hollowness” of health as a counter-concept of illness, 
and briefly sketched out a medical code, found in the application of the scheme ill/ healthy. I 
will now go back to the initial question of how illness appears if we take it into account as a 
communicative form itself.  
Leaning on Georges Canguilhem, I propose to examine the form of illness with the help of 
the distinction between pathology (or deviance) and normality. Disease is, as previously 
pointed out, equated with a positive value in the medical system, because it incessantly scans 
for illness rather than health and deviation rather than regularity in the assessment of a 
patient. This relationship (between illness and non-illness) has been described as “parasitic”; 
in order to be observed as ill one always has to display a certain amount of “non-illness” 
(Pelikan 2007: 78). The state of illness therefore always entail a certain requirement to also 
display features of a normal, regular state. A dead body, for instance, cannot be observed as 
ill: death cancels out possibilities of treatment and terminates the difference found between ill 
and not ill (Esposito 1996: 603). However, I think that the “parasitic” quality of this 
relationship can be expounded further, as an elemental tenet of illness itself. Canguilhem has 
outlined how, within disciplines such as biology and physiology, different forms of deviance 
is not only constituted by regularity, but also how this relationship remains unfixed, so that 
deviance can mitigate and even reappear as regularity and regularity can make a similar 
reversal. A well-known example is how masturbation during the 19th century emerges as a 
central problem of deviant sexual practice, assumed to host the causes of a range of severe 
physical ailments, such as loss of sight and heart diseases. A variety of “preventive” measures 
appears in response to this pathology, targeting, among other things, the arrangement of the 
adolescent body while resting in bed at night, wherein the hands at all points must be visible 
and possibly locked to the bed. During the 20th century, the practice of masturbation is 
transferred to a domain of normality, increasingly called upon by psychoanalysts and 
psychologists as a crucial passage of sexual development and self-knowledge (Foucault 
2003b: 237-259). Canguilhem refers to these two axes as the normal and the pathological. He 
writes: “(…) every conception of pathology must be based on prior knowledge of the 
corresponding state, but conversely, the scientific study of pathological cases becomes an 
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indispensable phase in the overall search for the laws of the normal state” (Canguilhem 
1991: 51).  
 If we apply Spencer-Browns calculus of form to Canguilhem, the observation of disease 
appears as the unity of the difference between a deviant pathology and normality. Illness 
then, does not only rely on means of pathologization, but simultaneously also on 
normalization. One cannot exist without the other.  
Illness as form: 
pathology ┐normality 
The question is not so much whether illness observes on the deviant side of the distinction at 
some points in time and at other points observes on the normal side. The question is rather 
how the two sides exist simultaneously.  Illness is indicated when “obesity” is made into a 
problem, concerning threats towards the life expectancy of the population and sequalae’s 
following from this condition. At the same time, it is only able to reach such a problem by 
invoking a pattern of regularity, such as “ideal BMI”, notions of “quality of life”, frequency 
of heart diseases etc. The pathology at once appears where the foundation of a “normal” life 
is threatened and makes it possible to constitute what normality consists of. Illness can thus 
appear only as the boundary between deviance and regularity.  
This distinction can also be continued into realms beyond the “body and mind”, so that a 
wide number of issues and relationships can be assessed in light of deviance/ normality. In 
the ever more common management of “healthy lifestyles” and ardent pathologies (related to   
alcohol consumption, eating habits, exercise, “well-being”), a patient will typically be asked 
to evaluate his or her own possible pathology according to how it effects economy, family 
life, personal relationships, work or self-esteem. With “obesity”, symptoms and diagnoses 
can be continued from the body to the ability to pay bills, ability to take care of the children, 
frequency of sexual intercourse with partner etc. The pathological condition can then be 
localized and indexed within the possibility of living a normal, “healthy” life, in which the 
disease is embattled through a normalizing conduct of “personal relationships”, “economy”, 
sense of ease and so forth.  
However, the distinction between pathology and normality cannot find assurance for this 
distinction outside of itself, it does not have an ultimate reality to which it can attach itself 
42 
 
outside of the boundary it marks. As Luhmann states: “The distinction of normal and 
pathological does not say clearly where the boundaries are to be drawn. The fragility of this 
distinction, its capacity to be transferred into ever new terrains of suspicion, exactly reflects 
the functionally necessary ambivalence of the understanding of reality. Psychiatry itself 
cannot do without a reality somehow guaranteed by the world; otherwise it would have to 
cease its own activity. In other words, it cannot really accept that it is pursuing its own 
projections with the assumption of pathologies” (Luhmann 2000: 93). There is no 
“normality” outside of the distinction between normality and pathology that can govern its 
boundary. Illness-communication is incessantly concerned with detecting pathologies, but it 
cannot find a solution, or even reassurance, outside of itself as to how it takes upon itself the 














The semantic history of health and illness at work 
In the following chapter, I pursue how the notion of health and illness has been applied to 
employees from the 1920’s until today. The analysis takes its point of departure in 1920 
mainly because this question is only occasionally and very scarcely discussed in management 
journals previously.    
1) The embodiments of illness. 1920-1944 
During the 1920’s, health and illness at the workplace is incessantly discussed from the 
position of safety regulations and preventive measures. What safety consists of and how it is 
obtained, almost grows into a branch of its own in the management literature of the 1920’s. 
Throughout the decade, several campaigns are launched with the purpose of enhancing safety 
at the workplace. One such campaign, the “Safety First”-movement, emerges in both Norway 
and several other countries as a response to the prevalence of work-related accidents that 
occurs, above all, in the industrial sector. A lot of the work conducted under the varying 
paroles of safety revolves around minimizing risks related to open fire, engines and heavy 
loads or the use of tools like scissors and bolts in addition to providing the necessary 
equipment for each and every worker, such as helmets, gloves and spectacles. The 
investigation of hazards and dangers towards workers are mainly centered on the physical 
environment of the employee, such as the arrangement and design of the workplace, the 
proper use of clothing and equipment, and exposure to emission gases. In management 
journals, the medical expertise encourages organizations to examine, among other things, the 
relation between frequency of diseases and exposure to gas and dust, the need for specialized 
equipment or lighting, the wear on various parts of the body, due to repetitious body 
movements, lack of movement, lifting heavy loads etc. Different branches of work are, so to 
say, delegated different correlative problems between potential ailments and specific work 
conditions. Among foundry workers, for instance, the problem relates to the occurrence of 
zinc fever and combustion, while bakers display a similarly high frequency of eczema and 
asthmatics Among so-called intellectual workers and office workers, on the other hand, the 
physical ailments are through to consist largely of myalgia and writer’s cramp (Liv og Helse 
[Life and Health], no. 5-6: 1936). To a large extent these concerns revolves around the same 
problems of cause and effect that was proposed by the Italian doctor Bernardino Ramazzini, 
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often referred to as founding father of occupational medicine, in his seminal work on 
occupational health published in 1700 (Ramazzini 1940 [1700]).  
The theme of safety poses, however, a pedagogical problem. Safety is a trait that must be 
nourished and developed within the current workforce as well as the strategized workforce of 
the future. This is sought regulated through “safety conscience”, in which the discipline of 
each employee becomes a key subject. The following is a set of proposed safety regulations, 
on the “significance of “safety conscience” intended for the prevention of accidents”: 
“1. One must at all costs bring into clarity the number of times a candidate has lost work 
hours due to accidents during the last two years, and how many times he has been exposed to 
accidents in previous employments.  
2. The candidate is notified that the organization only takes interest in careful workers, 
because it has recognized that those who are not careful with their own safety neither takes 
care of their work.  
3. One must not hire anyone that seems to lack “safety conscience”. 
4. All recently employed individuals must be explained the dangers of the work he 
undertakes.  
5. The recently employed individual must be inspected within two weeks and it should within 
no more than six weeks be clarified whether or not he submits to the safety regulations and 
understands the specific dangers attached to his work. Furthermore, it must be clarified if he 
has the sufficient understanding of the significance of safety.  
For the current workforce, the regulations are as follows:  
1. Only those who have “safety conscience” and make an effort to perform their work 
cautiously and avoid accidents can be assumed to submit to the safety regulations, and those 
are the ones who will be put into use in the organization.  
2. Safety measurements have been taken care of in order to prevent accidents. However, the 
will to work in a safe and secure manner must come from the employee himself, and he must 
use it and develop it in such a way that it is clear that he submits to the instructions 
announced by the chairmen, and that he does his outmost to prevent himself from harm.  
3. If the worker seems to lack this “safety conscience” and continues to be harmed, it will be 
necessary to dismiss him in order protect himself from further accidents.  
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4. All chairmen will be supervised in how to fulfill disciplinary action onto those employees 
who fail to submit to the safety regulations.  
5. All workers must be cautious and believe in the safety measures” (Arbeidslederen [The 
Daily Manager], no. 12, 1926: 12). 
Illness is here located in the bodies of employees; they are potentially ill or damaged, 
exposed to dangers of both disease and accidents. The employee himself incarnates these 
dangers, he is a possible menace to himself and colleagues, and must be continuously guided 
and instructed to conduct himself in such a manner that he does not put himself or others at 
risk. The purely negative appearance of health and safety, as the lack of harm and misfortune, 
is undertaken as a tautological assessment: The health of an employee is demonstrated by the 
fact that he is and stays “healthy” (avoids accidents) and an “unhealthy” employee is 
accordingly one that fails to do so (exposed to accidents). The status of an employees’ 
employability is contingent upon this tautology, insofar as his health – as safety - is measured 
as economically viable or non-viable for the organization, and is directly linked to a moral 
character found in his efforts and will to work. As it is stated in the regulations quoted above; 
an employee who does not take care of his health neither takes care of his work. In other 
words, the health of the employee spills over into his character, because the state of his health 
is viewed as emblematic for his will to work. The condition of his vigor and stature mirrors 
not only the negative prospect of a possible loss (illness, absenteeism, accidents) or danger to 
the organization, but it mirrors his complete moral foundation, related to his readiness and 
will to work.  
The facilitation of safety thus requires an assessment of the employee’s awareness and 
attitudes, targeted as a site of normative regulation, wherein the ideals of a safe work 
environment can be realized. The regulations are directed towards changing or expanding the 
awareness of the employee, in his everyday conduct of work. In other words, these are 
regulations that seek to enhance the discipline of workers, so that their bodies can converge 
smoothly with the environment they reside in. In this process, the dangers located in the 
physical environment can be projected to the individual awareness and discipline of each 
worker. Typical examples of this is found in illustrations, plates or folders on how to avoid 
accidents or bodily wear or how equipment is properly handled. As it is characteristically 
stated in an illustrated piece: “On all accounts it is a matter of avoiding positions of 
angulation and curved backs. By a natural upright position, one will be able to rest and the 
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work can be conducted more easily. Study these photos and learn from them!” (Liv og 
Sundhet [Life and Healthiness], no. 11, 1935: 253).  
 
Illness as a mutual vulnerability  
The employee’s obligation to take care of his body is both owed to himself and due to the 
body’s utility to the organization – and the employee and employer are unified in their 
common interest in the avoidance of loss and harm: “To make the parties cooperate more 
efficiently in the effort to avoid accidents, is in itself the most practical and obvious path to 
mentally reach a common ground, in a domain where both parties are victims of loss and 
suffering, even though chairmen and in particular the workers are alone in exposing their 
bodies” (Vern og Velferd [Protection and Welfare], no. 3, 1934: 54). There is in other words 
an idea of solidarity and communion proposed here, that can reach beyond the otherwise so 
dividing lines found in the division of labor and class interest. The body of the worker 
carries, quite literally, the possibility of this union, as his body is at once uniquely his own 
and hosts a direct bond to an employer, who sees in him an asset that is just as invaluable to 
the organization as it is to the employee himself. From this angle, the distinction made 
between the loss of life and health of one part and the economic loss of another is somehow 
balanced out in a joint effort and interest, taking its point of departure in the protection of the 
employee’s physical wellbeing. One might speak of the worker’s “two bodies”; on the one 
hand, the physical and prosaic body exposed to accidents and illness, which must be 
protected and kept from harm6. On the other hand, there is a body that holds a direct link to 
the organization’s economic interest and contains thereby also the realization of a mutual 
vulnerability. The body – in the form of the health of the body - is, as such, portrayed as a site 
of shared concern that prevails other dividing interests and disputes. The efforts to enhance 
safety do not therefore merely revolve around calling upon the docility and compliance of the 
worker, but also seek to re-charge the employee’s relation to his employer. In relation to this, 
the worker’s experience and enactment of work is similarly sought re-charged as something 
more than just an economic relation. In a sort of alienation-thesis launched “from above”, the 
employee is assumed to be detached from the appraisal of work as a reward itself. As far as 
he only remains motivated by the incentive of an upcoming payment, he also endangers the 
health of himself and others. Managers on all levels are, for instance, encouraged to represent 
                                                          
6 The notion of the «two bodies» holds a reference to Kantorowicz’ (2016) analysis of the “king’s two bodies”.  
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and gratify the value of work to augment the “conscience” among ordinary employees. John 
Oxaal, who is among the initiators of “Safety First” in Norway, states that: “the essential 
matter for the “Safety First”-movement is that the managers of the industry become 
interested in this enterprise, and that they, through their stab of functionaries, department 
managers and chairmen imparts the common man the significance and value of work, so it 
gradually is included in everyman’s consciousness” (Arbeidsgiveren [The Employer], no. 6, 
1929: 62).  
We can summarize the difference between safety and illness in the following figure:  
concept ┐counter-concept 
                                                  mutual vulnerability  economic burden     
                                                  disciplined  dangerous  
                                                  conscientious  morally suspicious  
                                                  employable  unemployable  
 
 
The gaze of recruitment   
Recruitment makes out another position in the same period, wherein health and illness are 
actualized. More accurately, recruitment is in various ways proposed as a solution to the 
prevailing number of accidents and diseases among employees in general. Health is, as such, 
closely interknit with the measures provided to analyze the psychological and physical fitness 
and vigor of the worker, composited in a variety of techniques that can enable an examination 
of the entirety of his character.  
 Hence, in the beginning of the 1920’s, a number of programs start to appear, targeting the 
suitability of individual workers. In addition to function as a tool to ensure and enhance 
productivity in the organization, these programs are also regarded as an instrument to support 
a scanning of the physical and cognitive state of future employees, in order to keep in with a 
healthy and strong workforce. The so-called “Taylor System”, protracted from Frederick 
Taylor’s principles of scientific management and, in Germany, the “Dauerprüfungen”, 
revolves around measuring the relation between a specific task and the time it takes to solve 
it, so as to scrutinize the energy and skills contained in a given excerpt – a candidate - of “the 
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human material”. The use of intelligence tests, such as the Binet-Simon Intelligence Measure, 
is another example of the efforts to map the weaknesses and strengths of a potential 
employee. A carefully composed system, initially developed in Germany under the heading 
of “Prüfung-Befund”, seeks to detect a comprehensive totality of the worker’s suitability for 
the position. The data of such an analysis should include: 
“The senses. Sight. Hearing. Limbs and muscles. Pressure. Handiwork: a) Force. b) 
Levelling ability. c) The balance and ease of the hand. d) Control of impulses when using a 
hammer. e) Double handiwork. f) Skills of handicraft 
Attention and will.  Span of sight. Performativity. Repetition durability. Reaction.  
Intellectual skills. Cognitive readiness. Memory: a) of a succession of events, b) of random 
forms and figures. Mental ability to combine and put together. Observational skills.  
Technical-constructive skills. Sense of perspective. Detecting patterns. Technical readiness. 
Ability to combine and put together technical arrangements” (Arbeidsgiveren [The 
Employer], no. 21, 1924: 142-143). 
The organization of “vocational selection and guidance”, inherited in these programs are 
considered to make out a “social-moral factor of quite significant importance”, as far as the 
welfare and health of workers are concerned (Arbeidsgiveren  [The Employer], no. 20, 1924: 
115). The body of the candidate almost reads like a horoscope for the organization, looking 
for subtle signs and hints of fortune or disaster; it takes the complete body into account, 
mapping its slightest deficits and measures its general constitution as an estimate of the 
organization’s future prospects. The whole range of bodily and cognitive abilities and 
functions therefore posits an absolute relevance and should be assessed accordingly, from the 
rapidity in the movement of fingertips to the time used to solve puzzles and intellectual tasks. 
By and large, the body of a candidate is, as such, directly inserted in the organizational space 
of production in the selection programs, seeking to find the piece that most seamlessly will fit 
into its machinery. These programs splits up the body and mind into a number of different 
functions and qualities, in analyses carried out according to detailed procedures, so that 
“fitness” and “health” becomes multiplied and varied; attention, reaction, muscles, memory, 
sight, strength, endurance and so forth. It is not just a question of if he will be able to 
perform, but also how his body and mind will respond to the specific conditions in the 
organization; what is the variety and strength of his physical and cognitive state; can his 
apparent fitness be thought to conceal a critical weakness; how will his health develop in the 
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future. Although varying with the different lines of work, the physical examination will 
typically cover different optical and audible tests, while the assessment of cognitive abilities 
revolves around language and memory skills as well as the ability to solve problems. For an 
office worker, for instance, the physical examination involves assessments of the steadiness 
and power of the hand (while, for instance, typing), in addition to a general health 
examination. As it is stated in one article on the subject of preventing myalgia among 
functionaries: “The prevention starts already in the recruitment of functionaries” (Liv og 
Helse [Life and Health], nr. 8, 1944: 62). 
In other words, one finds in these programs of selection and tests, a state of the body as well 
as the mind of the potential employee being directly linked to and inspected on the grounds of 
the machinery of labor. The organization knows exactly what it needs, in terms of its needs of 
human workforce and the challenge is to find the ways and means that allows it to localize 
the exact piece of “human material” suited to perform the specific function that must be 
covered. The “recruitment-gaze” is geared towards perfection, looking for its most flawless 
candidate to enroll in the arrangements of machines, as if the body itself is in direct 
continuation of this machinery. It aims at regulating the “capacity” of (present and) future 
employees; looking for the employee who can fulfill his or her tasks most efficiently, in terms 
of time and physical energy spent on each tasks. The purpose is to “place each employee in a 
position in which the least amount of energy and time is spent at the specific tasks that should 
be solved, at the same time as he finds himself at ease and well-adjusted to the work.  It 
makes no sense to place a highly intelligent man to perform monotonous tasks, where he can 
not make use of his skills and knowledge. We should not only consider his abilities and 
endowment, but also his field of interest and temperamental attitude. A man should have the 
necessary qualifications to fulfill his job, no more and no less. Too much can be just as 
unsound as too poor in this regard. If a profession contains a high level of specific demands, 
it requires a specific bodily and spiritual constitution” (Waaler 1935: 26). 
 
The future promise of recruitment 
“Health” is in these efforts temporalized as the future provision of a strong workforce, pinned 
out according to the scientific achievements of the emerging psycho-technical methods, 
through which organizations will be “saving dollars and energy by personnel research” 
(Arbeidsgiveren [The Employer] no. 20, 1924: 115). The economy of the organization 
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coincides with the health of each single member of its workforce: An employee with a weak 
constitution holds, for instance, the danger of insufferable expenses to the organization. 
Organizational psychology is born at this point, by which economic assessments and the 
employee as a source of knowledge and scrutiny is molded together anew; employees are 
typologized according to their cognitive and physical readiness, their behavior is studiously 
examined and their potential becomes a center point of attention. The advent of “personnel 
research” therefore marks the point in which economic analyses becomes entwined with an 
individualizing analysis of the employee, which is an enterprise set in motion not by 
inspecting the employee’s “inner life”, but through the use of intelligence tests, physical 
examinations and trials. Symptomatically, the Psychotechnical Institute is established in Oslo 
by the early 1930’s, to assist an array of public and private employers in developing 
assessment tools directed towards both present employees and applicants. Throughout the 
preceding decade numerous voices have been decrying the lack of a proper and scientifically 
reliable method, through which the health and “fitness” of the employee can be completely 
assessed in a uniform and systematic manner, in advance of hiring. The psycho-technical 
methods are formulated as an answer hereof, by addressing the complete physical and 
cognitive assumptions of a potential employee7; are they fit to work in an office; do they have 
the endurance to keep up at the factory floor; will they be able to avoid overexertion etc. (Eng 
1935: 15-17).8 The selection programs and tests allow for a systematic sorting of “the human 
material”, into which bodies and minds are suitable and which are not: “Through the 
application of these psychotechnical tests, we have, for the most part, succeeded in avoiding 
the appointment of inferior employees, while we also to a great extent have accomplished the 
recruitment of several people on the “right side” of mediocracy, that is the good and 
excellent achievers” (Waaler 1935: 25).9 
Like we previously saw with the question of safety, there is also a “bond” proposed here, 
between employers and employees, albeit of a different kind. Across the various selection 
programs and tests, one can see that the “health” of the organization and the health of the 
employee is unified in the “evolutionary” efforts to trim and strengthen the workforce, 
through physical and cognitive examinations of candidates. The “health” of the organization 
                                                          
7 These tests also go under the name of “vocational tests” in the English literature 
8 The test first appeas in Norway during the 1920’s as an assessment tool in relation to apprentices and students seeking hire or admission to 
vocational schools. The psychotechnical tests derive from Germany and were first introduced by the psychologist Hugo Münsterberg. See 
Münsterberg (1916): Psychologie und Wirtschaftleben. J. A. Barth. Leipzig 
9 Initially the tests cover an evaluation of the physical condition of the potential employee, but towards the late 1930’s a number of tests are 




can be maintained and improved by the effective prevention of unhealthy candidates entering 
into its workforce, and this health can likewise also be reinstated when unhealthy employees 
are excluded. The fitness and the cognitive and physical stature of the worker carries the 
aptitude and prognosis of the organization as a whole in the future; how it will be able to keep 
up with the demands posed by markets; how the productivity can be fortified and how loss 
can be prevented. The assessment of the employee thus doubles itself as an assessment of the 
whole organization, insofar as the question of the health of the workforce is precast with a 
future viability of the organization’s market value. The health of the individual worker is 
therefore at once both positively and negatively connoted, as the embodiment of the 
organization’s destiny. In other words, the question of recruitment now establishes a 
perceived symmetry between the organization’s “fate” and the physical and cognitive state of 
the employee.  
We can summarize the differences installed by the “recruitment-gaze” in the following 
figure:  
concept ┐counter-concept 
                                                  perfected (human) material  raw (human) material    
                                                  competitive advancement  competitive obstacle  
                                                  future surplus  present loss  
                                                  vigor  weakness  












The body-environment axis: nutrition, sleep, exercise, light, aeration 
From the late 1930’s, the body of the worker is actualized anew. The workers eating habits, 
the length and quality of his or her sleep and the frequency and physical nature of leisure 
activities are invoked as central topics. The employee’s body is compared to a machine, 
wherein diet, rest and exercise supplies the energy, through which it can regenerate and 
strengthen. To a large extent, these issues are addressed by medical doctors, who often 
propose a form of indenture, wherein the worker is encouraged to take responsibility for his 
or her own health on his time off work, while the organization facilitates “healthy” 
environments that enables the worker to rest and rejuvenate. The vitalist concepts of energy 
and rejuvenation are, perhaps not surprisingly, guided by strong notions of productivity; a 
healthy and rested employee is obviously considered more efficient than one that is tired and 
weak. At the same time, however, the health and illness of the employee now starts to appear 
as a problem that resides as much outside of the workplace, as it does on the inside of it.  
The advice and instructions forwarded by these doctors are often strikingly specific, and I 
will provide a few examples. The questions of how much, how often and what to eat are 
specified in detailed accounts, and does not only concern the food eaten during the work day, 
but the total food consumption of the worker. For example, a functionary or intellectual 
worker is recommended to settle for an intake of about 2400 calories each day, while workers 
holding up more physically demanding jobs like carpentry and painting are suggested an 
additional intake of about 600-1000 calories (Liv og Helse [Life and Health], no. 2: 1944). 
The employee is encouraged to study tables displaying the energy contained in each foodstuff 
and to consume the recommended amounts of meat, fish, milk and vegetables to strengthen 
the body’s immune system. The steady and correct intake of vitamins, minerals, fat and 
carbohydrates is not only a matter of staying hale and hearty, but also functions to obtain the 
ideal level of energy, which the employee needs to fulfill his or her work. While a varied and 
wide-raging diet is considered a key element in the maintenance and improvement of the 
employee’s general health, the necessity of regular eating habits is also underlined as a means 
of avoiding tiredness and exhaustion during work. The importance of a solid breakfast and a 
steady, but not too frequent consumption of meals throughout the day is addressed to all 
employees, disregarding the specific character of their work.  
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Like with the diet, the amount of rest is considered to have an indispensable impact on both 
the ability to perform at work and the general condition of the employee. The theme of rest 
and restitution is not only a “extra-social” problem but is similarly actualized within the 
workplace; organizations should facilitate regular shifts between activity and avoid 
repetitious tasks, to keep a steady state. The doctor Einar Øxnevad states it in the following 
way: “If the worker keeps it going too long without the necessary breaks, or if the work is 
heavier than he can handle, it will lead to a lasting tiredness. This kind of overexertion is a 
very damaging and troublesome condition. When tiredness occurs, the ability to work is 
reduced, the work becomes less accurate and accidents are more frequent. The worker 
becomes touchy, unsatisfied and nervous, with bodily pains and headache, so called fatigue 
pains, and gets no rest” (Øxnevad 1944: 22). However, it is also underlined that employee 
also needs to take responsibility to avoid becoming all too consumed by the work itself. The 
misuse of one’s own capacity to perform at work is a threat to the health: “[But] also without 
a situation in which the worker has been injured or fallen ill, his work performance and joy 
of working might be reduced by way of bringing himself to exhaustion, overspending his own 
work force, so that he becomes overstrained, always tired” (Øxnevad 1944: 9).   
All employees are recommended at least 7-8 hours of sleep between each day at work, as a 
tired and exhausted employee is perceived as a danger to both to himself and to his 
colleagues. It is important that the employee spends his days off, during the weekend and 
holidays, correctly and according to the work, he or she upholds, for instance, for people in 
working in offices, often in stationary positions, it is recommended to get out and get a feel of 
the fresh air up in the mountains. This is related to how, unlike other occupational ailments, 
the illness of the “intellectual worker” is assumed to often remain hidden from him- or 
herself. He must, with the aid of a doctor, discover it under layers of “disguised” or 
misleading symptoms. This relates specifically to how the office worker, functionary or clerk 
is considered disposed for overexertion: “Intellectual workers will more often become 
overexerted than manual workers. This is because physical weariness most often will appear 
very strongly for the worker, while intellectual workers might not even notice it at first sight, 
since it appears in disguise, in the form of insomnia, anxiety or irritability. After experiencing 
physical weariness, the body will recover after a short period of rest. In the case of 
intellectual overexertion, it will last for a much longer time. Overexertion among office 
workers might have a variety of causes. It might be due to a lack of sense of one’s own 
exhaustion and the need for more rest, in the form of sleep, more outdoors activities and 
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recreation” (Liv og Helse [Life and Health], no. 4: 1936: 32). Apart from the potentially 
hidden character of his or her disorders, the “intellectual worker”, with his or her specific 
ailments and needs for recreation, does not differ notably from other groups of workers in 
these inquiries. On the one hand it concerns the management of the body and on the other 
hand the physical elements surrounding the enactment of work in the office, such as poor 
ventilation and lighting as well as the physical position and bodily movements of the worker, 
all emphasized as sources of possible ailments.  
The so-called “personal hygiene” of each employee, concerning his eating habits, rest and 
exercise is invoked as inevitable for the mapping, prevention and control of illness. As such, 
the ambition of safeguarding the health of employees does not any longer only consist in 
enhancing “safety-conscience”, diminishing potential hazards of the workplace and making 
the employee disciplining his conduct at work, but also of making the employee responsible 
for his health when he is at home and absent from the social and moral constraints provided 
by the workplace. We see that these questions of diet, rest and exercise interlinks the 
productivity of the organization and the body of the employee, by a) invoking the employee’s 
body as a vital domain of self-regulation and b) by confronting the boundary between work 
and spare time. Both efforts revolve around establishing a form of continuity of disciplined 
self-conduct, that can remain intact throughout the workday and spare time, weekends and 
holidays of the employee, so that his “healthy” practices at work can be continued into his 
home and private life.  
The actions and habits of employees, with an emphasis on their specific conducts outside of 
the workplace, is thus perceived as a challenge for the organization. In the pamphlet “Health 
control of adults by corporate doctors”, published as by a team of doctors as an initiative for 
general examinations of employees, the problem of “personal hygiene” is formulated as such: 
“[But] if the working environment is ever so excellent, the personal hygiene of the workers 
will never be superfluous. A great part of what the occupational hygiene is building up can 
be torn down by the unhealthy lifestyle of the individual. This is why the modern occupational 
hygiene also must include conditions outside the regular working hours of workers, such as 
their housing, diet, outdoor activities etc.” (Natvig et al. 1944: 19). The employees’ own 
behavior and customs outside of the workplace is here framed as both the basic precondition 
for enabling a “healthy environment” but also the greatest menace against it. Einar Øxnevad 
formulates a similar notion, on a more positive note: “Everything that can be ascribed to the 
concept of hygiene, that is entirety of conditions at the workplace that can help prevent 
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accidents, and which improves the well-being of the body, enables us to improve the 
performance and satisfaction of work. This is why the employee needs to keep in mind the 
demands of personal hygiene he must make to himself, with the right diet, sufficient rest and 
sleep, a reasonable use of leisure time, vacation and personal sanitation” (Øxnevad 1944: 
12).  
The health and illness of employees appears at first sight to be re-situated, so to say, from the 
specific workplace to the general self-conduct of the employee. However, this movement is 
far from unambiguous. There are simultaneous efforts which seek to reinforce a medical 
surveillance and control of workers within the organizations and these two movements, the 
generalized responsibility of the individual employee and the enforcement of regular medical 
control at the workplace, seems rather to support than to contradict each other. In 1944, the 
medical doctor Eiler H. Shiøtz is among those who call out for a regular examination of the 
employees` health. While infants, children and pregnant women at this point undergo regular 
medical examinations and control, both at private and public initiative, only a minority of 
workers undergo such examination by authorized medical expertise. According to Schiøtz, a 
lot of workers come from “less good” environments, with a poor diet and living conditions, 
which leads to increased risks of contamination, accidents, occupational diseases or a 
generally weakened health condition. He therefore suggests that all organizations impose a 
regular control of workers’ physical condition. These suggestions also find their way into 
“Guidance for Corporate Doctors”, in an edited version, published by The Norwegian 
Council of Medical Doctors the same year. Schiøtz points towards three overall problems, 
which should be at the center of the medical control and supervision of employees:   
The first problem relates to the challenge of gaining a strong stock of workers and create an 
organization consisting of healthy and occupationally able employees, which in his opinion 
relies on the means of medical judgement. This is, among other things, connected to 
measures on how to avoid contagion of diseases such as tuberculosis between the staff and 
furthermore, to make sure that the employee is suited for the set of tasks encompassed in the 
(vacant) position. To assure the quality of such a process, both a medical examination and 
tests of the cognitive and technical abilities are needed. In other words, this is a variant of the 
“recruitment-gaze” described previously. The second problem relates to the surveillance of 
the health of the current stock of workers. A medical doctor should regularly examine all 
employees, at least once a year. Such a surveillance serves the twofold purpose of preventing 
diseases to evolve and to assure medical examination of employees who, for some reason or 
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another, otherwise would hesitate to see an ordinary doctor. During these regular 
examinations, it is important that the doctor acquire accurate and well-informed knowledge 
on the occupational and medical history of the employee, if the current position involves 
hazardous tasks of any kind as well as obtaining the employees’ genealogy, not least the 
record of illnesses in the immediate family. However, Schiøtz makes it clear that a corporate 
doctor should primarily trace conditions of illness among the staff and not conduct treatments 
as an ordinary doctor otherwise would do. In cases where a corporate doctor suspects a 
condition of illness, the employee must therefore be referred to a private doctor. The third 
problem relates to the inspection of the conditions at the workplace. By carrying out regular 
inspections, the corporate doctor will be able to investigate and possibly improve the sanitary 
conditions as well as the specific health risks that might be at stake in the organization. The 
sanitary inspection is comprised of measuring conditions like the air, temperature, moisture, 
illumination and cleanliness, while the investigation of risk will consider conditions like dust, 
poisonous material or radiation (Schiøtz 1944: 130-134).  
Medicine, or rather, the doctor’s competent presence, offers itself in this specific case as a 
totalizing knowledge that can afford organizations both an improved “human material”, 
enhanced work conditions and a strategic sorting mechanism of potential employees. The 
striking thing in Sciøtz’ text is not only how strongly medical knowledge and productivity is 
molded together, but how it, by doing so, also invokes ordinary medical treatment as a 
hetero-reference, placed beyond the principal assignments of a corporate doctor. A corporate 
doctor should not treat illnesses, but rather inspect employees, and supervise and facilitate 
their work environment. In other words, the employee must not be observed as a patient as 
such but is distinguished as a composite part of the workforce. Both in the case of the medical 
examinations (of the body and its environment) and the vital imperative of rest, diet and 
exercise, the questions revolve around scanning the body and enhancing bodily conducts; 
how can the body strengthen and re-adjust; how can its environment improve rather than 
endanger the body; how can ill, weak or contagious bodies be detected, safeguarded and 
replaced.   
This body-environment axis is articulated as a vital social experiment, that also aims at 
making work bring health in itself. The physical design of the workplace is set in direct 
connection with the employees’ sense of comfort, welfare and safety, which again can 
provide a sense of “health-enhancement” in the enactment of work. As Håkon Natvig, a 
central figure within the occupational “hygiene”-movement, phrases it: “[But] the 
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occupational hygiene has a more constructive task than that of just preventing damage, 
namely that of making work itself healthy. In a factory where there are big, bright areas with 
a pure, good aeriation, where there is an appealing dining hall (…) and where there are 
sufficient pauses in between work, there will also be a brighter mood among employees, the 
performance will improve and the work will go more steady than in places where the 
opposite occurs. In all regards, work will be less exhausting and healthier. In the widest 
sense, one might say that the purpose of occupational hygiene is to provide the proper 
balance between performance on the one side and consumption of human workforce and 
health on the other side. This is a task that both the employee and the employer should have 
an equal interest to realize.”  (Liv og Helse [Life and Health], no. 3, 1936: 11). At the same 
time, one can also see that unwillingness to work is framed as thoroughly unsound and 
unnormal, and a source of serious ailments: “Let us begin by asserting that all normal people 
contains an inherent urge and desire to work. If this urge cannot be fulfilled, the organs of 
the body will feel at unease, not at least the nervous system. Work is the life line. It is healthy 
to work. The work has a great value in itself and each and every one of us depends upon it.” 
(Arbeidslederen [The Daily Manager], no. 1, 1944: 31).  
On the one hand, we see a medical knowledge which seeks to constitute itself as a technology 
of bodily conducts, by at once trying to regulate and examine the employees’ bodies 
(Foucault 2008: 27-30). The knowledge and competence provided by the doctor is presented 
as an opportunity to simultaneously enhance both the organization and the body of the 
employee, through regular examinations of the workplace and the employees. It installs a 
simple difference between medically competent supervision and health:  
(medical) supervision ┐health 
This whole discussion, on how medical knowledge can provide for the health of workers, 
flattens out by the middle of the 1950’s, at the same time as an increasing number of both 
public and private employers signs up for the Corporate Health Service, established in the 
previous decade.  
On the other hand, the worker and his or her body is not only a productive element that needs 
to be protected against accidents or diseases, neither is illness and health no longer perceived 
as a problem strictly contained within the workplace. The employee is now also instructed to 
regulate and take care of his or her own health, according to notions of a “healthy lifestyle” 
and attitudes, which at this point largely revolves around rest, nutrition and recreation. These 
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instructions are not usually presented in the form of strict requirements and prohibitions of 
behavior, but rather seeks to enter into an alliance with the worker, through the supposedly 
common interest of enhancement, of both the conditions of the individual worker and the 
work environment. The alliance offers to improve the possibilities of the worker to improve 
his or her own health, while the performance and effectivity at the workplace also might 
advance. The health of the employee becomes intertwined with the productivity of the 
workplace, through a series of moral tactics that relies on making the employee responsible 
and knowledgeable of his or her own body. The prospect of illness is differentiated according 
to a variety of bodily conducts, that are endowed with the self-discipline of the employee. It’s 
guiding difference, between discipline and health, re-enters into itself, because the specific 
discipline of the worker must reflect itself in a general and continuous conduct of the body, 
beyond the physical workplace: 
 discipline ┐health 
          discipline ┐health 
The theme of discipline and health is not new as such (it is, as we have seen, already 
introduced in the themes of safety and recruitment), but the novelty lies primarily in the 
temporal dimension through which this discipline is thematized. The discipline now means to 
take charge of a rejuvenating conduct of one’s own body throughout all hours of the day. In 
the factual dimension this is thematized according to the use of spare time and vacation, 
which should happen strategically, by strengthening the body’s “vital capacities” and general 
constitution. In other words, the self-discipline of the body, its strengthening and rest, must 
mirror itself in the needs of the organization. Lastly, we see also the social dimension which 
is thematized in the identities forwarded under captions like “lifestyle”. The social meaning 
lies markedly in the efforts to install a rationality in the employee, which can generalize his 
bodily self-conducts in such a way that it is kept up and maintained across the domains of 
private life and home. With the theme of safety, illness is perceived as the range of ailments 
that could be detected as the outcome of the employee’s interaction with the work 
environment and with the gaze of recruitment, illness is conceived as the outcome of a failure 
to sort the “human material” in advance of hiring. With the actualization of the body’s 
vitality, there is a new difference installed in the preexisting themes of discipline, character 
and moral, through which illness can appear as the lack of a disciplined self-conduct held by 




2) The “human problem” of health and illness. 1944-1980 
During the first two decades of the postwar era, a new problem is coming into appearance: 
the “humanness” of the worker is discovered and framed as a crucial precondition for the 
productivity and organization of work. It is assumed that “the human factor” of work up until 
this point has been a severely neglected question, with vague, but catastrophic consequences. 
This question tries to invoke itself as what Kosselleck describes as a collective singular: 
Everything that concerns the workplace must be assessed according to the fact that we are all, 
first and foremost, human beings and not, for instance, machines (Kosselleck 2004: 50). No 
task should be solved and no strategy pinned out without this in mind.  
 
From “human material” to “the human factor” 
Among the most remarkable things about this communication is the way in which it presents 
itself as a radical break with the past. Before, we took only the formal and technical aspects 
of work into account, it says, but now we know that we have overlooked its most crucial and 
valuable asset, the human being. Nothing can be separated from this fact, accordingly. The 
process of production must be viewed as a human process and the employee must above all 
be regarded as a human being, who, for instance, also has other concerns and joys in life than 
just those of his work. The future of all places where people come to work are entirely 
dependent upon a transformation of the whole of its organization, drawn from this discovery, 
because the “very basic outlines for economic activity is about to change, as far as the human 
being and its management is concerned.  They have become the key factors of productivity 
and problems of such implications and scope no one in previous generations would have 
been able to imagine, and it takes a firm decisiveness to take this change into account” (Liv 
og Helse [Life and Health], nr. 1, 1955: 21).   
In addition to present itself as an abrupt end point from the previous tradition of neglects and 
misconceptions, the human semantics therefore also points out a future that must be revised 
according to the “human factors” of work. In line with this, it is a communication that seeks 
to filter out a new imperative of productivity, wherein the “human factor” is invoked to 
critically re-assemble all questions concerning measures to enhance the productivity and 
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strengthen the organization. This is directly woven into the how the assessments of and 
interventions into employees’ health should and can be made.  
An article in the journal “Protection and Welfare” discusses this question at length, proposing 
that “the prevention of accidents by and large is a matter of mentality”. The author, Ragnar 
Blomvik, goes on to assert that “[…] there is a limit to how far we can reach with perfected 
technical equipment and organization. If one seeks to move forward – and this is possible – 
we must start to involve ourselves in the human beings that are standing by the machines and 
the relations between all humans beings at work. Their attitudes to the problems we face and 
to the goals that are staked out, are completely decisive. In terms of  the technical utilization 
of equipment and the organization of work, many people will have made the discovery that it 
will often be appropriate to start with the human beings we are dealing with. Is it not often 
the case that the results slip away despite the fact that the equipment is state of the art? 
Because human beings, the human factor, was not taken into account” (Vern og Velferd 
[Protection and Welfare], no. 3, 1954: 50). In this excerpt, we find the solution to a wide 
range of problems encountered in the organization in the insight that the organization always 
is faced with human beings. Even though the article initially appeals to “prevention of 
accidents”, it proceeds to address a variety of issues, such as economic viability and 
technological arrangements, which are all sought re-evaluated in light of the “humanness” of 
the workforce. The article seeks to adduce an alternation of a contemporaneous management 
narrative, which is that of the more or less perfect organizational machinery driven by 
technological advancements opposed to the casualties caused by human errors and 
weaknesses. This problem is somehow turned upside-down, by pinpointing the lack of 
attention towards the “human factor” as an error and weakness itself, because it assumes an 
organization that - with the proper methods and technical means - can arrange for a flawless 
machinery, if it only succeeds in elucidating the “weak links” of its workforce. The author 
indicates that the assumption of such a machinery itself makes out a considerable limitation 
and endangerment to the organization, as it fails to take into consideration the cause and 
effect derived from the variety and inconsistencies found in the “mentality” of its different 
employees. The author expounds what the newfound “human factor” of employees consists 
of, in the following manner: “There are all those disturbing elements of personal matters 
coming from the environment wherein one resides and the conditions found there. It is about 
the conditions in the home, the relations between its members, the attitude of those members 
in addition to one’s own attitude. Furthermore, there is the environment found outside the 
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home, in the wider circle of acquaintances and friends. Everywhere there are impulses, which 
at any minute can sparkle or deteriorate the activities and thereby the effort provided by each 
and every one of us, whether we are owners, managers or employees. To decisively reach 
into and change this domain of conflicting and harmonious impulses is a matter of will, effort 
and belief in the possibility of such a change. Last, but not least is it a question of 
cooperation” (Vern og Velferd [Protection and Welfare] no. 3, 1954: 54). 
Blomvik does not state how to realize such changes or what it would mean to do so. Instead, 
he points to the relation between employees, their individual attitudes, the specific course of 
their everyday lives and the conflicting impulses contained in all human beings as questions 
the organization no longer can ignore, if it wants to “move ahead”, enhance its productivity 
and safeguard the health of its staff. It is a perspective that points towards a future set apart 
from the “technocratic” reign of organizations in the past, which completely ignored how 
illness must be prevented and assessed in accordance with the specific mentality of the 
individual employee. As a matter of fact, the interlinking of productivity and the “human 
factor” is articulated as a new common ground, in which employees and employers can join 
forces to enhance the organization: 
“One thing is the fact that we need to make both parties of the workplace recognize that it is 
themselves, and only themselves, who are in control over the means to realize the fulfilment 
of their own wishes and desires and, accordingly, only themselves who can bring about the 
conditions to increase the surplus provided for the common good. Moreover, another and 
more advanced cooperation than what so far has been the case must be presupposed, 
targeting the realization of these desires. This again, demands – quite right – another mental 
attitude, a changed attitude with both parties. This also depends upon the fact that our 
interest for each other’s wellbeing must go beyond the workplace and into the homes and 
leisure time and the nearest community” (Vern og Velferd [Protection and Welfare], no. 3, 
1951: 56).  
There is a puzzling statement conveyed here. First, it is a statement that brings together the 
desires of the employee and the employer as two sides of the same coin. They are united in 
their strive to realize their wishes and desires, unknowingly what these exactly are comprised 
of, but which nonetheless can be applied to induce an enhancement of the organization, in the 
form of an economic achievement, as a “surplus”. Hence, employers and employees both 
have desires, and they can realize these desires in a mutual commitment to a “common” 
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good. Their wishes and desires are at once unified in the organization and equated with the 
desires of the organization, so that, in this sense, the “human factor” evens out differences 
between managers and the managed in a supposed communal relationship (Weber 1964: 
136). Second, we see the contours of elements being ascribed to the relevance of the 
employee’s health, that are far from the “docile bodies” called upon in the programs of 
selection and safety measurements of the 1920’s, as described previously. These elements 
seek bring together an extra-social domain into the domain of employment, in the form of 
leisure and family life, on the one hand and the social life of the workplace, on the other 
hand. The employee carries with him a continuum of experiences that cannot be divided 
alongside his work scheme; hence, this continuum must be assessed and governed in all its 
range and diversity. To take these questions into consideration means that the employee must 
be cared for, just as the employee himself must be expected to engage caringly in his own 
work environment. The environment of home becomes relevant to the environment of work, 
as do collegial relations, possible disputes as well as the employee’s contentment and 
upheaval. In continuation of the new equivalences of care and interaction (family - personal 
life - work), there seems to be a further affinity underlying these considerations, between the 
family and the organization. The organization should host its members, as would a family do, 
one should care for one another as one does in a family. A workplace should therefore not be 
equated with a variety of simple material and economic relations but is dependent on the 
mutual understanding and care between its different members.  
The novel problem of “human factors”, “inter-personal” relations and the social life of work 
is, at this point, primarily posed by employers and not, for instance, by labor unions. In 1945, 
a book appears on the topic by the Norwegian director Rolf Waaler, entitled “The 
Organization and the Human Being”, pointing out that the organizing of work must seek to 
furnish a “harmonious and satisfied personnel”. Waaler is concerned with what he calls the 
“human problem” in light of the recent automation of previously manual tasks throughout 
different domains in work life. While the focus on technological advancement and 
streamlining of production has led to a decrease in accidents and wear on the human body, it 
might also have led to a neglect of the human beings at work, according to the proponents of 
a work environment more attuned to the “human problem of work”, with whom the author 
shares his concern. He writes that “business has become more complicated and 
unforeseeable. We are losing the interaction, because the organizations are taking charge of 
tasks that previously were undertaken by the individual. This development, making the human 
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problems more severe, has been accompanied by another development contributing to the 
solution of these problems in a rational manner. Our knowledge in the field of psychology 
has expanded, and a lot of work has been conducted in order to utilize this knowledge in the 
practical realm of work life. For some time now, managers has sought to solve their 
professional problems in an objective and factual manner. At the present time, we have seen 
how this will to objectively and factually solve issues is about to proliferate to questions 
concerning the personnel. One has realized that the human being plays a significant part on 
all matters, even though this might not seem the case at first sight. If people are managed 
reasonably and are offered a chance to develop and make use of their skills, their work will 
also be thoroughly conducted and their efficiency will be vast. The very conditions of work 
must be organized in such a way that people thrive, so that a harmonious and satisfied 
personnel can appear. This will only be possible when we take into account the recent 
inventions within psychology. This increased knowledge, alongside the enlarged complexity 
of work is what necessitates a more comprehensive assessment of the problems faced by the 
personnel management” (Waaler 1945: 27).  
Waaler lists up what he calls six critical variables for the organization inclined to assess the 
“human problem”: 
1. The need for a workforce and the characteristics of this need 
2. The human material, the size of individual varieties and the possibilities contained in 
this 
3. The development of applied psychology and its use in work life 
4. The principles of training and the adaptation of human beings in the workplace 
5. The best methods to utilize the human energy under various conditions 
6. Analyses and control of the forces that affect the harmonious cooperation 
Just like Blomvik, Waager actualizes the organization as a form of community based on a 
shared “humanness”. In this framing, the manager becomes someone who can nourish a sense 
of development and belonging among employees; employees must be seen and heard and 
experience a sense of companionship, whereby they will thrive and become motivated to 
work more efficiently. Unlike Blomvik, however, Waaler does not really refer to health or 
illness directly in his book, but introduces a number of themes derived from psychology that 
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In the midst of the “human problem”, a new source of pathological intrusion starts to appear, 
namely the boss. The concern raised here revolves around how managers hold a direct and 
decisive impact on the employees’ sense of satisfaction and thereby their ability to perform, 
but rarely are held accountable for this. Managers can ignite fear, nervousness and anxiety 
and even become a source of severe physical ailments among employees, in which they - the 
managers - might turn out to be the actual cause of the spiraling numbers of absenteeism and 
decline in the organization.  
This theme coincides with a noticeable rupture in the postwar era, described above, wherein 
the ideal of the rational, streamlined organization is being questioned, not only within the 
social sciences, but also by the organizations themselves. Some critics posit concerns about 
the diffusion of the “assembly-line” organization of Taylorism, which, they claim, revolves 
around strict technical principles, at the cost of adjustments and consideration for those 
actually employed to fulfill the job. Among them is Per L. Brantsæter, who in a review of 
recent studies of employees’ health and management, holds forth that Taylor and his 
descendants wrongly assumed “that it first and foremost were factors of physical movement, 
tiredness and the physical conditions of work that made an impact on the effort of employees” 
(Arbeidslederen [The Daily Manager], no. 12, 1956: 207). The author considers this 
misassumption to have consequences for the well-being among employees and asks at which 
cost the authoritarian and technical modes of management has been paid for in the currency 
of “human health and happiness (yes, life)?” (Arbeidslederen [The Daily Manager], no. 12, 
1956: 210). Brantsæter goes on to answer by alluding a passage from a textbook article 
entitled “Work, its nature, condition and motivation”10: “we can see that the neurotic 
manager, or factory manager, operational manager or senior manager can spread disease 
amongst his co-workers as if he carried typhus or smallpox. He will not spread the same 
disease every time, as with typhus or smallpox. One employee might become neurotic, 
another gets an ulcer, a third dies because of a cardio-vascular suffering, while fourth might 
                                                          
10 Referring to Brown in “Arbetssociologi” (1955) by G. Boalt and G. Westerlund.   
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simply get depressed – all depending on the personality of the employee” (Arbeidslederen 
[The Daily Manager], no. 12, 1956: 210.  
The critical assessment of Taylor had started to finds its way, albeit in tiny increments, into 
the field of management in the 1930s, not least after the Hawthorne experiments had been 
conducted in the preceding decade. The most remarkable part of Brantsæters small text is not 
the critique of Taylor, however, but the way it directly juxtaposes health and management by 
directly linking ailments to poor or failed management. Brantsæters proposes a direct relation 
between the lack of proper management or simply the lack of sufficient social skills among 
managers, on the one hand, and a direct (negative) impact on the health of employees, on the 
other. The manager is marked as a direct or indirect source of ailments at the same level as 
pollution or hazardous work tasks, potentially thought to cause severe harm by poisoning the 
work environment or cause unnecessary worry among employees. However, the connection 
between (lack of good) health and (mis)management is not a completely novel conception 
when the article is published in 1956. The theme is first introduced a decade earlier:  
“A manager, who has acquired a certain amount of fear among his subordinates, is 
completely off course and can cause severe harm both to himself and the organization. A 
common mistake among many well-meaning manager’s is to enact their impatience in such a 
way that it comes across as very hectic and disturbing on subordinates, resulting in feelings 
of being very restricted due to the psychic pressure.  A superior must know his audience, 
especially when it comes to people with a certain anxiety, who often are cautious and easily 
react with tension” (Liv og Helse [Life and Health], no. 10, 1944: 75). 
“Overtime and additional work should also by all means be dissuaded, as it is very 
unprofitable in the long run – and one has found examples of simple extortion of the 
workforce. If one were dealing with a skilled and vigilant functionary who “commits” in 
great pains to fulfill his duties, the only proper solution would be to hire an assistant. The 
significance of avoiding the psychic pressure and the tension caused by this has been noted 
previously. It will often be important for a manager to pay attention to how these symptoms 
start to appear at the outset of a disease” (Liv og Helse [Life and Health], no. 8, 1944: 63-
64).  
These managers are often associated with a lack of the subtle “human skills”. Yet, this is not 
a communication that strictly pinpoints the pathological traits of “bad” management, but 
seeks simultaneously also to assume a new understanding of what management entails, when 
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the newfound condition of management as managing human beings is brought into the 
centerfield of attention. For instance, all managers are encouraged to take notice of how they 
influence their subordinates and how they can improve the work environment by the means 
of a psychological awareness. There is, accordingly, a variety of psychological profiles and 
typologies on the offer, targeting such heightened awareness on the difference in personality, 
mindset and fragility across the workforce (which I will describe later). The decisive point in 
this case is, however, how a new form of pathology is articulated with the “human 
semantics”, which seeks to install a number of pathological risks - and symptoms hereof - in 
the relationship between the management and the employee.  
“If the management does not care to hear anything but its own voice, the number of people 
who takes initiative and who are energetic and skilled will ultimately mitigate. And the 
workforce remaining in the organization will consist of people who have become so polished 
that their energy and will to work has vanished” (Liv og Helse [Life and Health], no. 1, 1955: 
21) 
“ [why] are some organizations in such a good shape? The answer is that the executive 
managers are tolerant and caring people, and open and heartfelt. This does not in any way 
need to endanger the efficiency of the organization. It rather implies a manager who can be 
honest about mistaken that have been made and openly discuss these mistakes with others. It 
gives the subordinates a sense of openness and cordiality. The ideal thing would be a 
manager who is open, warm and tolerant and who does not become a complete “stickler” 
when mistakes are made” (Vern og Velferd [Protection and Welfare], no. 4, 1962: 93).  
These statements are often accompanied by dire warnings against a work environment 
becoming absorbed by joylessness, suspiciousness, negativity and conflict, to such a degree 
that it can bring about a demise of the entire organization. In other words, management 
discovers itself as a potential threat towards the organization in an entirely new fashion, as it 
can “poison” the work environment of the organization, through its own appearance, with its 
behavior, “attitudes” and lack of understanding of the individual employee. A repertoire of 
almost paternalistic qualities is invoked to contrast these caveats of the “pathological” 
manager poorly equipped with social skills, with notions like confidence, trust, understanding 





“An organization for well-being” 
This whole semantic register becomes intensified by the proponents of a new era of “human 
engineering”, who seek to develop methods and tools for the modern organization who can 
no longer ignore the questions of how employees experience their own work; how they thrive 
and how a sense of belonging and community can be established and strengthened. Among 
the most prolific peers of this enterprise in Norway is Sverre Lysgaard, who in the 1950’s and 
1960’s conducts pioneering research on the relation between well-being and work at several 
Scandinavian workplaces. Lysgaard, who is a sociologist, also carries out courses, holds 
lectures and designs educational material aimed at both regular employees and managers on 
the subject of well-being at work. He holds forth that “in order to thrive as a human being, 
we have to feel that what we do at work is related to our own objective. What we do must give 
us a sense of meaning in our lives and we have to be able to unfold our possibilities. We must 
have a sense of being in growth, or face challenges and feel that we might learn something 
new” (Arbeidsledelse og Teknikk [Occupational Management and Technology], no. 4, 1961: 
60). Lysgaard argues that the traditional concern for health, as a matter of avoiding accidents 
and a hazardous work environment, is no longer a pressing issue for organizations: “At least 
in the modern industry we have passed the phase when employees worked under threatening 
conditions or languished. What we can do now is to go further and enhance the opportunities 
of the employees, more broadly speaking” (Arbeidsledelse og Teknikk [Occupational 
Management and Technology], no. 4, 1961: 61). This also implies that that organizations 
must start to investigate what is referred to as the “social life” of work: “Why are some 
people are at ease and enjoy themselves? Why are some upset? Is it related to their situation 
at work? When we have the answer to this, we are better equipped to act upon the matter” 
(Arbeidsledelse og Teknikk [Occupational Management and Technology], no. 4, 1961: 61). 
The text draws up a boundary between illnesses that are deemed relevant for the modern 
organization and those who are not. In the latter case, there are the “old-fashioned” ailments 
strictly derived from the material conditions of work, the relevance of which have been 
mostly surpassed by the modern and technologically advanced standards of work life. Illness 
and health cannot really be dealt with as a matter of physical and material conditions any 
longer. Instead, organizations should gear themselves towards the emotional challenges and 
difficulties faced by managers and employees in their continuous strive to realize themselves.  
 The call for a renewed perspective on health seems to resonate strongly across the 
management sphere, and the question of how management should provide for a work 
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environment where the employee can thrive finds a strong foothold throughout the 1950’s 
and the following decade, where the theme keeps resurfacing with increasing frequency in 
articles, books and as course material. Among the most persistent concerns are how 
organizations can productively enhance a sense of well-being among employees, which is a 
question that sprawls across the management literature by the early 1960’s. In 1962 there is 
even a Scandinavian conference organized on the subject of “well-being at work”, with a 
number of participants from different areas of research, management, employer federations 
and unions. It is evident from the lectures, debates and talks held at the conference that a 
wide range of proposals are offered to deal with it. According to Erikh Orth, an assistant 
director at the Danish Federation of Employers, there has at this point been “a significant 
development within the sphere of management in order to solve the problem of well-being 
during the last years” (Arbeidsledelse og Tenkikk [Occupational Management and 
Technology], no. 5, 1962: 86). Not everyone agrees on this. In article entitled “An 
organization for well-being”, the psychologist Peter G. Lindeberg argues that organizations 
up to this point completely has neglected the well-being of their employees due to their 
“material obsession”. He writes that “[w]hen it comes to the organization of work in the 
garage or in the office, the measures of material nature are conspicuously overvalued. The 
individual psychological factors, which to the greatest extent are decisive for the efficiency of 
production and wellbeing, are on the other hand less emphasized. When the individual 
corporation seeks to do something for the employees, it usually revolves around measures of 
material nature, often targeting physiological conditions, such as hygiene, the use of colors, 
cafeteria etc. If the corporation tries to go beyond the restrains of regular working hours, the 
measures are still oriented towards material aspects, such as vacation homes, sports and so 
forth. These are excellent measures, but they impose on areas which perhaps should be 
restrained to the privacy of each individual” (Arbeidsgiveren [The Employer], no. 17, 1963: 
265). On the one hand, privacy here indicates a material privacy, provided by economic 
inducements and support, from which the organization is encouraged to consider its 
withdrawal. Regarding the “position of the individual”, on the other hand, Lindeberg goes on 
to note that it is “not sufficient that the employee has a clearly defined task and understands 
the context of his work. He also needs a position that gives him the necessary sense of 
appreciation in order to thrive and feel at ease” (Arbeidsgiveren [The Employer], no. 17, 
1963: 267).  
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Another psychologist of note, Sverre Kile, who becomes one of the première advocates of a 
new program of health, lays claim to a similar view and asks, “what does it gain a human 
being to conquer the world, when his soul is injured?” To which he goes on to answer that 
“we should more than ever safeguard the health of the mind and combine this work with our 
knowledge of how a solid economical foundation is achieved” (Vern og Velferd [Protection 
and Welfare], no. 4, 1962: 93).  
The excerpt is taken from the report of a speech held at the annual congress for Prevention in 
Work Life in 1962. In this speech, Kile assumes the notion of well-being as a crucial 
precondition for a health of the mind. At the same time, he contends the commonplace notion 
of well-being, which, he claims, too often is misconceived as a pure demand from the 
individual towards its surroundings, associated with comfort and idleness. Such inclinations 
should not be tolerated. Instead, well-being must be put into active and vital use to furnish a 
strong community in the organization, provided by the united efforts of each single member: 
“Well-being is far from only passive gratification, in terms of an employer or a society 
providing for our needs. Wellbeing is active self-realization. Believe me! Everything else is 
laziness, dependence, a mentality of demands. The person who acquires a sense of wellbeing 
only on the occasion of abundancy, finds himself in a house of disarray. The individual needs 
to actively enter into the community and contribute - and not just passively receive. Well-
being and the sense of ease is too often mistaken for simple gratification, but to work is a 
blessing and a duty. This involves an organization where we both come to provide and 
receive, but we cannot receive anything beyond what we have deserved. The speaker went on 
to underline that the inclination to realize the self, implicates the unfolding of something that 
is within the self. Here we will find that it is not just the nature, but also the environment of 
the individual which is influential. He points out that the healthiest form of well-being is that 
of performing and the most dangerous one is to expect something for nothing” (Vern og 
Velferd [Protection and Welfare], no. 4, 1962: 92-93).  
Well-being is here strictly juxtaposed to a passive position, from wherein demands of comfort 
and gratification can be posed. Contrary to this passivity is an active realization of the self, 
realized in the best interest of the community, e.g. the organization. While the problems of 
the “human factor” and “well-being” appears to attract a heterogeneity of expectations 
towards both its content and possible solution, it is evident that the proponents of a more 
“human” organization find the material and bodily conditions of work less relevant for health 
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than the “psychological factors”, such as the employees’ self-assessment and individual 
experience of the workplace. Even though few voices express it in the same dramatic vein as 
Kile, there is a notable regularity of expressions folding out in this period, on the need for a 
transformation from the “material” to the “social” and “relational”. The report “Human 
Relations in Norwegian Corporations”, published in 1958, also underlines the non-material 
character of well-being: “We should not assume that measures of welfare will have any 
decisive influence on the well-being or efficiency in the corporations of a modern industrial 
society. Measures of welfare should not by any circumstance become some sort of substitute 
for measures which are more important to the problem of human relations. It is first and 
foremost the day-to-day relationships between colleagues, superiors and subordinates that is 
decisive for the well-being and efficiency among employees” (Arbeidslederen [The Daily 
Manager], no. 3, 1958: 55).  
Björn Sjövall, psychologist: “The question of the meaning of work has mostly been framed as 
an economic and social problem, and rarely does anyone ask what the meaning of work 
inclines in our personal lives. We spend a great deal of our daily lives at work and even in 
our spare time we might be said to be actively engaged in such a way that it resembles work. 
What signifies work is the fact that we aim for a result, and that we want these results to 
satisfy certain demands in terms of quality and quantity (…) Previously, we would experience 
work as meaningful because it gave us an economic incentive and a position in our 
community. The factor of personal development brings something new into this. Work 
becomes a part of our entire personality (Arbeidsledelse og Teknikk [Occupational 
Management and Technology], no. 9, 1953: 178-179).  
Øvind Skard, dr. philos.: “There is a lot of talk on “human relations” in the organizations at 
the present moment. A lot of people misunderstand this concept and equates it with welfare. 
These two concepts have nothing in common. “Human relations” concerns the relations 
between people. It is clear that this, then, does not concern a specific domain of 
organizations, but is a significant feature in all those instances when two or more people 
comes together in an organization” (Arbeidsledelse og Teknikk [Occupational Management 
and Technology], no. 8, 1955: 147).  
To various extents, the material conditions of work is placed in a rather dim past, and the 
future of organizations rely on how the persistent questions of well-being, satisfaction and 
thriving is dealt with, in which the “psychological level” is elevated to function as a matrix 
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for the mapping of health and illness among employees. An array of different tools for 
investigating the individual experience of the workplace is on the offer. However, we can 
also find efforts to pin out this problem in a somewhat different stake. Among the most 
striking in this regard is thesis of “hand in a glove”. While a number of new ailments find 
their name and place in the organizations during the 1960’s, such as anxiety and burn-out, 
one finds few examples of programs that are articulated to primarily handle the work 
environment as such. The “hand in a glove”-thesis is one exception and is formulated as a 
complete inversion of the question of individual “suitability”, which revolves around finding 
the “proper match” between person and position. The proponents of “hand in a glove” 
suppose instead that the organization itself makes out the epicenter of the tension (between 
the person and its environment) and likewise have to be resolved at the level of its structure 
rather than at the level of its individual employees. These new ailments are thought to stem 
from the organizational constraints and uniformity that leaves out any possibility for 
employees to find their “own place” at work. The consequences of such rigid forms of 
organization might be economically viable initially but comes with huge costs for the health 
and well-being of the employees and will eventually also harm the organization, as it will be 
drained for energy and resources, it is proposed.  
The organization should pave way for individual difference and make room for a diverse and 
unimpeded work life, where the environment should adapt to each person and not the other 
way around. In other words, this is a program framed in an anti-bureaucratic fashion, seeking 
to design organizations in which all forms of traits and individual character can fit like a 
“hand in a glove”: “To put it in a nutshell: We have to assemble our society in such a way 
that it fits all of us, or almost every single citizen – and help each and every one to find their 
own place. This should not happen by way of totalitarian directives, but as a service provided 
to every human being. They are not the same, their needs vary and their ability to perform 
diverge” (Vern og Velferd [Protection and Welfare], no. 3, 1968: 46). These proposals are in 
continuation of a larger debate on “fitting the job to the worker”, that emerges in the late 
1950’s and also unfolds in the realm of management journals (Arbeidsgiveren  [The 
Employer], no. 2, 1961: 23). Nevertheless, there is only a scarce and random continuation of 
the “hand in a glove”- thesis, which eventually disappears completely around 1970 and I will 





As far as I have been able to determine, among the first efforts to specifically re-invoke the 
«problem of health» in a realm of psychologized causes and effects takes place in 1931. In an 
article published in an anthology carrying the expressive title “The dissatisfied worker”, the 
two authors Fischer and Hanna distinguish between what they call “mental hygiene” and 
physical health, underlining the latter as a somewhat outmoded and limited concept of health. 
Mental hygiene is not counter-posed to physical health; on the contrary, it is conceived as a 
precondition of physical vigor, to such an extent that different forms of physical ailments can 
be prevented and handled through therapeutic work with the employees. A key term 
throughout the article – and the rest of the book – is the “maladjusted emotions” of the 
worker. Maladjusted emotions make out a hazardous risk for both the individual employee 
and the entire organization, and a number of examples of this is given by the authors. 
Accidents, for instance, are more often related to the emotions of the worker than to his 
physical surroundings or lack of measures of safety. Illness and fatigue may very well be 
“compensatory” acts, by an employee not feeling a proper acknowledgement for his work. 
Hostile attitudes towards the management is found among employees struggling with a sense 
inferiority or displacement. “Emotional maladjustment” thus serves as a universal scheme of 
cause and effect, wherein physical ailments appear through psychological “compensation” or 
as an effect of commotion. “Mismanaged” emotions can furthermore become poisonous for 
the whole organization, with employees less inclined to contribute and take care of its needs, 
or with individuals becoming so caught up in their own emotional upheaval that they neglect 
their own or other’s safety and well-being.  
Against this background, the authors recommend all organizations (of a certain size) to 
establish a “mental health department”: “The fundamental function or raison d’etre of the 
mental hygiene department is the safeguarding through personal and individual contact of 
the mental health of the potentially unstable worker and the adjustment of the emotionally 
maladjusted worker” (Fischer and Hanna 1931: 244). On the one side, “emotions” are 
attributed with a form of assessable quality that can both reach out to and “de-code” the 
employee in a way that would otherwise be unattainable for the organization. On the other 
side, the specificity of individual emotions must be rendered visible for each employee in 
order for such an inducement to take a proper foothold. Employees should be exhorted to 
locate the possible source of ailments within themselves, to traverse the inner range of 
emotions as an explanatory index of why they perform and behave as they do, and to intersect 
73 
 
their own sense of well-being with that of the organization. Accordingly, the employee’s 
inner life can become a spring of great productivity, if only “the potentialities wrapped up in 
his emotions” are allowed to be awakened and put into use (Fischer and Hanna 1931: 254).  
In addition to the prevalence of emotions, there is also an evident concern for the relation 
between the social and genealogical “biography” of the employee and his experience of 
difficulties at the workplace. A mental health department “should contain a complete record 
of the employee’s previous jobs, the length of time they were held, the reasons assigned for 
leaving; a record of each employee’s intelligence rating, a personality inventory, and his 
educational attainments; the number of brothers and sisters in his family and their respective 
ages; the ages of the parents and their social and economic status; the educational 
attainments of the parents and their vocations; and finally the employee’s marital status (…) 
In addition to these records the consulting psychologist will of course keep a careful record 
of each individual who comes or who is sent to him for help, the nature of his difficulty, the 
degree of improvement obtained, recommendations to other departments, etc.” (Fischer and 
Hanna 1931: 243- 244). Mental health here implies a far-reaching program, as far as the 
organizational assessment of the employee’s health goes, wherein “health” now serves to 
interlink everything from family background and career path to personality traits and 
cognitive capacity.  
F. Herzberg is, internationally, perhaps the one that most clearly tries to re-formulate a  
“psychological” program of health for the workplace, with affinities to the coupling between 
illness/ health and the management of emotions, brought forward by Fischer and Hanna. His 
“motivation-hygiene theory”, published in 1966, distinguishes between what he refers to as 
the hygienic and motivational factors of work. The hygienic factors consist of what prevents 
dissatisfaction with the job for the individual employee, such as effect on personal life, job 
security, salary and status. According to Herzberg, these factors do not, however, contribute 
positively to the satisfaction and contentment of work. Set against this backdrop, the 
motivational factors revolve around how employees’ sense of satisfaction at work affects 
their performance and wellbeing, and includes such concepts as achievement, recognition, 
responsibility and advancement. Herzberg states that “a “hygienic” environment prevents 
discontent with a job, but such an environment cannot lead the individual beyond a minimal 
adjustment consisting of the absence of dissatisfaction. A positive “happiness” seems to 
require some attainment for psychological growth. It is clear why the hygiene factors fail to 
provide for positive satisfactions; they do not possess the characteristics necessary for giving 
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an individual a sense of growth. To feel that one has grown depends on achievement of tasks 
that have meaning to the individual, and since the hygiene factors do not relate to the task, 
they are powerless to give such meaning to the individual. Growth is dependent on some 
achievements, but achievement requires a task. The motivations are task factors and thus are 
necessary for growth; they provide the psychological stimulation by which the individual can 
be activated toward his self-realization needs” (Herzberg 2007 [1966]: 375). On this basis, 
the article distinguishes between motivation seekers and hygiene seekers, in which the former 
is attributed the quality of finding meaning with the work itself, detached from its specific set 
of tasks, while the latter group is seen as more oriented towards extra-occupational sources of 
gratification, such as the already mentioned factors of salary and status. The most striking 
thing about Herzbergs text is, however, the way in which this employee-typology relates 
itself to the domain of health. The notion of both job attitudes and (mental) health, he claims, 
has for too long been considered the opposite of illness, and the question of health has 
thereby been constrained to only consider how individual’s respond to potentially negative 
impacts, such as distressing personal relations, anxiety or stressful surroundings. Instead, 
Herzberg suggests, the motivating factors of “self-actualization and personal growth” must be 
positively taken into account, in terms of what makes people both healthy and content at 
work: “The motivation-hygiene concept holds that mental health depends on the individual’s 
history or past experience. The history of the healthy individual shows success in growth 
achievements. In contrast, mental illness depends on a different pattern of past experience. 
The unhealthy individual has concerned himself with surrounding conditions. His search for 
satisfaction has focused on the limitations imposed by objective reality and by other 
individuals, including society and culture. In the usual job situation these limitations consist 
of company policy, supervision, interpersonal relations and the like. In broader life 
adjustments the surrounding conditions include cultural taboos, social demands for material 
production and limited native ability. The hygiene seeker devotes his energies to concern with 
the surrounding limitations, to “defenses” in the Freudian sense. He seeks satisfaction, or 
mental health, in a policy of “defense”. No personal growth occurs and his search for health 
is fruitless, for it leads to ever more intricate maneuvers of defense or hygiene seeking” 
(Herzberg 2007 [1966]: 381).  
The psychological categories at stake here, the intertwinement of personal growth, self-
assessment and mental health, involves a peculiar pathologization of the employee, which 
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also finds a strong foothold in the whole debate on the “human problem” in Norway. I will 
address this in the next few pages.  
 
Situational training and social sensitivity  
With the articulation of the “human problem”, the workplace is framed as the venue in which 
modern individuals acquire a sense of meaning in their lives. The employee comes there to 
realize his possibilities, alongside others who also do so, in a community of shared values 
between colleagues and between employees and the management. In this way, employees are 
presupposed as subjects guided by the will to realize their opportunities and the need for a 
sense of coherency and attachment. The workplace is, as such, destined towards offering a 
realization of meaning and objectives. When this fails, however, the health of its employees 
is at stake. Pathologies flourish, it is proposed, where the sense of meaning slips away or 
remains unrealized.  
To handle this condition, which does not report itself, so to speak, organizations start to 
acquire knowledge on the contentment and satisfaction – and the loss of it, among its 
employees. Questionnaires are sent out and group sessions and training programs are 
organized, where the employee and manager alike are encouraged to study the distinct social 
“dynamics” of the workplace and understand the social individuality of their colleagues. The 
questions revolves around the “environment” of the workplace and of becoming aware of 
others, how they might experience the workplace differently, due to different backgrounds 
and skills etc. Furthermore, both the employee and the manager are encouraged to discover 
their own individuality as a part of a bigger community. How does my appearance and 
behavior effect my surroundings, what kind of signals do I send out, how do I speak to my 
colleagues? In continuation of this, the employee is encouraged to assess his own emotions 
within this community. When do I feel content? How do I feel about the atmosphere at work?  
These new efforts to evaluate and interpret why and how the employee experience 
contentment, thriving and well-being is partly tapped from the realm of “human relations”, 
brought out to organizations through a register of psychological themes (Donzelot 1979: 
171). These themes, ranging from relational sensitivity to interpretation of utterance and 
situation is at this point, symptomatically, about to be fleshed out as a crucial managerial 
competence. As it is stated in one article on the subject of situational training for managers: 
“We may not often be aware of how we appear to our superiors or subordinates or our 
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friends, maybe not even to our immediate family. The situational training gives us the 
opportunity to learn more about the effect of our behavior” (Arbeidslederen [The Daily 
Manager], no. 1, 1960: 6).  Similar type of courses, targeting the enhancement of social skills, 
are also being directed towards employees. By the middle of the 1950’s, employees are, for 
instance, offered courses and small textbooks on the subjects of collegial sensitivity and 
corporation, in which they, among other things, can learn how to “evaluate their own 
attitudes as a member of a group” (Arbeidslederen [The Daily Manager], no. 3, 1958: 55). 
The courses offered on sensitivity and situational training are often based on cases, following 
a line enquiry on how interactions and situations unfold. A typical scenario is depicted: If 
your colleague behaves unexpectedly or displays an ill temper, there might be reasons for 
this, of which you are not familiar. It might derive from a specific situation at work or it 
might be related to private matters. Now, how would you deal with this? In other words, 
these are exercises and tools that conceives of the workplace as a community and which gears 
the employee towards reflections on how he is a part of a community at the workplace. The 
introduction to one of Sverre Lysgaards courses on thriving and well-being at work states that 
“we spend one third of our lives at work. This place gives us our status, our standard of 
living. It also gives us the decisive input for well-being or the lack of it. When the modern 
directors look at us, they assess our productivity and the conditions for well-being at work 
and with work. The employee and director are thereby in full agreement on the need to shed 
light on the workplace and the problem of wellbeing” (Arbeidsledelse og Teknikk  
[Occupational Management and Technology], no. 10, 1953: 75). The workplace, as it is 
portrayed here, provides the ontological reassurance of status, income and meaning and it 
provides a neutralization of the differences between employees and directors in their united 
efforts to realize the workplace’ sociality. Well-being involves a commitment to the 
realization of sociality. Symptomatically, among the topics at the course are the relationships 
between employees, the relationship between employees and managers, responsibility and 
involvement, as well as the participant’s attitude towards work and colleagues and the will to 
work and cooperate. The course, directed at both employees and middle-managers, 
encourages the participants to “investigate their own workplace in order to find out what 
makes us thrive and feel well or the opposite, what is the matter with ourselves and the 
environment and what can we do to create a better situation” (Arbeidsledelse og Teknikk  
[Occupational Management and Technology], no. 10, 1953: 75).  
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In the themes of the safety and recruitment, the health condition of the employee was 
observed directly, as the manifest state of his body. The physical and cognitive capacities of 
the employee are measured; “health” is detected when illnesses and injuries are directly 
absent or when the body appears energetic and fit. When the “human factor” becomes so 
central it also involves that neither illness nor health any longer only can be pinned out 
according to a set of distinct and unambiguous symptoms. The diagnose now also becomes a 
self-diagnose and the organizations put a lot of effort into folding out techniques of 
assessment for this purpose. When meaning attains such a central position, the loss of it 
likewise comes to constitute a risk, for both the employee and the organization, as a source of 
ailments, such as the lack of thriving and motivation and or a sense of unease.  
This means that illness and health, no longer holds a literal embodiment of viability; it is no 
longer only codified according to a host of qualities directly attached to the body of the 
employee. For instance, the risk of decline in the organization was previously equated with 
the decline of bodily conduct and vigor of employees. Now, on the other hand, the risk of 
decline is related, among other things, to the decline of motivation among employees. 
Another example is how “work environment” in this period acquires a new meaning, 
designating a social milieu more than the physical design of the workplace or how one starts 
to speak of the “climate” as a set of social relations at work. “The employees are not 
motivated because of the anomalies imposed by the work environment”, the organization 
seems to say about itself. At the same time, the organization also says to its employee, “to 
thrive and embattle these anomalies, you must find a meaning and this meaning can only be 
provided by yourself”. Illness then, is therefore no longer strictly observable in numbers of 
absenteeism or reported injuries and ailments and cannot be conveyed only as the cause and 
effect found in the interaction between the employees’ body and his environment. When a 
number of different concepts such as meaning, well-being, contentment, community and 
productivity assembles into a new semantics of health, there are also new pathologies 
appearing in its midst, such as passivity, unthriving, negativity and conflict-ridden attitudes. 
The various concepts and counter-concepts that circulates in the human semantics is abridged 




    
concept ┐counter-concept 
                                                  human  technocratic    
                                                  mental health  the body  
                                                  meaning  economic motivation  
                                                  involvement detachment     
                                                  motivation indifference  
                                                  cares for community  self-sufficient   
                                                  sensitivity  lack of social skills 
                                                  the employee is seen and heard  authoritarian rule   
                                                  individual differences privacy  
Illness and health is not as much a problematization of the body and environment as it is a 
problematization of the self and its environment, but emotions are not sought disciplined as 
was the case with bodily conducts. Instead, they must be spoken and balanced out in 





3) Illness as affect. 1980-present 
During the 1980’s, a number of new interventionist policies and programs are brought about, 
which aim to render the emotions visible to the employee who finds him- or herself in a state 
of disarray and upheaval. They are symptomatic for a number of new themes clustered 
around the emotions of the employee, wherein health and illness is increasingly invoked as a 
self-relationship that must be thoroughly scrutinized to find its solution. The techniques 
centered on the self’s interaction with the environment and its own “balance”, range from 
breathing- and relaxation-exercises to different therapeutic forms of speech acts. To be more 
precise, a whole vocabulary is now developed to describe a state of emotional maladjustment 
within the employee, that problematizes his relation to himself and his work.  
 
Detecting the self 
The semantics developing in this period is in continuity with a number of themes brought 
forward with the human semantics, not at least the interweaving of meaning and work. The 
most notable rupture in these new programs and tools from the 1980’s onwards is the 
outdifferentiation of an “affective self”, distinguished by his or her emotional 
(over)attachment to the surrounding environment. The following part will not be presented in 
the same detailed account as the previous periods that have been described. Instead, I will 
shortly describe the semantic field wherein stress attains its status as an “epidemic” before 
moving ahead to the problem of stress itself.  
In the 1980’s and the following decade, the “personal interview” is among the methods in 
use, that attracts a lot discussion, as at once a therapeutic intervention and source of 
knowledge of the employee:  
“Studies of the actual work environment does not tell us anything about each individual’s 
experience of his situation and his surroundings. Stress, anxiety and burn-out is not a 
physical entity that is measurable; in order to understand it we have to go and see the 
employee. In practice, this is done through large-scale work environment surveys, where the 
key tool is the personal interview. During such interviews you will often experience that 
people who claim to be in good health actually display precursory symptoms of illness. Many 
who proclaim to be satisfied with their work do actually have a relationship to their job that 
might turn out to be unhealthful. Others will claim to be very pleased with a high-pitched 
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work environment, through demands on their performance and pro-longed workdays, despite 
the fact that they don’t have any time for the necessary recreation. Others again, will say that 
they are pleased simply because they think this is what they are expected to say […] Through 
the interviews we will gain insight into the experience of stress and uneasiness among the 
employees, both physically and psychologically, which gives us the possibility to detect 
symptoms and predecessors to illness. Additionally, we will ask questions in order to map 
how each individual experiences the work situation, the environment and overall 
organization. These extended surveys cannot be conducted without a high degree of 
confidence between the interviewer and the employees. It is crucial that each person can 
speak freely and in complete discretion, which itself has a therapeutic value. It can be both 
difficult and redemptive to speak of your own experience with burn-out and stress, and such a 
conversation posits certain demands on the person conducting it. Some will, for instance, 
bring up experiences that intersect the spheres of private life and work, or reveal personality 
traits that they consider a “weakness”” (Ledelse [Management] no. 10, 1985: 40).  
The importance of trust and confidentiality between the interviewer and the employee is 
underlined repeatedly. Discussions are made of whether, for instance, someone of “senior 
rank” can conduct interviews with their own staff or if someone from other departments or 
external expertise always should be used instead. Under all circumstances, it is decisive that 
the employee feels free to expound experiences of difficulty, pressure and commotion, and 
the interview should facilitate an atmosphere of congeniality and lenience. 
There are two points to be made here. First, one can see how the personal and “inner” life of 
the employee, throughout its vast emotional range - his or her doubts, disappointments, 
enjoyment, sense of ease or discouragement, the experience of marital difficulties or collegial 
intrigues - are now becoming crucial points of reference for mapping and preventing illness 
as well as improving the work environment and enhancing the performance of the employee. 
Symptomatically, large scale surveys on absenteeism appearing from the 1980’s onwards 
frequently targets the mapping of “inner motivation” and sense of “coherency” and 
“meaning” among employees, in order to detect causal patterns between illness and 
discontentment in the workplace (see for instance, Andersen/ SINTEF 2000: 101-118).  
Secondly, to be able to identify and respond to problems such as anxiety and emotional 
strains, one must gain access to the inner vaults of sentiments in the subject. It is, as the 
authors of the abovementioned interview-technique suggest, a form of intervention that must 
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seek to dig out and unveil what is hidden within the employee, that can reveal the sources of 
her well-being, discontentment and pleasure, which she might not herself even be familiar 
with and conscious of. The employee might think she has a sound and healthful relationship 
to work, but she very well might not. She might think she has her balance in order and that 
she thrives in the hurried pace at her work, but she might as well be seduced and blinded by  
ideals of how an employee should perform, or she might be burdened and inhibited by her 
idea of belonging to a formal organization, which expect her to speak and act according to a 
certain code of conduct.  
This points towards a general problem in the various therapeutic tools; employees might be 
subdued by their expectation of how to behave and speak within the boundaries of a 
“traditional” organization, in which the relation – between organization and employee - is 
regulated according to pre-defined roles for the employee or an asymmetry between superior/ 
subordinate. This position and outlook is itself even framed as harmful and unsound, because 
it blocks for the possibility of an authentic self-relationship at work. The potential illness of 
the employee does not only reside in the slumbers of her mind as a self-relationship, but also 
in her own conception of a fixed relationship to the organization, that restrains her from 
saying what she really feels. Her “formal” identification of herself as an employee vis-à-vis 
the organization makes her unable to speak her own true will. In such an atmosphere, 
pathologies breed and dissatisfaction thrive. Another atmosphere and relationship is called for 
then, that can “open up” the employee, both to the organization and to herself. Therefore, the 
organization must seek to engage the employee in enactments of disclosure that breach the 
traditional “stiffness” characterizing a formal employee-employer relationship. This is also 
framed as a “motivation”-issue: 
“An employee who does not show the “willpower” to perform extra or to go out and finish a 
job with determination, does not necessarily lack the necessary personal skills in order to 
succeed. Maybe it’s just as much about the what kind of environment and what experiences 
we have been able to create when we meet this colleague or, alternatively, in our role as 
managers. Is there trust here? Will I be seen and recognized as the one who perform extra, if 
I choose a more crooked path towards the goal, if I invest the extra effort it takes to succeed? 
Self-control and endurance is not only personal traits that exist in a vacuum, even though we 
tend to think that way. Most of us know that it is easier to climb a mountain when we are 
accompanied by others, whom we care for, even though you still have to take every step 
yourself. Meeting people is somehow moments where you carry a part of that other person’s 
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life in your hands. How aware are we of this, in our private life and work life? How do you 
manage and make use of these moments as a good colleague or as a manager? How do we 
help each other to build trust and how do we give others good reasons to trust one another? 
Heightened awareness of this means that you as a good colleague or a good manager can 
make a considerable difference” (Personal og ledelse [Staff and Management], no. 4, 2014: 
55).  
The relation between the organization and the employee is, as such, highlighted as a pivotal 
site of managerial intervention, for the well-being of the employee to flourish, to prevent and 
curtail illness or improve the work environment. It is a relationship that must not be assessed 
– from the point of view of the employee - according to its character of employment and both 
the specific therapeutic tools and the general interaction at the workplace must therefore 
invoke an air of complementarity and friendliness; the enactment of emotional disclosure is 
surrounded by secrecy, care and confidentiality. The various therapeutic efforts must 
therefore not bear any resemblance to the play of question and answers found in an 
examination (Foucault 1995: 184-185). The aim is not to, by any regards, measure or assess 
the employee as such, but should be centered on how to facilitate the authenticity of her self-
relationship in such way that a true and unconstrained speech can be articulated. Her own 
search for, and expression of, true emotions constitute the efficient means to sustain her 
health and well-being. Furthermore, the organization seeks to mirror its own well-being (and 
lack of it) in the emotional state of the individual employee. The emotional life of the 
employee is conversely coded as a site of organizational learning and improvement, in which 
the employee’s unhindered and authentic speech makes it possible to map the actual work 
environment of the organization. In other words, the employee’s articulation of her true 
emotions accounts for a more realistic and accurate description of the organization itself than 
any of its other features, such as its physical surroundings, amount of sickness leave or health 
policies.  
An incessant concern for the “self-worry” of the employee is articulated throughout the 
different intervention-techniques and therapeutic tools, as a source of unbearable difficulties, 
in the form of negative thoughts, emotional “over-investment” and imbalance. The pathology 
marked here, between the employee and his or her work, is sought located in the (in)ability to 
distinguish emotions from thoughts. Phrased differently, the relationship between the 
employee and his or her work is coded as an affective self-problematization, requiring the 
individual install a distanced and rational gaze on itself. As it is pointed out by Holmqvist and 
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Maravelias, ”(…) the healthy employee is self-aware; i.e., he or she possesss self-knowledge 
about the impulses, faculties and shortcomings that are associated with his or her specific 
personality and lifestyle” (Holmqvist and Maravelias 2011: 133). We find this expressed in a 
variety of different ways: 
 “The point is to avoid becoming a victim of your own negative thoughts. If you find that your 
thoughts are filled with negative content and make you feel ill, try turning your attention to 
what's good at the moment and become more aware of what's right for you. From thinking 
that you cannot manage something, move your attention to what it actually takes, what 
resources you have, who you can contact, etc. This way you may experience better internal 
control and greater influence on your thoughts and actions, while strengthening both your 
self-esteem and self-image. Here is a basic question for all those who think their boss and 
colleagues are asking too much of them: Are you sure that they are actually expecting this 
much or is it just something you imagine?”(Personal og ledelse [Staff and Management], no. 
6, 2008: 20) 
 “Our emotions influence our ability to think and what we think. Strong, negative emotions 
like anger, despair, anxiety and self-load are more challenging to deal with than more toned-
down emotions like irritation, sadness, worry and disappointments of oneself. The strong 
emotions will surely trigger inexpedient thoughts and reactions that will increase the level of 
stress. Many will easily end up being trapped in thought patterns that turn out to be futile” 
(Arbeidsmiljø [Working Environment], no. 5, 2002: 32). 
Stress emerges in this period as a form of “queen pathology” in which this self-relationship 
seems to find a very condensed expression. I will therefore continue the discussion of this 
self-relationship by displacing the problem that has been guiding the current analysis, from a 
historization of illness and health to a historization of the stressful subject.  How is it possible 









“The important matter is that each self in its own grade, in its own measure and degree, 
should be as fully rounded up, as well-proportioned as possible. And this consideration 
brings us back to our neurasthenic patients. Is it not plain that what ails them is a loss of 
balance and proportion in their mental lives?” (Drummond 1906: 12)  
 “How and on which tasks do I spend my time? What kind of balance do I have between the 
different arenas of my life? Do I like what I do or would I rather be doing something else?” 
(Personal og ledelse [Staff and Management], no. 2, 2006: 32). 
Between these two quotes a hundred years have passed. Both quotes point towards a self and 
its self-observation, which seems to be overloaded by complexity, unable to find a proper 
form of outlet. Both quotes actualize the lack of balance as a symptom and point of 
intervention.  There is, however, not only continuity but also rupture between these two 
utterances. In the first, for instance, the problem is observed from the medical system and is 
centered on its exclusive audience, the patient. The second quote is observed from 
organizations and is directed towards employees in general. In this chapter I will look closer 
at both the affinity and difference between the patient of the first and the employee of the 
second.  
Stress is not only actualized as a self-relationship. During the 1970’s and onwards, stress also 
acquires the hallmark of a societal diagnose. It is observed as a malady of society, in which 
the low-spirited emblems of modern living can be fitted out and find a proper symptomology; 
hurriedness, the dissolution of social ties and self-consumption of work, loss of ancient 
virtues such as steadiness and the integral coordinates of religion, the increasing self-
indulgency and fragility of the younger generations. Stress, coded as at once an individual 
and societal disease, becomes a prism through which modern society is critically assessed; 
the solitude of the modern individual, its uprooted existence and alienation from society is 
adduced to the inspection of what is found to be an inherent illness in modernity. 
Stress is seen as a gloomy spark of life in a civilization draining itself for energy, a backlash 
for the prosperity and health that medical advancements has offered: “What makes people 
sick? It is the thesis of a growing number of medical scientists – and of this explanatory book 
– that the basic cause of much of the twentieth-century disease is a shadow which has slowly 
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darkened our lives, like the smog that has darkened our cities. This shadow is stress.” 
(McQuade and Aikman 1993 [1974]: 4). The “shadowiness” of stress is underlined 
repeatedly in the mass-medialized images produced in the 1970’s and 1980’s. This notion of 
dimness resembles somehow the pathological problem of stress outlined within the discipline 
of physiology in the prior decades. Unlike a body only responding to concrete attacks from, 
for instance, bacteria or sudden exposure to extreme heat, stress is additionally outlined 
according to its “shadowy” function: a state that haunts, in equal measures, perceptions of the 
future as well as the present, manifesting itself in a “sense” of danger – real or illusionary. 
When presented as a societal diagnose in the mass media, the “shadow” put on trial is, 
however, the very condition of modern society. Newspapers, popular magazines and self-help 
books report on the arrival of a malady residing in the heart of modern existence; stress is 
paving its way to the headlines, accompanied by baffled statements, diagnoses and advice on 
preventive measures from medical professionals, psychologists and statisticians (Jackson 
2013). One might say that modernity itself has again found its very own expression in a 
semantics of pathology. In 1983, the cover of Time Magazine depicts a crying, anguished 
man breaking free from blocks of concrete tied around him, under the headline “Stress! 
Finding a cure for Modern Anxiety”11. Critical voices, on the other hand, assert that “stress 
has become fashionable, most people with regard for themselves and their work are now all 
of a sudden “stressed out”” (Bjørk and Sidselrud 1985: 37).   
A large number of stress policies and management exercises at the present moment seek to 
enhance the self-relationship of the employee by different means. The employee is 
encouraged to surveil her own reaction patterns, to question her own impulses and retract 
from the immediacy of her emotions. This requires a distancing gaze towards the self, that 
can detect the intrusion of affect that is assumed to distort and tweak the experience of 
reality: “Stress management is about finding the inner readiness within each individual” 
(Arbeidsmiljø [Working Environment], no. 6, 2002: 15). The observation of stress as at once 
a “modern epidemic” and a problematic self-relationship strikingly re-evokes the reception of 
a pathology, which during the 1880’s proliferated throughout sanatoriums and medical 
journals, actualizing, as we will see, clutters of existential themes linked to a newfound 
subject, both under the spell of and anguished by work.  My hypothesis is that this figure is 
first actualized with the medical diagnose neurasthenia, emerging towards the end of the 19th 




century. More accurately, the neurasthenic condition pathologizes work as a self-relationship, 
as opposed to a condition strictly posed by external constraints.  
 
In-between sickness and health: the neurasthenic condition  
During the early 1880’s this diagnosis emerged, via the US, in Europe and the Scandinavian 
countries12. The term neurasthenia derives from Greek, and literally translates into “weakness 
of the nerves” (Pietikainen 2007: 46). It rapidly attracted the attention of psychiatric and 
medical expertise, to such a degree that already by the late 1880’s, over the course of less 
than a decade, it became among the most widespread diagnoses in Scandinavia, almost as if a 
long awaited, but unknown relative now finally arrived (Lillestøl and Bondevik 2013). At the 
time of its invention, the problem of neurasthenia gives rise to a number of considerations, on 
the relation between work on the one side and illness on the other.  
As soon as the diagnose paves its way into the medical journals, it becomes a source of 
controversy, as to what the primary causes are, and to whether or not it actually does exist at 
all. The Austrian professor L. Hirt is among those who finds the diagnosis’ prevalence 
somewhat problematic because it “presumes nothing. Its incorrectness is difficult to prove, 
and has thereby acquainted many friends during a short time” (Hirt 1889: 312). Doubts are 
made, in other words, of its ontological status. Other voices of the contemporaneous medical 
expertise raise similar questions about its suspicious “popularization”, relating it to the 
present day “forced struggle for existence and indulgency, in which all eggs are put into one 
basket in order to obtain the most in the shortest amount of time” (Dedichen 1886: 253). On 
the one hand, the neurasthenic is cast as an example of a weakness prevailing throughout 
society, as a pathology produced by society’s “lowered expectations” towards its youth and 
their incessant hurriedness. On the other hand, critics also cast doubt of whether the 
neurasthenic really is sick or a captive of a “popular discourse”, trapped in the enthrallments 
of a fashionable disease (Stäheli 2012). The diagnosis’ increasing frequency among patients 
at sanatoriums and in medical journals paves the way for the motives of the neurasthenic to 
come under suspicion. Is the neurasthenic merely performing? Does he just want to display 
the features of pathology without actually having been possessed by them? Some voice 
                                                          
12 Intellectual overstrain are seen as key explanations, but often in combination with other activities, such as too much exercise, hard manual 
labor, exposure to perverted literature, sexual frivolity, adolescent masturbation, a poor diet or infections (Vogt 1905a: 16, Hirt 1889: 314, 
Babes 1893: 153, Vetlesen 1907: 346-347). Furthermore, exhaustion and fatigue are considered the primary characteristics of the illness, but 
the cluster of symptoms deriving from neurasthenia varies and also includes insomnia, dyspepsia, headache, irritability, anxiety and sadness 
(Bynum 2003: 1753). 
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concerns of having unleashed a dangerous excuse for the self-indulgency among the younger 
generations and find its wide appeal troubling, because it might distort the distinction 
between the state of illness and health. The combination of the diagnosis’ supposed 
indistinctness and vast expansion is, by these voices, conceived of as an epistemological 
threat towards the “arch-division” between pathology and normality through which medicine 
has established its authority and knowledge. Those who most loudly formulate their hostility, 
equate the prevailing numbers of neurasthenics directly with the present zeitgeist: “The 
concept of neurasthenia seems to have found a great audience. There is supposedly 
something elegant about being neurasthenic and this elegance is in fashion” (Dejarine and 
Gaukler 1913: 548).   
However, the state «in-between» sickness and health is, for the most part, seen as an accurate 
and helpful explanation of the neurasthenic and his condition. It is a diagnose perceived to 
designate a transition, in which the subject is about to make itself ill by the enactment of 
sheer thought and fascination with, most commonly, work and intellectual endeavors. Against 
this backdrop, neurasthenia (as a medical diagnosis), is attributed with a groundbreaking 
insight, “providing a clearer understanding of the transitory states between the healthy and 
sick condition. These states have previously been considered irrelevant or partly still 
belonging to the planes of common tension, but they can indicate the beginning of more 
severe and damaging states. In order to afford a good treatment it is of the outmost 
importance that these states are discovered early on” (Vetlesen 1886: 190-191). Unlike, for 
instance, the contemporaneous diagnose of hysteria, the neurasthenic condition refers to a 
fixation, wherein the individual has become inclined to a state of thought, which has not yet 
taken a proper form as illness and can therefore not be observed according to any 
unambiguous symptoms. The neurasthenic is, as such, assumed to be both sick and not sick, 
embodying an odd state of normality and pathology simultaneously. This leads to the idea 
that “we are all more or less neurasthenic, for neurasthenia seems to range from occasional 
outbursts of uncontrolled temper or fits of gloom – “moodiness”, in fact, to obsession by 
some one false idea, ending perhaps in insanity” (Drummond 1907: 1813). Everyone carries, 
accordingly, traces of this pathology within them, to some extent or other. Even though the 
term “epidemic” never is explicitly linked to the phenomenon, as far as I have been able to 
see, it is under all circumstances an undercurrent of indirect affinities proposed in many of 
these assessments, folding out in the medical journals of the era.  
88 
 
The deviance is therefore partly marked in the culture of modern society, rather than 
exclusively in the individual as such, with its incessant demands of work and a way of living 
that holds a pace threating to consume each single of its members. Phrased differently, there 
is, so to speak, a double diagnosis offering itself with the articulation of neurasthenia, as at 
once an individual condition and a condition of modernity, thought to impose itself on the 
populations of Western societies, as a “disease of the present” (Anonymous in Norsk 
Magazin for Lægevidenskaben [Norwegian Magazine of Medical Science] 1886: 223). 
Modern society is considered suspect: it requires an incessant work of thoughts, it seeks to 
enthrall through promises of wealth and short-lived happiness, it appeals to instincts of 
devotion, but produces merely selfishness and self-regard. Above all, modern life, and in 
particular its working life, narrows the center of attention among individuals, in a way that is 
compared to living in a small room with the blinds down. The neurasthenics have been 
“crippled by modern culture” (Sadolin 1906: 418). This critique is partly fashioned as a 
redemptive call for the tranquility and simpler outlook on life found prior to the arrival of the 
modern work life and urbanization; virtues no longer esteemed, thoroughly neglected and 
shattered by the specifically novel problems posed by modern society, such as hurriedness 
and ambition: “It is born out of the ways of modern living, by the pursuit of self-enrichment in 
the shortest amount of time – one consults older textbooks on the subject without luck. There 
would be no reason for the neuropathologists to describe it, if it sometimes did occur in the 
past. It first emerged in present times, and it is very fitting that this disease was discovered or 
more correctly first described in that part of the world, in which inhabitants are known to 
both work and live fast, and they are decidedly more nervous and grow older earlier on, that 
is America” (Hirt 1889: 312). The subject has displaced its true will in pursuit of the 
fluctuating ideals fabricated by the contemporaneous zeitgeist, often in the form of a 
complete devoutness to the single idea that obscures everything else.  
However, neurasthenia is not considered to be evenly distributed throughout the population, 
some groups are more exposed than others, most notably people of bookish professions, such 
as intellectuals, brokers, politicians and artists, whose “calling requires spiritual and bodily 
vigor, are all neurasthenics to a certain extent” (Hirt 1889: 315). The neurasthenic is 
therefore very far from the marginalized figures that occupy great parts of psychiatry at that 
time, such as the sexual deviant, the insane or the criminal master-mind 13. On the contrary, 
neurasthenia is conceived of as a coming from the midst of society and is thereby, as already 
                                                          
13 For a description of the latter, see for instance Borch 2005: 36. 
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mentioned, partly linked to a pathological deviation within society itself. In many regards the 
opposite of an “abnormal individual”, the neurasthenic is considered as a sort of tragic figure 
of modern culture, and most notably its work culture. Perhaps more accurate, one could say 
that the neurasthenic is seen as the host of a pathology within the normal, as a condensed 
expression of the “normalized” ills contained in the surrounding environment of modernity. 
When put into a form, the transient figure of the neurasthenic looks like this:  
 
To briefly sum up so far, the neurasthenic is, by both critics and proponents of the diagnosis, 
viewed as a figure that somehow remains indistinct and without a proper place in the 
traditional schema of medicalization and treatment, as he or she cannot be positively 
represented as sick or “abnormal”, but only appear in the margins of and between “sickness” 
and “normality”. In this strange continuum between disease and health wherein modern 
human beings are thought to reside, certain dispositions of the mind can pose a pathological 
“danger”, such as the fixation of thoughts; the “obsession by some one false idea”, whereby 
the neurasthenic condition can take a foothold and expand, in worst case leading to extreme 
forms of mental illness, such as insanity. In other words, the neurasthenic is also linked to the 
prevailing register of well-established pathologies in the medical discourse.  
Among those diagnosed with neurasthenia is the aspiring author Robert Musil, who in 1904 
is treated for a “nervous condition of the heart” due to overwork. As an ambitious, young 
engineer, he devotes himself completely to the fulfilment of a project, involving the 
newfound possibilities of engineering technology. In Musil’s own words, he becomes 
intensively caught up in his work, as he notes in his diary: “I was tremendously excited. It 
would by no means be right to conclude from what I had done that success would follow. On 
the other hand, I couldn’t dismiss the idea out of hand either. At best it would take a year 
until everything worked. Tests, trial runs. I decided to risk this one year. With the firm 
intention that if I failed I would put an end to the matter. It worked and buyers were found for 
the patent which brought me quite a nice sum of money. But what a year that was! Just 
imagine such a person in the first years of full maturity who, in order not to dissipate his 
efforts, cannot spare a single thought for what he considers his vocation. For a full eighteen 
 
     pathology ┐normality 
                normality ┐pathology 
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months – then the sale and all kinds of related things made similarly heavy claims on me. 
Eighteen months ago I was talented and my [literary] drafts were well received. But what 
does it mean to have eighteen months cut out of one’s development! Will there be anything 
left there to justify having made this sacrifice? … You can imagine how one burns to test 
things out. At the start, one feels deep discouragement – but this is something one anticipates. 
It has to be this way. The nerves are like ropes that have gone brittle and the first thing that 
needs to happen is for the association centers in the brain to be replaced. But in a fortnight 
one begins to pick up the threads again. Then some family doctor or other runs across one’s 
path and diagnoses a nervous condition of the heart as a result of overexertion, orders 
complete rest and paints the blackest picture of what will happen if one disobeys him. Of 
course, one has lived too intensely – it’s no wonder at all if, not having a single finer idea 
throughout the whole day, nor any sense of one’s own spiritual existence, one wants 
experience stimuli at night that positively tear at the nerve-endings…” (Musil 1999 [1904]: 
72-73).  
Musil’s account of his own beguilement and luring fascination of work is striking. The sense 
of illness he contracts is, in his own account, obviously not seen as a result of any exterior 
conditions and hardships attached to labor, yet he is, according to himself, made sick because 
of this work. The illness of this work is linked to an unhealthy consumption and obsession 
within himself. When Musil becomes consumed by work, he is lead astray from all other 
matters of life, as he describes it in his diary. This enigmatic state is promoted by medical 
expertise as a defining feature of the neurasthenic, and as such, Musil’s self-description is not 
very original. It is completely in line with the semantics emerging among medical 
professionals and therapists at this time. While he was ordered to rest at his family home, a 
large number of patients were sent off to sanatoriums, spa resorts and clinics, but apart from 
that one will find cases similar to that of Musil reverberate throughout the medical journals 
and reports from sanatoriums. George M. Beard, who first coins the concept of neurasthenia, 
describes a number of patients, with certain common features. A young man, aged 36, 
suffering from vertigo, insomnia and a feeling of pricking: “the pretty evident cause was 
excess in sexual indulgence combined with over work in business” (Beard 1887: 4). Another 
man, aged 27, displays symptoms of weakness and numbness aggravated by physical exertion 
and labor: “mental labor, however, when protracted, made him worse […] In order to 
improve his health he had spent several months traveling in Europe, but was more injured 
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than benefited thereby. Long standing in picture galleries seemed to have aggravated all the 
symptoms” (Beard 1887: 5).  
The relation between the self, work and illness is articulated throughout the descriptions of 
the neurasthenic patients and their ailments: ‘“Mr. R. aged 30. Business man, with very 
marked family history of nervous tendency; inclined to take whisky to exess; a very hard 
worker; anxious to succeed in business, often worked all night or took only one hour’s sleep 
in the twenty-four; thought he could do without sleep. Lost the power of expressing himself in 
writing, could not spell simple words correctly, would even forget his own name when 
signing a cheque. Began to take alcohol to procure sleep. Complains of restlessness; cannot 
concentrate on a business problem; sleeps very little; disposed to be excitable; has feeling of 
pressure and discomfort in top of head, aggravated by mental work” 
“Mr. R, aged 37. Business man: has been nervous and restless for some 12 or 18 months. 
Four or five months ago sold his shop, and has since brooded over this transaction. Thinks 
he will never be able to start another business – that he has ruined himself by his folly in 
parting with his business. Talks of nothing else; cannot sleep; complains of beating in the 
temples, which he says keeps him awake. His friends fear he will “go out of his mind” on 
account of his perpetual worry over the shop. Very depressed at times” (Drummond 1906: 
12-13).  
The descriptions are typical for the neurasthenic patient, oscillating between restless activity 
and fatigue. While Musil’s condition, a“result of overexertion”, is described as a form of 
perplexity and paralyze, it is still not a pacifying condition, but rather the opposite, in the 
form of a restless activity in which all attention is drawn towards work – after which a sense 
of fatigue sets in. The novelty of this obsession thought to emerge “from within” can hardly 
be overestimated, according to the medical expertise (“one consults older textbooks on the 
subject without luck”). What’s more interesting in this context, is that while neurasthenia 
couples a fatigued body with the enactment of work, its diagnosis could not possibly be 
further away from what Karl Marx around the same time describes as the horrific and 
terrifying imagery of extortion and overwork found at the factory floors (Marx 2008 [1890]: 
306). The overburdened subject presumed in the neurasthenic condition, exhausted by 
overwork and fixed thoughts, seems impossible to equate with the worn-out bodies found, for 
instance, in the mines or the factories. Instead of a state of exhaustion strictly derived from 
the material conditions of work, it is assumed that the subject somehow has become unable to 
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dispose his or her own initiative and energy properly, leading to unsound attachments to the 
work itself. In this regard, the neurasthenic diagnosis sets in a new form of reference between 
the worker and the enactment of work that cannot be directly paired with the concept of the 
contract or with the exploitation-thesis. It is a reference that directs the subject’s over-
extortion back to his own problematic self-relationship. I will describe this in the following 
pages.  
 
Loss of will and balance: a self of fixed ideas 
The neurasthenic is confined to his own continuous “self-examination” and is, at the same 
time, immersed in fascination with a singular idea or object, from which he has difficulties to 
detach:”[But] when one is allowed to absorb more than its due share of attention, and by 
degrees to become, as we say, a “fixed idea” monopolizing consciousness, the habit of 
selection is lost, the true will slips into abeyance, its power weakened or lost for want of 
exercise, and a usurper reigns in its stead. Instead of choosing its own objects of attention, 
the mind is unwillingly dominated by some notion that has taken possession, and becomes 
gradually narrowed down to its limits” (Drummond 1906: 12).  
While appearing indistinct as a pathological condition, its symptoms are sought identified 
indirectly according to a certain form of falsity that has entrenched itself in the subject. He 
has somehow, it is suggested, lost track of his own centerfield. The “self” can no longer 
display any features of authenticity, as it is depraved of its own true will and seduced by 
artificial ideas. The neurasthenic is ultimately considered to be in a state of temporary “self-
loss”, having no possession over the means by which it orients itself and perceives of reality, 
and thereby unable to constitute itself in the world. It is, as such, a diagnose of failed or weak 
self-observation; the self is considered unable to observe itself because it remains too closely 
attached and attuned to its own self-examination. This combination of absorption of thoughts 
and loss of will is explicitly linked to power. In the quote above, David Drummond, among 
the leading medical experts on neurasthenia of the era, conscripts the interweaving of 
powerlessness and the self, which makes out the object of intervention in the sanatoriums and 
spa resorts. The problem of the neurasthenic is that his will has been displaced within himself 
and that it remains beyond his reach. The fixation of his ideas is at once a symptom of his 
loss of will and a symptom of an external, alien will which have taken its place and absorbed 
him. His powerlessness lies in the fact that he is guided by a will other than his own, 
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incapable of distinguishing an external intrusion from the impulses, thoughts and perceptions 
truly coming “from within”. Likewise, the “loss of balance” from which the neurasthenic is 
suffering, is put in motion by emotional and intellectual “over-investment”. This is where the 
medical expertise comes in, it seeks to intervene in order move and transform a subjectivity 
from a state of powerlessness to true will and from a state of fixation to release.  
The neurasthenic therefore remains indistinguishable for itself, absorbed in complete and 
intact attention to whatever object or idea that has spellbound its will. Animated by an over-
investment of thoughts, emotions or actions, the neurasthenic is in a “loss of balance”. The 
emotions contained within the self must to be turned into a hetero-reference: “self-
consciousness unites two elements distinguished in thought, but inseparable in experience, 
subject, and object, the “ego” which feels, thinks, wills; and the environment which is 
absorbed in feeling, knowledge, action, and is itself interpreted and remodeled in the process 
[…] When once this constitution of the self is fairly apprehended, the inspiring thought 
follows at once that within limits it is open to all of us to become the selves we wish to be. We 
may do it by the exercise of steady choice in our objects of feeling and thought; these 
forthwith become the springs of our action, and in all three capacities are made one with the 
self by the double movement which at once transmutes objects into the self and transforms the 
self into their likeness. Infinite grades of character naturally emerge from this process, 
according to the degree of access that any individual has to that which is beyond himself and 
to the possibilities of responses with which the “ego” starts its career. The important matter 
is that each self in its own grade, in its own measure and degree, should be as fully rounded 
up, as well-proportioned as possible. And this consideration brings us back to our 
neurasthenic patients. Is it not plain that what ails them is a loss of balance and proportion 
in their mental lives? Some idea or group of ideas assumes abnormal and undue importance, 
overmasters the central will, and leads to a break-up in the hierarchy of centres governing 
both conscious and subconscious life” (Drummond 1906: 12).  
What is the logic governing this problem, of a subject temporarily out of control and in loss 
of its will? There seems to be two contradictory agencies at play, which upholds the 
neurasthenic figure. On the one side, there is the superior autonomy of a rational self, that is, 
a self that exclusively hosts its own thoughts and perceptions as opposed to the influences 
coming from a variety of external sources, originated beyond its own rationality. The self’s 
supposed superiority is drafted from its ability to detect and maintain a boundary, a strict line, 
between its own independent rationality and those more or less artificial rationalities found in 
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its environment. On the other side of this model of a triumphantly rational self, there is an 
agency which, in its fixed yet imperceptible ties to an external object or a false idea, cannot 
see how it has discharged of its own autonomy and have become dominated rather than self-
ruling. In order for the self to regain its own true will and rationality; to realize its own 
inferiority, it must, paradoxically, be enlightened and mobilized by exterior interventions of 
therapy and exercise.  
In line with this distinction between the self and its environment, Drummond sketches out an 
association of perception and reality that is mutually contingent. The neurasthenic condition 
is, as already mentioned, though to be retrieved from a general immobility of emotion and 
thought, but these can come back into motion once the neurasthenic realizes that there is a 
variety of patterns and options available to him – on how to feel and think differently. In 
other words, there is an element of contingency sought installed between the immobile self of 
the neurasthenic and his environment; all individuals are equipped with an ability to choose 
how it perceives of its reality and can thereby also form this reality itself, according to 
Drummond, but for the neurasthenic, provisionally guided by a will other than his or her own, 
these choices remain invisible as choices. Every human being, Drummond asserts, contains a 
latent capacity to form its surroundings by way of perception. This sense of contingency and 
choice is, however, lost in an accentuating state of neurasthenia. A peculiar juxtaposition is 
proposed, then, between the constancy of a self-governed and superior rationality and the 
mobility of thought patterns.  
Against this backdrop, a typology is pinned out, of the specific characteristics of the thought 
patterns and inclinations of the neurasthenic. In other words, even though everyone are 
considered to be “more or less neurasthenic”, certain personalities are more prone to the 
obsession of ideas than others: “The human being is just as varied in its individual resistance 
to harmful influence as it is varied in its appearance and look” (Cramer 1910: 144). They are 
susceptible to “embrace shadows before joys”, and fail to see how their own emotions and 
outlook is determined by perpetual introspection: “Our unhappy neurasthenic patients forget- 
if they ever recognized- that the mental horizon of which each individual is the centre may be 
gloriously wide and embrace the interesting and sunny aspects of life, or may be miserably 
circumscribed to the petty affairs of one personality who lives under the toils, burdens and 
sorrows of life in a dense shadow that obscures all its joys. Hence the danger of introspection 
and self-examination to those whose minds are not easily responsive to the common 
wholesome incentives to thought, and who are not spontaneously attracted by things outside 
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their own limited personal sphere; for these habits tend to fix attention more and more on the 
central point, the tiny circle from which radiations might go forth to an infinitely far horizon” 
(Drummond 1907: 1813-1814). 
 
Neurasthenia and occupational hygiene 
The Norwegian psychiatrist Ragnar Vogt relates neurasthenia to extreme efforts of 
brainwork. In his publication on psychiatry and in a lecture series held in 1905 he outlines the 
“physiological and psychological conditions, under which the ability to work can be 
exploited with a precise economy – in order to pursuit happiness of life and personal 
development” (Vogt 1905a: 1). Under the heading of “occupational hygiene”, Vogt discusses 
how “brain-energy” can be stored and consumed most efficiently. While the brain directs the 
performance of intellectual tasks as well as the functional impulses of the body, no 
demanding intellectual activities can be carried out without reducing the total amount of 
energy available to the brain, according to Vogt (Vogt 1905b: 3). He is not alone on this 
venture of interweaving work and personal development according to certain dispositions of 
vital forces of the body. It can be detected in the reports from sanatoriums and occasionally 
also in the medical journals, in addition to small handbooks and manuals published on the 
topic. This literature is partly fashioned as an answer to the problem of neurasthenia, and is, 
as far as I can see, the first time the themes of work, happiness and personal development is 
interlinked through different forms of exercise and self-accounting. In other words, the 
neurasthenic condition does not only call upon a therapeutic intervention, but also a 
continuous work on the self, on a daily basis. Just as importantly, however, personal 
development is invoked as an answer to the problem of the neurasthenic condition.  
Happiness and personal development are here formulated as the object of work. Work does 
not serve its own purpose, but the purpose of attaining a development in the inner life of the 
employee. At the same time, the employee is obliged to take care of this him- or herself, on 
the basis of efficient and systematic use of energies. The notions of happiness and personal 
development does not, however, really contain any specific meaning, as neither Vogt nor 
anyone else makes any noticeable account of their implication. Exactly what the development 
in the inner life of the employee signifies or how work can afford happiness, remains 
therefore unknown. Instead, Vogts guide is centered on the regularity of disposition of body 
and mind throughout the conduct of work. 
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In his writings, Vogt compares the brain to a machine, which consumes energy fulfilling one 
task while it at the same time decreases the amount of energy that can be spent solving other 
tasks. The key concept of energy is assumed to represent a universal potential inside all 
humans, as the basic element that makes us able or unable to work. The energy must 
accordingly be handled with regard to individual varieties, such as persistence, and carefully 
be adjusted to the schedule of the day14. To sustain well-being and health for the worker is, 
according to Vogt, largely a matter of planning work properly and predisposing energy 
efficiently. While the volume of brain-energy will vary between individuals, everyone will at 
some point meet a boundary, at which a sense of fatigue and exhaustion will set in. This is 
especially true for those who also devote a considerable part of their energy to steer the 
functioning of their own organs (Vogt 1905a: 5-11).  
Against this backdrop, he introduces three elementary principles of energy saving for those 
undertaking any kind of intellectual work. The first form of saving is based on consciously 
selecting the order of tasks that are set out for a day’s work. When the brain over a period is 
accustomed to fulfilling certain tasks, it works more relieved after a while. The most 
demanding tasks should therefore be performed firsthand after a night’s sleep or after shorter 
rests during the day, while more familiar tasks can be carried out afterwards. By the means of 
“harmonious exercise”, the brain can thus be adjusted to handling challenging intellectual 
work, and up to a certain point, most individuals with certain capacities can be skillfully 
trained to master their energy efficiently (Vogt 1905b: 4). Secondly, any element of the new 
and unfamiliar will require a substantial amount of energy, as the brain, just to process the 
very imagery of the unknown, becomes heavily burdened. The intellectual worker should 
therefore carefully consider how and when he ventures into unknown or new surroundings 
and conditions of work. The third principle of energy saving is directed towards an 
“enhanced setting of attention”. The intellectual worker is often too easily distracted by 
interruptions or tasks, for which he or she is unprepared, leading to a situation where any line 
of thought barely is able to arrive at a conclusion. As far as possible, the worker should 
commit to the schedule set for the day and at all costs avoid irregular hours at the office, such 
as overtime. The lack of continuity and well prepared and set tasks for a day’s work as well 
as irregular working hours is described as triggering factors of the neurasthenic conditions 
(Vogt 1905a: 5-11).  
                                                          
14 The exercises of energy saving do by all accounts address a certain kind of privileged worker, who can consciously take into consideration 
and decide how to make use of the energy available to him or her throughout a day’s work. 
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Vogts inquiry revolves around a concept of energy, through which the worker can make 
strategies, predispose capacities, and enhance the ability to fulfil the tasks during a day’s 
work. Through the use of time-tables, planning and by breaking the day’s work into pieces 
according to their degree of energy-consumption, the neurasthenic ailments can be tamed, 
controlled and prevented. In other words, neurasthenia can be prevented by the means of a 
regular and disciplined conduct of the enactment of work, according to Vogt. 
 
Proximity and distance  
Vogts concept of a disciplined enactment of work seems to present itself as a form of 
“vaccine”, whereas the sanatoriums, necessitating a withdrawal from work, are presented as 
the treatment of a condition in full flourish. As pointed out, the neurasthenic is cast into a 
lapse of thrilling one-mindedness, whereby all attention is drawn towards the object or idea 
of his or her fascination. It is perceived as a problem of proximity, as an inability to retreat 
from specific thoughts and disengage with objects. This closeness to the enthralling objects 
and ideas is sought broken through certain procedures of separation, detachment and 
isolation. The aim is to enable a regained and strengthened will through separating the self 
from its false desires, so it can become unbound by the fixed ideas overmastering a “true 
self”. The treatment of the neurasthenic revolves around attaining two forms of distance. 
 First, there are the spatial arrangements through which a physical distance is obtained. The 
recreational spaces of the sanatoriums and health resorts provide the ideal topos for this 
purpose, as they usually are placed far from the hurriedness and noise found in the densely 
populated areas of cities and small towns. Patients are treated with various combinations of 
rest, diet, isolation, bathing, hiking and other forms of low-key exercise. The aim is not only 
to separate the neurasthenic from infatuating objects, but also to shield him or her from the 
urgency and haste of the modern, urban life; “the practice of prolonged hiking can do more 
good than a whole pharmacy” (Hirt 1889: 316). Bearing in mind that a large number of the 
patients are diagnosed with some form of overexertion due to work, the worker is now, for 
the first time, being sent off to the soothing resorts at the countryside and up in the 
mountains, put into electrical baths and sent off at long walks and hiking15. His or her body 
                                                          
15 It is worth noting that the condition is not restrained to the spheres of intellectual work. While the intellectual classes and businessmen 
often are at the center of attention for the diagnosing and treatment, farmers and working class are also frequent neurasthenic patients in the 
sanatoriums As it is noted by Petteri Pietikainen, “neurasthenia was not restricted to the intellectually overstrained middle classes” and in 
certain sanatoriums across Scandinavia the neurasthenic patients were made out by a majority of working-class (Pietikainen 2007: 102-103).  
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and mind must be withdrawn from the entrenchment and consumption of work: “it is highly 
recommended that the patient for a period of time is placed in different surroundings, among 
other people, that can provide another engagement than what he is used to, under constant 
supervision of a doctor” (Hirt 1889: 315). The neurasthenic’s desire to be near work must be 
dissuaded. Physical proximity is offered as a “de-temporalization” of the self, that at once 
seek shield the neurasthenic from the enthralling enactment of work and the general 
accentuation of the modern world.  
Secondly, by the means of a physical distance that can furnish a certain relaxation, a re-
strengthened self can appear, enabling the patient to differentiate and set itself apart from the 
ideas occupying its mind. The patient must not end up mimicking his or her ordinary life and 
work, but is instead encouraged to mimic other, possible “lives” filled with soothing 
activities. For instance, patients are expected to refrain from work that is too similar to their 
profession and are encouraged to do gardening or carpentry in order to keep their minds off 
intellectual endeavors. Even though rest is considered an important element in the treatment, 
too much of it is dissuaded in case of triggering a “hypochondric self-observation” and 
thereby worsening the condition of the patient. These treatments thereby also contains an 
element of “dis-identification”, whereby the self can remove himself from the contagious 
enactments of work and urban life and re-furnish an identity in line with his own true will.  
The semantics brought about to actualize the neurasthenic can be viewed accordingly:  
 
concept ┐counter-concept 
                                                  powerless and loss of will true will   
                                                  emotional over-investment  balanced 
                                                  introspection wide mental horizon  
                                                  fixation choice    
                                                  abeyance independence   
                                                  self-examination   
                                                  falsity  





What exactly is the novelty of neurasthenia? It is not the first time the field of medicine seeks 
to scrutinize the relationship between work and illness, as this starts to take place almost two 
hundred years earlier (with the publication of Bernardo Ramazzini’s “Diseases of workers” as 
its point of departure, also mentioned previously (Ramazzini 1940 [1700]). Furthermore, a 
moral concern for the social and political agency of the worker also made out another co-
current and reoccurring problem throughout the 19th century, which in part was sought 
governed through the worker’s body. Across great parts of Europe and the US, workers were 
in this period encouraged by employers to take part in morally elevating activities in their 
spare time, in order to, among other things, be lifted up and separated from the politically 
harmful and degrading masses the working class so easily could become attached to (Cross 
1993: 99-103). These concerns, in the US and parts of Europe formulated as appeals to 
“rational recreation”, revolved exclusively around the activities of workers outside of their 
workplace, in which their bodies and minds were sought lifted into communities of kindred 
spirits through sport and song16.  
In other words, the novelty of neurasthenia does not revolve around its articulation of work, 
illness and health. The advent of neurasthenia indicates, instead, a completely new 
problematization of the individuality of the subject in his or her relation to work, where 
illness, work and the self is brought together in the light of a series of self-problematizations. 
The self is seen as having become pathologically imprinted in the enactment of work 
according to a lack of self-restriction. It is the first time that the source of problems is located 
within the worker him- or herself; the dispositions of mental energies; the fixation of 
thoughts; the lack of balance and will; the inability to “let go” of work. The neurasthenic 
condition installs a reference between the worker and the enactment of work that 
problematizes this relation as a self-relationship. 
It is remarkable that this condition, that occupies such a central position in psychiatry around 
the turn from the 19th to the 20th century, was thought to designate a continuum between 
pathology and normality rather than to constitute a clear-cut illness as such. To a certain 
extent, the neurasthenic condition is perceived of as a “normal” response to a pathological 
culture. On the one side, the neurasthenic was identified, albeit vaguely, as a patient and his 
condition was treated with the aid of a spatial distance provided by the sanatorium. On the 
                                                          
16 Although, according to Gary Cross, these efforts often failed to become the intended locus of organized leisure (Cross 1993: 101-102) 
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other side, the neurasthenic was perceived as a figure going far beyond the function of 
medicine and treatment, as a “symptom” of a societal pathology. As such, the neurasthenic 
did not only pose a medical problem, but he posed a problem for the constitution of the 
medical gaze by de-stabilizing the distinction between healthy and sick. The neurasthenic’s 
indistinctness is “doubled up”, both indistinct to himself and to the system which seeks to 
diagnose him as either sick or not sick. The difficulties of finding a proper place for the 
neurasthenic in the medical realm leads to accusations of a fashionable disease, an imposture 
merely playing out a ready repertoire of a popular pseudo-pathology. 
 Almost with the same sudden rush as the diagnosis emerges, it loses its dominant function as 
a diagnostic term and ebbs away in the intersecting years between the two world wars, and 
appears today as a marginal phenomenon in classification schemes such as ICD-10 (Byrum 
2003: 1753). However, the analysis provided in this chapter has not been guided by an 
interest in the ruptures or discontinuities taking place within the fields of psychiatry and 
medicine as such. Instead, I have intended to show how a specific notion of subjectivity 
comes to take shape as a self-problematization, that is made into an object of intervention; a 
self-relationship which is sought transformed by re-instating a rationally autonomous agency 
















The assets of pathology 
We have seen how the neurasthenic is conceived of as a tragic figure of modern life, no 
longer able to separate himself from the surrounding environment and how this is handled by, 
among other things, sending these individuals off to resorts and sanatoriums in order to keep 
their minds off work and themselves. To make the subject regain its own will and come 
closer to himself, he must distinguish his own thoughts from the “artificial” ideas of modern 
culture that surrounds him; he must amend his own thought patterns and disconnect with the 
objects occupying his mind. For the inventors of stress research half of a century later, the 
most impeding object standing between the self and its environment, is likewise related to the 
“perception of events”, which can be handled by “by putting events, goals and ideas in a 
different perspective, through conscious thinking. For instance, saying “I prefer to meet this 
goal” rather than “I must meet this goal”” (Smith and Selye 1979: 1955). There is in other 
words a specific problem underlying the condition of stress concerning the self-relationship 
of the person holding that condition. Unlike the neurasthenic sent off to the soothing 
sanatoriums in the mountains, the stressful individual must acquire “balance” by other means. 
In the following pages, we will see how, with the articulation of the “problem of stress”, this 
figure becomes charged with qualities of fundamental vitality to human life and the 
performative needs of society. Already from the initial attempts in physiology to pin out a 
new concept of the interaction between the human being and its environment, there are 
guides and instructions following in its wake formulated by the stress researchers themselves, 
on how to handle this supposed ancient state – of a self-opposed self. With the appearance of 
stress as a physiological problem, a new and detailed theory is built up around this figure, 
regarding the relation between the body, the perception and its environment. Stress 
management and stress research is inseparable. As the quote above indicates, the pioneering 
actors of stress research did not strictly confine their problem to the observation of 
“physiological processes”, but were actively engaged in formulating programs, directed at 
both organizations and a general public, in terms of how this condition efficiently is 
managed. Stress, just as we have seen with the concept of neurasthenia, does not really attach 
itself directly to neither illness nor health, but is instead situated between these two poles. 
There is, in other words, a strong continuation of a condition that simultaneously is linked to 
both illness and non-illness. A new element introduced to this state “in-between”; the 
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embattlement of the self-opposed self becomes a positively connoted state that 
simultaneously withholds a negative effect. Stress is both necessary and harmful. I will 
devote the following pages to the emergence of this necessity, and against this background 
give a detailed account of the intertwinement of theory and practical advice that constitutes 
the initial stress research.  
Exactly how are the scholarly endeavors of these stress researchers entwined with the 
management of stress, already from the offset of their research? First, they actively reach out, 
as practical advisers, self-proclaimed professorial “laymen”, public educators etc., to the 
different realms of organizations found in education and industry. The extent to which these 
researchers also function as counselors, industrial advisors and “therapists” (composing self-
management techniques on the basis of their own biological and physiological research), 
makes it tempting to construct a caption like “research-management-therapy” and stick it 
onto the massive production put forward in this field. This was done to such an extent that it 
has been argued that the concept of stress did not proliferate into a “popular discourse” from 
a branch of science, but the other way around: “Rather than a well-validated scientific 
discovery slowly permeating popular consciousness, it was support for the concept among 
the masses and the growing tendency to interpret their experiences in terms of “stress” that 
led to the gradual acceptance of what had previously been a highly skeptical community” 
(Wainwright and Calnan 2002: 40). Second, the analyses and vocabulary on stress brought 
about in these works has taken a monumental form, as a source of revelation that explain not 
only why or how human beings are stressed, but also how it can be dealt with.  
Thus, from the very beginning of stress research within the discipline of physiology, its 
pioneering actors set out to formulate their research programs and epistemological interests, 
not only according to a study of the human body, but also with an explicit effort to contribute 
to the improvement of society and the functioning of its institutions. This was done in light of 
the basic human response mechanisms, which they sought to unveil and interpret in their 
research. In the voluminous body of work that Walter B. Cannon and Hans Selye produced, 
there is a continuous and remarkable intertwinement of perspectives considering the human 
body, on the one hand and the organization of society, most notably the industrial 
organizations, on the other hand. In other words, the epistemological profiles in these works 
are rarely consistently engaged with a strictly physiological problem, but on the contrary 
often juxtapose and enmesh considerations of the human body with and against the society 
that surrounds it. In the words of Foucault, this research provides “programmes of conduct 
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which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of “jurisdiction”), 
and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of “veridiction”)” (Foucault 
1991c:75). 
I will describe how this research went far beyond concerns posed in a strict framework of 
physiological inquiry, but how they sought to provide general societal analyses and ideals of 
self-management on the grounds of their physiological research. Following this lead, I will 
look at how certain forms of “self-analysis” and “codes of behavior”17 are posited in their 
advice aimed at both a general audience and organizations.  
Before I move on to this, I will linger just a moment on the peculiar type of knowledge that is 
brought about and represented in these works. On the one hand, one finds restless, 
undetermined and hastily conceptualizations, brought up as intrinsic at one moment, just to 
be left to lie fallow the next.  When looking into the reels of ideas and practical advice that 
constitute the writings of these researchers, it becomes apparent that they leap back and forth 
between different knowledge forms, such as pedagogy, psychology, sociology in addition to 
its base of physiology and biology; guided by a complete undercurrent of impatient 
digressions and analogies. This “mess” is simply a strong and consistent feature in the body 
of work brought forward by Walter B. Cannon and Hans Selye, invoking in the reader a sense 
of witnessing a knowledge form that still is looking for its own coherency and a more 
determined shape through which it can present itself.  It is far from unambiguous what their 
theories are designed to promote: The “low”, sketch-like epistemological contours of the 
knowledge found here seems not yet certain of its own representation and hence actualizes 
itself through a vast number of appearances; a philosophical inquiry based on physiological 
underpinnings; a biological code of human behavior; a self-management model; an industrial 
psychology and so forth.  
Yet, on the other hand, this is also a knowledge that eagerly awaits its own groundbreaking 
influence throughout society and which, from the offset, goes about to prescribe “grand 
narratives” in which modern society can inscribe itself and explain its various problems and 
possibly find solutions to them. Moreover, it is a knowledge that presents itself through 
ostentatious proclamations, whereby it seeks to link itself to the essential keys of the human 
nature provided by the likes of Darwin or Malthus. In this context, I will not trail these efforts 
                                                          
17 A term used by Hans Selye.  
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to place their own research in a direct line of “grandiose” thinkers, but center in on how the 
subject of the stressful condition is problematized and made into an object of intervention.  
 
The body politic of Walter B. Cannon18 
Throughout the 1910’s and the following two decades Walter B. Cannon delivered the 
blueprints for what stress researchers later would describe as the “feedback mechanism” and 
adaptive functions of the nervous system. In a number of these writings, which both aimed at 
a general public and peer scientists, Cannon voices his concern for the situation in which the 
modern man might end up: mollified and completely at ease with his surroundings. After the 
shock of the First World War, pacifism is on the rise throughout Western societies, and 
Cannon considers this new anti-militarist movement to pose a considerable threat towards 
both human nature and the industrial organizations of society. In “Bodily Changes in Pain, 
Hunger, Fear and Rage” (1970 [1915]), Cannon describes how the “fighting qualities” 
inherent in human nature should not be evaded by any means, because the utility to society of 
a subject that remains alert and prone to respond with an instinct of attack, should not be 
underestimated. When warfare between nations seems to diminish and the nature of fighting 
emotions is increasingly belittled, other domains of society needs to substitute the “martial 
virtues” found in the military that in equal measures can pertain the urges and elemental 
instincts of humankind.  
There are two points to be made here, which I will discuss at some length. A) When Cannon 
proposes “to examine other forms of organization – industrial, domestic or social – in the 
light of the organization of the body” (Cannon 1967 [1932]: 305), he very accurately put into 
words a peculiar ambition of his research; to transpose a biological problem observed in the 
interior of the body to the social organizations of society. B) The question of how the 
organizations of modern society can stimulate man’s natural desires imputes a specific 
subjectivity, which point in two directions of stimulation. On the one hand, it relies upon an 
environment that effectively can nurture, uphold and facilitate these primary traits of human 
capacity and will, and on the other hand, it is a question of how the societal environment can 
be nourished by them and effectively put them to use. 
                                                          
18 Cannon refers tirelessly to the necessity of a “body politic”. The semantics of “body politic” has a centuries-long conceptualization in the 




(a) The body of society 
How does Cannon see the problems he observes in the field of biology, revolving around the 
organization of visceral nerves and increase of blood sugar, as not only relevant, but simply 
intrinsic for the understanding of modern society and the individuals it inhabits? First of all, 
despite highlighting the importance of man’s natural instinct, Cannon does not consider 
human beings to constitute a body of mere animalistic or primitive behavior. On the contrary, 
Cannon considers the society surrounding modern individuals to be out of step and 
rudimentarily composed when compared to the evolutionary advances of human beings, a 
society on a stage of development similar to “lower animals”. Therefore, it is society rather 
than mankind that finds itself on a primitive level.  
Secondly, what the surrounding society lacks in comparison with the physiological 
achievements of the human bodies, is a well-functioning centralized agency of stabilization, a 
“social homeostasis”, that can uphold the necessary steadiness of security and freedom in 
order to reduce unnecessary distress among its members (Cannon 1967 [1932]: 305).  
The idea of a social homeostasis is derived from the physiological homeostasis, which serves 
as a guiding concept in the research of Cannon. It describes the bodily capacity to preserve a 
steady state of blood pressure, temperature, or level of oxygen etc., despite the infliction of 
disease or physical constraints such as extreme heat or starvation. In the latter case, for 
instance, the body is thought to “spare” the parts of the brain and the heart, on the cost of the 
decay of other physiological structures (Cannon 1941: 4). Homeostasis designates thereby the 
careful and intelligent composition of instant defense and stabilizing agencies mobilized by 
the body, when different forms of danger threatens it.  
Cannon conceives of the various functions of labor and professions found throughout society 
as analogous to the specialized functions and organs of the human body. While various forms 
of skilled work performed by employees in the spheres of business, education or industrial 
manufacture provides the necessary service for the continuous maintenance and development 
of society, it lacks the elemental function to regulate internal stability when faced with threats 
such as mass unemployment or economic decline. In times when such crises actually occur, 
the whole body of society weakens, due to the distress inflicted on its individual members. 
The challenge of managers and leaders is to arrange for a readiness of responses, which can 
uphold a sense of stability among the members of society during an “attack” and enable 
effective forms of counteroffensive, to diminish the impact of such attacks. In other words, 
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society – and especially its industrial organizations and division of labor – is not only similar 
to the functions of the human body, but the actual governance of society and organizations 
holds unrealized biological qualities, by which “incredible steadiness” can be achieved 
(Cannon 1941: 5). The utopian visions of Cannon, often proposed under the slogan of a 
“more perfect social justice”, invokes a society that on the one hand is akin to the 
“wholeness” of biological organisms, in which different parts are seamlessly arranged and 
unified in the supportive functions of the body. On the other hand, society is understood to 
lack exactly this agency, which can provide for such arrangements, in the form of a 
government that intelligibly facilitates a “constancy” of security and freedom, despite any 
form of external pressure or threat. The condition of stress is therefore equally as present in 
the bodies of human beings as it is in the body of society.  I will not go into further detail 
with Cannons strange and fascinating efforts to provide a framework, in direct continuation 
of his physiological research, for the enhancement of societal governance and organizational 
management. The reason is simply that this idea of societal and organizational organisms, 
when not discouraged by peer researchers (see for instance Melcken 1932), does not find any 
further points of connection in the stress literature, in occupational health promotion or the 
practice of stress management19 – it is simply blocked out and remains today only in the 
shadows of the legacy ascribed to the initial stress research.   
(b) The substitutes for warfare 
While the concept of a “social homeostasis” never makes it into the realms of organization or 
the political spheres for which it was designed, the “martial virtues” which Cannon assigns to 
human nature finds a foothold that can be detected in almost any contemporary stress 
management course or self-help manual, under headings such as fight or flight20. 
Physiological homeostasis (stress does not appear as a specific term in Cannons work until 
the 1930’s21) is, as we have seen, presented as a response mechanism in which “primal 
instincts” of the body are activated, such as the release of blood sugar or secretion of 
adrenaline, which supplies the body with energy and reduces any sense of fatigue. This array 
of responses is sought explained as the result of man’s evolutionary adaptation to the specific 
living conditions in wild life, where omnipresent dangers have threatened and left human 
beings with the two options of either resistance or rapid withdrawal (Cannon 1970 [1915]: 
                                                          
19 Although there are those who remain favorably inclined towards his proposal of studying social organizations in light of the (stress-
handling) body, neither this ambition nor the concept of social homeostasis is followed-up at any noticeable scale (see for instance Selye 
1974: 63).  
20 An expression coined by Cannon himself in 1915. See Cannon 1970: 219 
21 See Cannon 1935 
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218-219). On this basis, homeostasis is understood as a generalized and universal state of 
response, embedded in the deep nature and biological structure of human beings.  
It might come across as somewhat peculiar that Cannon is so concerned with the societal 
preservation of martial virtues (and hostile towards pacifism), considering his efforts to pin 
out a system of social homeostasis wherein individuals could be sheltered from the anguish 
contained in modern society. However, the idea of a social homeostasis does not lead Connon 
to disallow the concepts of threats and dangers as purely harmful. On the contrary, as 
previously pointed out, the necessity of stimulating man through different forms of activation 
of perceived or real threats is central to the initial thesis of homeostasis. Alluding to the 
psychologist Graham Wallas, Cannon proposes that the lack of a situation whereby the 
different emotional responses of individuals are triggered into action can itself cause 
ailments, such as nervous strains (Cannon 1970 [1915]: 380; Wallas 1914: 66). The “baulked 
disposition” which can be found in the state of idleness is therefore not only unnatural to 
man, but also pose a threat to society at large. When the fighting instincts of human beings is 
kept at too great a distance, the complete welfare of society is at stake, due to the lack of 
energizing mechanisms that are not allowed to find a proper form of release, with the 
following risk of a society that lapses into self-indulgency and shortage of initiative (Cannon 
1970 [1915]: 391). In other words, society must find the proper means to satisfy the human 
body’s integration of “martial virtues and preparations for conflict” (Cannon 1941: 9). The 
most interesting thing in this regard is not how Cannon in his general theory brings about a 
vocabulary that is partly mounted on, both directly and indirectly, military terminology, with 
a prevalence of concepts and terms such as combat, struggle, aggression, hostility, 
antagonism, defense and attack22. The most striking thing is how the processes of reaction 
observed within the human body holds a direct psychological evidence for the military 
composition deeply ingrained in the human character, as its most defining feature23. The 
subject that appears here, always directed towards the single purpose of his or her own 
survival, is basically a displaced warrior (Cannon 1941: 4). To sum up short, human behavior 
is therefore, at a very primal level, above all dispositioned to react on threats and dangers, 
both as a source of stimulation and ontological intimidation. As human nature, according to 
Cannon, has been structured to reside in an environment of constant danger, the stimulation 
                                                          
22 This vocabulary is not unique to the works of Cannon in the field of physiology at this point.  
23 It should be noted that Cannon strongly oppose any militarist notion of the necessity of war (see Cannon 1970). 
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of these “martial virtues” are intrinsic for the general development of individuals, who are 
always-already geared towards warfare.  
The resolution, however, to the problem of finding a proper form of release for these 
aggressive instincts is not to be found in the ontological insecurity provided by war. This is a 
skepticism partly ascribed to the totalizing destruction of modern warfare, but also to its 
increasingly “machine-like” character, in which the battlefield has removed itself from the 
virtuous struggle of man against man: “The exhilarating swing and tug and quick thrust of the 
big limb muscles have largely vanished. Pressing an electronic contact or bending the trigger 
is a movement altogether too trifling” (Cannon 1970 [1915]: 391). Instead, Cannon proposes 
competition as the proper form to “discipline the forces” of aggression and to exercise the 
fighting instinct, which is embedded in the nature of humans. It allows for a simulation of 
threats and danger to be kept up within human beings, on the condition of the existential 
security provided by modern society. The competition holds all the virtues that modern 
warfare either fails to deliver or delivers in too great amount: bodily vigor, attainment of 
alertness and skill, a practice of self-restraint, magnanimous rivalry, promotion of hardihood 
and willingness to encounter hazards. The contest is therefore the ideal answer and substitute 
to warfare for the human subject who always moves, in the depths of his nature, across a 
battlefield or, at least, a hostile environment. In this way, the concept of the modern 
individual is steeped in the image of the contingency of nature; its play of unpredictable 
demands and its incessant struggles of survival. Cannon brings together the raw contingency 
of nature and the tranquility of modern society, and points towards simulation of threats and 
dangers as the solution to the tensions between the naturally dispositioned human body/ mind 
and its artificial, modern environment.  
The diagnose of the human being placed in the midst of tensions brought forward between a 
civilized society opposed to a nature of pure contingency, afforded by Cannon: 
concept ┐counter-concept 
                                                  idleness fighting qualities    
                                                  baulked disposition  rivalry and contest 




The pathologies marked by Cannon are those of a society having completely discharged the 
sense of living under threats. Modern society has overemphasized the need for comfort and 
serenity, and by doing so, it might easily strip away the initiative of its members, which must 
be nourished by stimulating an experience of danger and unpredictability. As such, Cannon 
invokes a societal pathology that “contaminates” a natural state held within human beings, 
most markedly as a lack of the disciplining constrains provided by the relentless contests for 
survival that hosts the game of nature.  
 
Eustress/ distress 
Following the necessity of finding a proper form of release of certain impulses in a similar 
vein, Hans Selye, who initiates the branch of research exclusively conferred to the problem of 
stress, proposes that “stress is unavoidable and, in fact, it would be undesirable to avoid it” 
(Selye 1979: 6). Stress is, thus, now considered to carry a positive and necessary influence 
alongside its negative impacts on human beings. With Selye’s introduction of this two-folded 
notion, the preservation of “fighting qualities” (for which Cannon is so preoccupied 
throughout his writings) is advanced to a whole edifice of knowledge on the interplay 
between human beings and their environment. Hans Selye names this double capacity of 
enhancement and detraction eustress and distress. It immediately sparks controversy across 
different disciplines and remains, to say the least, contested. The psychologist Richard B. 
Lazarus has, for instance, noted that “despite its widespread appeal, [it] has still not been 
adequately supported or refuted by empirical research” (Lazarus 1999: 32). However, while 
enduring a controversial position within different branches of research, its impact can be 
detected in any stress management course, organizational stress policy or self-help book, 
often presented as a universal feature of human nature: “The stress response is highly 
functional when properly managed, leading to eustress and elevated performance. There is 
also a downside to the stress response, for individuals, and for organizations, which is called 
distress. Distress occurs when the stress is not well managed or when it goes awry” (Quick et 
al 2013: 14).  
The evolution of this pairing does not evolve gradually, but happens with a sudden and abrupt 
turn in Selyes work. When he first outlines the concept of stress in the mid-1930’s, under the 
heading of General Adaptation Syndrome (GAS), there is no such two-folded disposition of 
the stress experience present in his dissection of biological mechanisms. Stress is, initially, 
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considered to designate a physical process leading to different forms of psychological 
responses. It actually takes beyond thirty years before Selye articulates the “machinery of the 
body” along such a two-sided spectrum of responses, with one side containing the potential 
of productivity and enhancement (eustress) and the other side containing only wear and tear 
on the human capacity (distress) (Szabo et al. 2012: 477). The notion of eustress is initially 
picked up, curiously, from an interdisciplinary anthology entitled “Why Man Takes Chances”, 
which for the most part contains philosophical and sociological inquiries into the thrills 
pursued by fictional and real “stress-seekers” (Klausner et al. 1968). Under different 
professional guises, the following question is put forward in the book: what characterizes 
both the societies and the individuals who are prone to pursue threats and dangers only for the 
sake of their thrill? The question in itself is interesting, because of the analogy between 
human beings and society is again proposed here. Unlike Walter B. Cannons notion of a 
“social homestasis”, it is not the interior body which is put adjacent to society, but a 
personality trait thought to reside in certain human beings which is being made equivalent to 
“traits” found among different organizations and societies. It is suggested that this 
“personality” is prone to take risks and is attributed with features akin to those of the warrior 
and entrepreneur. These features are, in the work of Selye from the late 1960’s onwards, 
recast from a typology of individually differentiated qualities into a typology of the stress-
experience itself, which thereby becomes a feature ingrained in all human beings to various 
extents. In other words, a notion initially designed for characterizing an untypical and 
extreme individual quality (found among only a small minority of individuals) is almost 
immediately reconfigured into a general tenet of human nature itself.  
This innovation allows for a new form of assessment of the subject’s relation to its 
environment. Firstly, the human being is made into a carrier of a symptom, which is at once 
both tormenting and stimulating the body, in a peculiar binary structure that now renders the 
state of stress with a universal force of aggression and as an equally universal precondition of 
life itself. Secondly, new predicaments of the individual’s internal life is brought about and 
arranged according to the necessities of different forms of “self-analysis” that can enable a 
transformation of the self24. These arrangements are directed towards the particular 
experience of the subject’s “life world”; how does the world appear to the individual; what 
makes each person feel strong and in command or weak and helpless; how does family life or 
work intrude and upset or enrich and improve well-being? These are among the topics that 
                                                          
24 «Self-analysis» is a concept often referred to by both Hans Selye and some of his fellow researchers within physiology.  
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are now are being introduced among stress researchers, requiring the stressful subject to 
attune to a therapeutic mode of self-inquiry, in order to render the vast emotional register 
within him- and herself, sometimes hidden or suppressed, visible and thereby also 
manageable. Stress becomes contingent upon each individual’s outlook or capacity as well as 
nourishment, sleep, lifestyle etc.  
Stress is considered to necessitate a “wholeness” of self-analysis and awareness, as it is 
handled by at once working on the body, through means such as correct nutrition or workouts 
and by working on the perception, through coping techniques and self-analysis. The 
perceptional and bodily response, as primary targets of intervention, analysis and exercise, 
point towards an “invisibility” that unfold in the supposed “abyss of forces” that constitutes 
the condition of stress. What so obviously sets stress apart from most other pathologies, is 
that the condition of stress holds a both transformative and binary structure, found in the 
eustress/ distress-scheme. What makes one person feel at ease and well, such a tight schedule 
at work, can make another person ill. Alternatively, by means of self-intervention, an event 
previously causing illness can instead designate a productive and enhancing experience for 
the same person at a another point in time. A dominant characteristic of stress as a 
pathological entity is therefore found in its radical self-patholigization. The self “thinks” and 
“feels” itself to illness, but this pathologization can be suspended and reversed. The eustress/ 
distress- scheme displays a remarkable trait, in which a biological reaction thought to cause 
illness can, by way of perceptional intervention, be transformed into its opposite, as a source 
of well-being and health. The key to this transformation lies in the act of making perceptional 
reaction patterns visible to oneself, whereby stress can be reduced, or even be turned into an 
asset, creating a “being in balance”. In a text published in The American Journal of Nursing, 
a “model for coping with stress” is proposed with the following proclamation: “On all levels 
of life, from unicellular forms to human beings, health is determined largely by stable 
balance, a condition in which the parts of the whole function in harmony. When an organism 
is not in such balance, a condition of excessive stress exists” (Smith and Selye 1979: 1953).  
The ancient theme of balance and of the part and the whole is here turned towards the 
emotion and perception of each individual. Moreover, the condition of excessive stress is 
proposed as the result of a lack of such a balance. To take a concrete example, the model 
presents the reader (in this case most likely a nurse) with the problem of “perception of events 
and agents as stressors”, which can be handled by “neutralizing the intensity of stress by 
putting events, goals and ideas in a different perspective, through conscious thinking. For 
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instance, saying “I prefer to meet this goal” rather than “I must meet this goal”” (Smith and 
Selye 1979: 1955). The “perception of events”, as it is phrased here, is presented as a key to 
unlock what might otherwise seem a fixed and definite experience for the individual. In 
addition to other “conditioning factors” such as a healthy lifestyle, sound nutritional habits 
and absence of sudden life changes, the question of so-called coping mechanisms are at the 
centerfield of this model. In this specific case, the stressful individual is presented with three 
mechanisms of coping: ventilation (of feelings, “talking about problems”), diversionary 
activities (distract the attention from the problem) and physical activities (decrease anxiety by 
utilizing the “unchanneled energy created by the stress reaction”). Coping with stress thus 
requires an extensive work on the self, ranging from perceptional modification to physical 
workouts and nutrition.  
On the one hand, we find in the concept of stress a disclosure of a whole economy of the 
body, functioning according to incessant reaction patterns, which at all costs strives towards 
upholding an equilibrium of its internal environment. In the midst of this economy is the 
circulation of energy, inexorably used, gained and restored throughout the different functions 
and parts of the body (Selye 1976: 429). This is the basis of both homeostasis and the general 
adaptation syndrome (GAS). There are three successive stages to the “human response 
mechanism” of GAS, first introduced by Hans Selye in 1936. The first reaction, the alarm, 
designates a phase of shock and “countershock”, where the adrenaline in the body heightens. 
In the second stage of resistance, the initial sense of shock disappears and the body is 
seemingly “adapted” to the new environment of threats. In the third stage of exhaustion, the 
body is out of “adaptability” and can no longer keep up with the “adaptive” requirements 
posed by an external stressor to the body. Thus, an alarmed body is mobilized to resistance, 
which eventually exhaustively gives in – this succession of biological reactions is likened to 
the lifecycle of a human being: birth/childhood, adolescence/ adult life and finally old age/ 
death. The stages do not only display the elementary defensive mechanisms of the body, 
according to Hans Selye, but constitutes a plain operation of the most elementary form of life 
itself (Selye 1976: 459). “Stress” is, during the 1960’s and 1970’s (in the writings of Selye), 
increasingly steeped in such ontological images, elevated to a function as the matrix of 
essential life: the human body would not be able to perform its most basic operations, 
including the process of circulating blood, breathing etc., without a state of stress. Thus, 
stress is proposed as a universal condition of life and the mere act of staying alive. It is not 
only a mechanism brought about to safeguard human beings from possible threats when they 
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occur, but designates a constancy of operations that simply marks the division between death 
and life. Hans Selye himself notes that “there is no such thing as no stress. Only in a dead 
object is there no stress because there is no demand” (Selye 1979: 6). 
On the other hand, we find minute, diverse and relentless prescriptions of how the threat of 
disequilibrium (resulting in a state of stress) can be handled by different means of 
intervention, through perceptional exercise, self-awareness, counselling, breathing 
techniques, nutrition, sleep and lifestyle. It is a work that, among other things, requires the 
individual to make itself the object of analysis: “[M)an’s ultimate aim in life is to express 
himself as fully as possible, according to his own lights, and to achieve a sense of security. To 
accomplish this, you must first find your optimal stress level, and then use your adaptation 
energy at a rate and in a direction adjusted to your innate qualifications and preferences” 
(Selye 1974: 110). The subject must center itself on finding a proper level, an adequate 
balance and adjustment between what is damaging and what is stimulating for itself and how 
this level can be obtained through self-mastery. It involves a variety of strategies for how an 
experience can be configured differently, be specified in new ways and reshaped through the 
work on the sheer perception of each individual. These forms of reconfiguration are only 
available to the individual who, above all else, is prepared to acquire certain forms of 
knowledge of him- and herself.  
Distress is not only counterposed to eustress, but is a state that can be recast through a style 
of thought into a less distressful mode of being or even transformed to an experience of 
eustress. In the work of Selye and his peers, these techniques are proposed under headings 
such as a “code of behavior”, a “model for coping with stress”, a “philosophy of gratitude”, a 
“guide of conduct” and so forth, outlining, among other things, different personality traits and 
how they can be modified, or how certain “reaction patterns” can be overcome25. Under the 
guiding light of self-analysis, certain experiences can be assembled in other ways or recast in 
a different light, in order to obtain the right balance: “Stress, at its best primes you for your 
                                                          
25 The workings of the mind of the individual is, however, regulated according to very simple mechanisms and easily placed into typologies 
of popularized psychology, considering the complexity of biological structures that unfold in the interior of our bodies. We have, for 
instance, the “goal-oriented person” and the “positive thinker”, prone towards experiencing stress in positive terms, characterized by 
handling pressure by way of a “joy of achievement” and being “more conducive generally to success” (Selye 1980: 9). Opposed to this 
group of individuals, is obviously the “negative-thinking person”, who might not experience a lot of stress, but nonetheless will come out of 
things less satisfied, perform poorer and not obtain the healthy state he or she otherwise could. In this context, Selye refers time and again to 




peak performance at work or play and rouses your interest in the world. At its worst it can 
interfere with your ability to think and act straight (…) The wisest course is to try to 
recognize the circumstances that sound alarm bells and learn to manage the harmful 
stressors. This self-knowledge can help you sidestep some of the stressors that sour life and 
make the most of those that enhance it” (Selye 1979: 18).  
 
The bio-psycho-social-being 
Central to this self-knowledge, is a puzzling race against nature itself. Human beings are not 
strictly confined to the limits of their own nature, but can, provided the right means, amend, 
revise and even transform certain conditions of the nature that constitute our bodies and the 
way it informs our minds. The malleability of the individual’s perception can overrule and 
master the “nature of our bodies”, through which reality can be experienced differently: 
“nature doesn’t always know best”, as Selye states (Selye 1980: 9). According to this line of 
thought, the challenge is therefore to find the codes to “outclever” the body and its reaction 
patterns; each individual has to learn how to take charge and dominate the forces of his and 
her own nature. However, alongside this transient and malleable conception, we also 
encounter another form of nature, which is charged with completely different superiority. 
This is a “true nature” of human beings that has been distorted by misunderstood promotions 
of philanthropy and altruistic efforts in Western societies, and a form of nature that remain 
fixed and solid: “We can do nothing about having been built to work and work primarily for 
our own good. Organs that are not used (muscles, bones, even the brain) undergo inactivity 
atrophy. Every living being looks out for itself first of all. There is no example in Nature of a 
creature guided exclusively by altruism and the desire to protect others” (Selye 1976: 451). 
Selye continuously filters out two such distinct “natures”, one that works through laws over 
which no human being can possibly exercise authority, and which designs the thorough, 
invisible commands that can only be affirmed by our social behavior. Moreover, on the other 
hand, there is a nature which can be transformed, bent and modified, if only individuals allow 
themselves to become aware of how they react to threats and dangers. In other words, in this 
other form of nature, the perception of each individual can defeat and surmount the nature 
embedded in our bodies. In these two outlines of “nature” then, perception either is under the 
spell of it or simply detached from its laws.  
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The two variables described here, the economy of the body and the regulation of self-
analysis, composites the individual in a particular kind of prism; it appears as a “bio-psycho-
social-being”26, linking the elements of physical rouse observed in the interior body to the 
imperative of balance, requiring a certain knowledge of and a certain work on the self. Selye 
accordingly encourages people to find their own stress level: “People differ with regard to the 
amount and kind of work they consider worth doing to meet the exigencies of daily life and to 
assure their future security and happiness. In this respect, all of us are influenced by 
hereditary predispositions and the expectations of our society. Only through planned self-
analysis can we establish what we really want; too many people suffer all their lives because 
they are too conservative to risk a radical change and break with traditions” (Selye 1976: 
452).  
The bio-psycho-social-being is therefore a creature born out the efforts to interlink biological 
observations in the interior body with a set of normative prescriptions of self-management 
and organization. As such, the physical body, the mind and the sociality of each individual is 
sought bundled together in the state of stress and the attached requisites for handling it. This 
intertwinement, found across the models and prescriptions for self-management pinned out in 
the name of a physiological science, joints the body, the “sociality” and the mind of 
individuals as equal, interrelated targets of intervention. The imbalance found in the interior 
of the body must be “balanced out” in mental capacities and in the social life, through the 
different planes of identity that is thought to make up a person, such as work, family life or 
leisure. What is important to notice is how this whole imperative of balance melds biological, 
emotional and psychological reactions into a single mold. The question of balance brings in a 
grid of analysis (“self-analysis”) and intervention that unites a physiological process to that of 
social and psychological processes. The biological system is, as such, promoted to function as 
a representation of social and psychological problems. This point has also been made by 
Abbott (1990). In his exposition of the tradition of stress research, he notes how this scientific 
genre has been made up of four distinct, but overlapping themes, which adds up to the notion 
of the “stressful individual”; anxiety, performance, adjustment and what he refers to as 
“mentalism”. While there is no underlying unity holding these themes together in a cohesive 
epistemological framework, they all point towards how stress research is informed by strong 
cultural undercurrents in the contemporaneous society, far from any conception of a “pure” 
science.  The elements of “culture” making up this branch of research point towards a “janus-
                                                          
26 A term used by Selye. See Smith and Selye 1979: 1953 
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faced” subject, according to Abbott, which “is at once damaged by society and maladjusted 
to it” (Abbott 1990: 442).  
The construction of the “bio-psycho-social-being” can be summed up according to the two 
forms of contingency which it seeks to interlink:   
A) The contingency of the environment we reside in. The environment is portrayed as 
fundamentally unreliable; any living inhabitant might suddenly be forced to adapt to a 
completely new situation by way of struggle or flight, e.g. the environment will be posing 
more or less demanding requirements of action towards us, often without any form of 
warning in advance. We might or we might not succeed to act in accordance with these new 
requirements, which can be a matter of life and death or just greeting the new superior at 
work.  
B) The contingency of our own perception of the environment: Human beings will respond to 
the same external threat with different levels of reaction “internally”, which, according to 
Selye and his peers, can be explained by the difference in perception between individuals.  
 
Stress as pathology and self-suspension of pathology  
Just as with the case of neurasthenia, a lot of debate is stirred up concerning the difficulties of 
finding a proper place for the concept of stress in the differentiating scheme of health and 
illness. Is stress really a disease at all? From the offset, this question attracts quite some 
attention, and the pathological status of stress becomes a source of considerable dispute. For 
instance, it is proposed that “(…) we might be better off without the term “stress” at all, given 
our present crude level of insight, but perhaps the notion of a generic term which somehow 
ties together the threatening or taxing demands of the environment on living organisms 
strikes some deep, responsive chord within us which keeps alive the use of “stress” 
terminology in spite of all the confusion it creates” (Mason 1975: 8). The very confusion of 
the concept is, up to the 1980’s, repeatedly a frame of debate among researchers, therapists 
and other practitioners; its lack of clarity, its general vagueness, its “simple-minded 
invocation” which has “done as much to retard research in this area as did the concepts of 
the miasmas at the time of the discovery of microorganisms” (Casell 1976: 107).  
 The backdrop for a number of these debates is how the notion of stress seems to be charged 
with a particular kind of pathology: “Stress is a (perceived) substantial imbalance between 
demand and response capability, under conditions where failure to meet demands has 
117 
 
important (perceived) consequences” (McGrath 1970: 20).  Stress is referred to as the “just-
to-be-ill syndrome”, whereby its “vagueness” is pinpointed as a central feature of the 
experience itself. Throughout Selyes research, we find descriptions of stressors, what 
produces stress, as non-specific demands, but also the effect of these demands remain non-
specific. In other words, any situation can trigger stress and this stress can manifest itself in 
an extreme variety of symptoms (Engel 1985). The key term provided by Selye here is 
adaptation, which is juxtaposed to maladaptation. A human being will, accordingly, to 
various degrees react and manage to handle the various non-specific demands posed by its 
environment. Adaptation then, designates the individual capacity to handle pressure and 
maladaptation the lack of such a capacity.  
Secondly, as we have seen in this chapter, stress is designed as a pathology that is not only 
counterposed to “health” but seeks to simultaneously describe itself according to notions of 
both health and illness. As a pathology it can only appear on the condition of its self-
suspension as pathology, as what I have previously described as de-pathalogization. The 
pathology of stress can only be made visible to the subject on the condition that it is 
exclusively produced within him- or herself. It is a condition that at once have to be 
discovered as a symptom (pathology) and re-visualized as a potential source of energy and 
productivity (health). In the semantics prepared to describe this phenomenon, a number of 
binary oppositions are mobilized, such as the perception opposed to environment, adaptation 
opposed to maladaptation, transformation opposed to nature and stress opposed to death. 
Stress is designated as both a precondition of life and an illness, and these two axes are, 
moreover, conceived as a continuum, in which the experience of stress is contingent upon the 
outlook and perception of each individual.  
Between the two concepts of neurasthenia and stress there is a continuity of an “overloaded” 
subjectivity. As such, the concept of stress re-articulates a number of elements introduced in 
neurasthenia, such as the problematization of the self; the difference between the self and its 
environment, the mental disproportions of the individual, the necessity of self- assessment 
and release of “fixation”. But there is also rupture and discontinuity. Contrary to the concept 
of neurasthenia, stress is not conceived of as a symptom of a pathology which has been 
normalized in society. It does not imply a pathologization of society, of which the individual 
“case” is a response or condensed expression. The modern individual is not inscribed in this 
pathology as a tragic figure, as was the case with the neurasthenic. The stressful individual’s 
tragedy is his own, it is not derived from society, but seen as an expression of the individual’s 
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own failed adjustement to the more or less excessive demands posed by his environment. 
Stress is therefore not a normalized pathology but a normal state which can readily become a 
pathology. Stress designates an illness on the condition of its “health”, in which the 
pathological becomes an inability to handle the normal:  
excessive stress as illness ┐excessive stress as source of growth and performance ┐stress as normality (source of life) 




Central to both Cannon’s proposal of homeostasis and Selye’s concept of stress, is the 
necessity of at once both maintaining and stimulating perceived threats and dangers among 
individuals as well as providing techniques, models and “codes” for handling and balancing 
out their potentially harmful effect. They both bring forward and formulate applications and 
instructions for how different forms of stimuli can be directed towards individuals, within a 
framework aiming at the motivation of a natural state embedded in human beings, which has 
either been neglected or not fully rewarded in modern society. As such, there is also a 
relentless cultural critique at stake here: While Cannon, as we have seen, wages a stark 
disapproval of pacifism, Selye opposes the widespread misconception of altruism throughout 
society27. These contemporaneous fashions are thought to conceal the true nature of human 
beings, such as the martial virtues or basic self-sufficiency ingrained in us.  
The biologist Harold Wolff, formulates the question of stress in order “to indicate that state 
within a living creature which results from the interaction with the organism with noxious 
stimuli or circumstances” (Wolff, quoted from Hinkle 1973). Just like balance, the theme of 
stimulation serves at as an epistemological indicator that pinpoints various problems that 
needs to be uncovered, often referred to as the “person-environment problem”. In 
continuation of this, this theme of stimulation likewise also binds a physiological operation to 
a social and psychological conduct. Stress as distress is as such designed to convey a state of 
exception, which, when it occurs, alerts the body through an increased production of 
adrenaline and so forth. With the introduction of eustress, however, this state of exception 
changes its fundamental tenets, because this unusual state becomes completely contingent 
upon the individual’s own perception and interpretation of external events. In other words, 
the concept of stress now becomes psychologized in a way that was previously not the case. 
This rapture is also evident from the new horizon of psychologized themes which are 
actualized in the physiological research on stress, such as appraisal, coping, balance and self-
analysis. When eustress is introduced, the horizon of problems starts to appear as a matter of 
self-management. In other words, the contingency of each individual’s perception is made 
into a key explanatory scheme, which through means of self-assessment, is encouraged to 
determine how the experience of stress can be evaluated differently and handled by other 
measures. The individual must provide him- and herself the means to “allocate” the stress 
from a non-productive to a productive circuit of experience. “Being stressed” is now a state 
                                                          
27 Selye proposes instead an “egotistic altruism” (Selye 1974: 134-136) 
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relying upon the self-investigation of subjects, which must ask him- and herself a number of 
questions as to how this exact experience – of tiredness, headache, anxiety, insomnia, unease 
– is actually the symptom of stress or something else, how it can be handled, reduced, by 
which means etc. 
The problem of stimuli is not so much about incenting the individual to unveil for him- and 
herself the actual nature he or she is composed of, but it rather revolves around how 
individuals can be geared towards more enhanced performances and obtain increased well-
being, at work or in sport and leisure, through a combination of inducements of arousal and 
continuous self-assessments. We have seen how competition makes out one such proposition; 
other proposals include targeting the emotional register of individuals, by stimulating a sense 
of joy, achievement and satisfaction in daily life. The stressful individual is also encouraged 
to make use of practical techniques such as setting goals, formulating clear plans and marking 
off achievements being made. There is, however, a fine line drawn between commitment and 
exhaustion, and between indolence and overachievement. Again, also the incentives of 
stimulation have to obey the imperative of balance. For instance, individuals should take 
certain considerations when they embark upon the quest for excellence, so that this 
excellence is not confused with a destructive strive for perfection: “Everyone has his own 
limits. For some of us, these may be near the maximum, for others near the minimum, of what 
man can attain. But within the limits set by our innate abilities, we should strive for 
excellence, for the best we can do. Not for perfection – for that is almost always unattainable 
– and setting it as an aim can only lead to the distress of frustration” (Selye 1974: 111-112). 
Stress is necessary to perform and enact and simply live, on the one hand. On the other hand, 
stress can turn into an illness if it comes in excessive amounts. This illness, however, can be 
suspended as an illness once the individual acquires a “perceptive” balance within him- or 
herself. 
 
Walter B. Cannon and Hans Selye’s writings offer a physiological concept, which from the 
outset is carefully intertwined with ideals of how this condition can and should be managed. 
It is striking how much effort it is put into this intertwinement by these researchers 
themselves; Selye, for instance, publishes several books that consists partly of physiological 
research and partly of models for conduct, behavior and coping with stress. Here we can find 
clear traces of how stress management always entails a form of self-management, and how 
the condition of stress always entails a self-generated condition – and thereby also a 
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responsibility to work on the self. The condition of stress as it is formulated by the pioneering 
researchers is from the start filtered into its own possible solution, by way of self-assessment.  
In the next chapter I will describe how the stressful individual is asked to reach into itself and 

























Self against self. Stress and self-help 
“Work can make you sick – and work can make you happy. Which one happens depends on 
who you are, what you do and how you are treated at work” (Robertson and Cooper 2011: 3) 
“In some instances, we face involuntarily emotional storms – challenges that some to us 
unbidden. Depending on how we manage them, they can either overwhelm us or serve as an 
opportunity for growth” (Loehr and Schwartz 2005: 79) 
“The key to maintaining balance is in finding the appropriate level of stress to be productive, 
well and happy” (Coke and Mierau 2005: 319) 
During the 1970’s, in addition to being scattered across the established mass media, stress 
proliferates throughout society in the medium of popularized self-help literature, often 
comprised in small self- help guides and pieces promising scientific solutions to the problems 
encountered by the stressful individual. As such, a self-help book will typically offer the 
reader not only “an improved understanding of stress, [but] also provides an effective 
program for coping with stress” (Woolfolk and Richardson 1979: vii). In other words, what is 
presented here are efforts of formulating a cure for the “modern anxiety”.  
The narratives found in these self-help guides follow a particular line of inquiry. First, the 
reader will be introduced to elaborate accounts of the physiological processes targeting 
different parts of the body when an “alarm” is triggered, in addition to a typology of 
psychological responses to such alarms. These facts are typically presented as intrinsic for the 
ability to change the stressful situation; you have to know your body in order to understand 
yourself. Set against this background, the reader will then be faced with his and her own 
contingency; how the pattern that molds together perception and response can be revised, 
alternated and reframed with the help of various techniques and modes of self-inquiry. In 
equal parts, we find the exposition of “the nature of stress” and “the coping of stress”. The 
different strategies proposed by the self-help literature reveal an obvious affinity to and 
continuation of the forms of self-management recommended by Hans Selye and his 
contemporaneous researchers. The following account is based on a reading of the self-help 
literature on stress that starts to appear in the aftermath of Selye, and is most often not written 
by physiologists or medical professionals, but by actors operating in the non-medical realm of 
the so-called “psy-disciplines”, such as psychotherapists and psychologists. Even though this 
123 
 
literature spans from the 1970’s up to present times, I will not historicize this development, 
but rather treat it as an expression of an emergent semantics, that does not, as far as I can 
determine, undergo any noteworthy rapture or transformation in this period. 
Symptomatically, many of the self-help books first published in the 1970’s are reprinted 
throughout the following decades, gaining status as “classics” and are still expanding in 
circulation. Furthermore, it must be noted that this is not an investigation of the concept of 
self-help as such, but rather, more specifically, how the notion of stress is conjured up with 
and seen as critically relying on the means of self-help. As it has been stated elsewhere, the 
notion of stress and the necessity of stress-management is closely tied together, already from 
the offset of stress research. When I choose to examine the self-help literature more closely, it 
is also because of its actualization in the organizations themselves, where, as we will see, the 
semantics of self-help occupy a significant position. The different guides and practical advice 
contained in the self-help literature often appear first in the US, but rapidly find their way 
into European and Scandinavian countries, as translations and through management- and 
occupational health journals. 
 “Managing your lifestyle”, “changing beliefs”, “resolving interpersonal conflicts”, 
“relaxation”, “altering your response”, “transforming threat into challenge” and 
“maintaining a stress-resilient lifestyle”. These are a few among the many different themes, 
aiming at enhanced self-awareness, that constitute the remedies of stress afforded by the 
emergent self-help literature. The different themes mentioned here are indicative for the key 
demand that the individual should articulate upon itself: change. The zenith of change (within 
the subject) is observed as contingent upon a distinction between person and environment.  
 
The concept of stress hosts a series of discrepancies, which the different forms of stress 
management programs seeks to balance out. These discrepancies are embodied in a number 
of differences, such as that between the resources available to the employee and the volume 
of tasks to be carried out, and the difference between availability and privacy. Other 
discrepancies point towards the difference between the non-explicated expectations of the 
management and the employees’ own expectations, the difference between the present and 
the future, the difference between coping and illness, and the erupting, technology-driven 
displacement of the difference between the time at work and the time at home. They are 
themes that strikingly encapsulate the same concerns as those forwarded by a large number of 
those researchers who, in one way or another, are trying to find a solution to the so-called 




However, these discrepancies are most often outlined and problematized according to the 
difference between the person (perception) and the environment (reality), which is a primary 
distinction in the self-help literature. For instance, stress is a condition that usually appears 
manageable only at the side of the person in this distinction, while the environment on the 
other hand is charged with solid and often inflexible qualities. There are, in other words, 
different degrees of agency indicated between the two sides. The different programs, manuals 
and guides are designed to provide a transformation from distress to eustress and from 
anxiety to relief, which departs from a problematization of the self “as a unified centre of 
personal agency which can act upon itself, others and the world. This conception presents the 
individual as the sole ontological pivot of experience”, as Heidi Marie Rimke precisely puts it 
(Rimke 2000: 64).  Furthermore, these manuals and guides require the stressful individual to 
inspect the distinction itself, between him- or herself, on one side and the environment, on the 
other. Stress management relies on techniques that brings about an individualization of the 
environment of each individual and an effort to re-constitute the relationship between reality 
and perception. The self appearing in stress management can be formalized as the unity 
between a “case” requiring intervention and a self-observation which must re-adjust. The 
subject must at once make itself into an object of intervention and an observing subject:  
object of intervention ┐observing subject 
 
 
The unobservability of emotions 
The stressful individual is a victim of his or her own fixed perceptional patterns, in the form 
of “automatic thoughts”, unnecessary worry and mistaken beliefs. Each person is accordingly 
equipped with an internal voice that nags, warns and triggers arousal, but, additionally, there 
is also the presence of emotions, the unvoiced medium that often cause a sense of being 
stressed or anxious, detached from the subject’s awareness. “Mistaken beliefs” are rooted in 
such emotions, endangering the clear-cut rationality of each individual. Emotions and the 
potential falsehood they constitute holds a parasite-like incertitude and deviousness, where 
they crop up into the beliefs of each subject and ignites disarray, misguidance and excitement 
all the while the individual remains unaware of this. In order to regain control and balance, 
one has to set out to uncover these hidden thoughts and silent emotions. To take an example 
from a self-help guide entitled “Stress Management for Dummies”:  
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“Your automatic thinking can be incredibly strong and believable. When you notice these 
automatic (usually negative) thoughts, you believe they are reasonable and appropriate. But 
often they’re not. They can be distortions of your reality and create a good deal of unneeded 
distress. Here are some questions you can ask yourself to help you uncover these hidden, 
automatic thoughts:  
- What am I so distressed about this event or situation? 
- What might I be saying to myself about what happened to create this anger (or any 
other stress emotion)? 
- If a friend asked me why I was so stressed about this event or situation, what would I 
tell him? 
This kind of inquiry can help bring to the surface thoughts that may otherwise go unnoticed”. 
The guide proceeds to elaborate how “uncovering these automatic thoughts and bringing 
them into awareness is an important step in changing your thoughts” (Elkin 2013: 194-195).  
However, the notion of belief is not only a conceived of as an affective mediation of 
falsehood opposed to a distanced and rational self-observation. Some also connote belief as a 
pure means, which can work either productively or inefficiently, as Woolford and 
Richardson: “We commonly think that the most important thing about beliefs is whether they 
are true or false. On the contrary, the most important thing about beliefs is not their 
truthfulness, but their usefulness. It can be enormously helpful to you to evaluate beliefs in 
terms of their usefulness rather than their truth or falsehood. Stress-related beliefs are more 
like value judgements than beliefs about facts. In a real sense, there is no objective way to 
determine their truthfulness. Beliefs are more or less fruitful guides to action that need to be 
evaluated based on their results. They are nothing more or less than either effective or 
ineffective tools for living. The pertinent question is, do your beliefs maximize self-respect 
and pleasure in living?” (Woolfold and Richardson 2008 [1979]: 112). To these authors, the 
point is not to enhance a correspondence with any form of “external actuality”, or phrased 
differently; the cognition of reality, as such, is not the ultimate aim at stake. In this case, the 
elaboration on the singular, unique perception contained within each person should rather 
organize the individual self-inquiry along the improvement of his or her well-being and 
productivity. Opposite to Elkim in the first quote, these authors are not concerned with what 
individuals believe, but how their beliefs efficiently can produce other results within 





Nevertheless, emotions are always attributed with certain features of susceptibility and 
delusion, leading the individual astray from the clarity of perception. The dubiousness of 
emotions is to be found in their immediate unobservability – they refrain from disclosure and 
transparency, but works through the body, in the shadows of conscious thought. These 
emotions hold each individual captive of its own mind, producing beliefs that ingrain 
themselves as truths, (mis)leading the subject through commotion and disillusion. In other 
words, the condition of stress is fashioned by an overflow of negative emotions on the cost of 
a clear perception, positive energy and rational assessment. In order to handle stress, one thus 
must wage in an emotional struggle against these emotions; feelings must be localized, their 
infliction must be assessed and their turmoil diminished. The stressful individual should 
accordingly embark upon an excavation in the self; the secret layers of emotional subjugation 
in the mind must be dug out, and the hidden frenzy and distortion they impose must be 
unveiled. The subject should always start by inquiring its own individuality and ask, “why do 
I feel this?” and “could I feel otherwise?”. Only through such acts of self-inquiry is it 
possible to redeem the unobservability of emotions observable and make the “automatic 
thinking” come to a halt.  
In foregoing parts of this thesis, we have seen how emotions is introduced as an element 
which allows for the difference between pathology and normality to be set anew in 
organizations, in which the register of personal experience is seen as both a precondition for 
the health of the employee and as a source of new ailments. Phrased differently, illness goes 
from being diagnosed from the outside (observed as a fit, injured or unhealthy body) to also 
being diagnosed from the “inside” of each individual (the personal experience of 
contentment, well-being, meaning). When emotions are made into the center of attention in 
stress management, however, they are largely equated with the intrusion of “irrationality” that 
necessitate a reform of thought and instinct. The stressful individual is framed as a case of 
“emotional self-seduction”, which acquires him to un-learn himself, because his emotions 
and sense of instinct is not in line with reality. In other words, the reference to emotions has a 
significantly different meaning than what was the case in the emotional and therapeutic 
codification of health and illness, that start to develop from the 1940’s. In stress management, 
emotions are at once cast as an intrusion that must be excluded and as an invigoration that 
must be re-included to fulfill a different self, as we will see.  
 
The negative thoughts and the constant worry ingrained by emotions, gears the individual 
towards a diffuse state of alarm and unease: “So it is stress of a peculiarly subjective sort that 
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is the principal marauder of our society: not the pressure of a gun against the ribs, but the 
nagging worry about being mugged; not outright competition from a rival stalking the same 
forest for game, but a cutting memo circulating in a quiet office organization; not the 
dreaded appearance of diphtheria symptoms in a member of the family, but the uneasy 
feeling that one’s child is out courting unhappiness and destruction, our instinctive body 
responses are of little use against problems such as these. Nevertheless, we go right on 
responding, with the result that we not only stew in the problems - we stew in the responses 
too” (McQade and Aikman 1993: 127).  
The authors liken stress to the performance of a ventriloquist theater, completely attached to 
and moved by someone else’s will. The self, embedded in emotional turmoil, is perceived as 
the passive and ordained prerequisite of the body. Being stressed is accordingly observed as 
the opposite of an actual “self-will”, it involves feeling and sensing someone else’s feelings 
and senses. Distress is an exterior, alien emotion and state that the subject unknowingly 
makes itself the host of, letting it feed into the core of its own individuality, making the 
perception of reality and self-knowledge turn sour and blurred. In other words, the state of 
stress makes individuals lose their own actual voice and outlook, they only perceive and 
speak through the deception of negative thoughts and emotions fueled by the body. As such, 
nothing is actually true for subject that finds itself in a state of alarm and worry, as he or she 
is thoroughly deceived of his or her own reality. The fundamental loss of the ability to sense 
and assess reality calls upon a scrutiny of perception; the subject’s “self-talk” and 
interpretation of the world, its sense of reason and knowledge of itself. A condition seen as 
fundamentally alien to the subject, levied from an external and dubious source, must be 
conquered and resolved with the means of mapping the “forces” that play out beneath or in in 
the outskirts of conscious thought.  
 
Detachment and accountability: emotional re-constitution  
“Stress management is about finding the inner readiness within each individual” 
(Arbeidsmiljø [Working Environment], no. 6, 2002: 15).  
The question is then, how can the subject obtain a reality that is already has lost? How does 
the subject regain its own “self”, when the self has been taken hostage to an alien state of 
turmoil and distraction? Furthermore, with what means is the individual supposed to 
overcome and break free of the restrictions and subjugations imposed on itself?  
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Within the framework of stress management, a new form of reality can be granted through a 
re-constitution of the difference between the self and its environment. The different strategies 
designed for this, seeks to hold the individual accountable to itself for both how reality is 
perceived and for how it can be perceived otherwise, e.g. how the premise of contingency can 
be used as a means to perceive, think and act differently.  
A whole epistemology of cognition is built up around the concept of stress, often put forward 
in binary schemes, in which the world mainly can be experienced as either “emotional” and 
“instinctive” or as “rational”. However, since emotions cannot be excluded from the self, 
since people cannot completely “de-emotionalize”, the subject must pin out itself as rational 
and detached through what we might call “emotional re-constitutions”. There can be no 
solution to the problem of stress unless the subject of this unease opens up, looks inside and 
confide. The stressful subject simply carries too much weight; she is perplexed by her own 
continuous stream of reflection, becomes tangled up in mesmerizing images of herself, as she 
projects herself into worrisome pasts and futures. She is at once caught up by self-reflection 
and has lost track of it, she both contains too many feelings and does not yet “know” how she 
is seduced and controlled by these emotions. The paradoxical state of stress is not viewed 
according to its deficiency and lack, but by an abundancy and surplus of impulses, reflection, 
motives and emotions that slip away from control and regulation. Being stressed is 
accordingly a result of containing too much. 
A certain form of knowledge is required of the self, then, as already mentioned, that seeks to 
question the forces of will that enables us to see and act, simply to “be” in this world. It is 
framed as a fundamentally epistemological quest – how do you know what you know about 
yourself and the world you inhabit? The answer to which can only be found by “putting it 
into words”. The stressful subject should thus engage in different forms of “speech acts” and 
self-assessments, that not only makes her capable of gaining insight into the turmoil of her 
inner life, but also makes her attuned to the specificity of her own difficulties, that above all 
requires a unique, individualized trajectory of cause and effect on the basis of her personality 
(childhood, family life, career, ambitions, collegial relations, “weaknesses”, “strengths”, traits 
etc.). Against this backdrop, the management of stress brings about an individualization of 
the subject, in the sense that she is expected to condition her experience of stress by invoking 
her own personality and “lifeworld”, which appear as codes for both detecting the pathology 
and handling it (and thereby realize that it does not have to be a pathology). 
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A large number of stress policies and management exercises seek to enhance the self-
relationship of the employee by different means. The employee is encouraged to surveil her 
own reaction patterns, to question her own impulses and retract from the immediacy of her 
emotions:  
 “Think yourself on a scale from 1-10. How much pressure do you feel that you’re exposed 
to? How much of this pressure comes from your surroundings and how much of it comes 
from yourself? What do you feel should be the appropriate pace for you? Often one will 
experience that a significant amount of the load on your shoulders is really your own 
luggage. This is because you have put your own demands and expectations above those of the 
employer or colleague. Many become self-restricted and lose their drive, because they 
constantly want to perform above their peers. The willingness to take on tasks undermines 
our common sense and reason. We tend to take a lot of responsibility for other people’s work, 
or we lean too far forward. Many of us are our own worst critics. We allow saying things to 
ourselves that we would never say to others. We evaluate and devaluate our own efforts in 
ways that would have caused labor disputes and conflicts had we only done it against our 
own colleagues. “If it’s not a 100 %, it’s not worth anything!” Other examples of similar 
“mind-tricks” includes “Since I didn’t make it last time, I’m probably going to fail now as 
well!”, “If I actually did make it, it was due to luck!”, “When I don’t make it, it’s my own 
fault and nobody’s but mine!”  
More often than we are aware of, this inner voice takes control of us. It increases a sense of 
pressure without us noticing how it pushes us around. What would be useful to reflect upon 
considering these forms of inner and outer pressure? If you are able to identify this form of 
pressure, you have an advantage, because it makes it possible for you to prevent further 
distress. If you are able to develop a stronger sense of pressure control, you can reduce some 
of your needs for stress control” (Personal og ledelse [Staff and Management], no. 2, 2006: 
32-33).  
 
“The possible sources of stress is most efficiently mapped by conducting individual 
conversations on a regular basis in addition to systematic surveys. These methods are 
complimentary, where an in-depth interview is useful in order to detect causes and find 
solutions, while surveys on the work environment might be useful in order to gather 




The self is bounded - and deceived - by its continuous self-assessment, an “inner voice”, 
which inflicts its misguidance through emotional upheaval. The state of stress prevents access 
to the “actual” reality, which is hidden behind the layers of urgency; the stressful subject 
equates its own reality with the negative instincts mediated by emotions and attitudes, 
whereby disappointments and distress effectively is realized rather than a “productive and 
well-balanced performance”. In order to handle this, the subject is encouraged to engage in 
what we might call strategies of detachment, which makes it possible to shield the self from 
the abruptness of its own emotions and misconceived attitudes.  
In other words, the world, as it appears for the stressful employee is fashioned according to a 
series of misrepresentations and forgeries brought about within him- and herself, such as self-
criticism or towering, but misconceived ambitions. A self that lets itself become inflicted and 
disposed according to such immediate “states” will lose the autonomy of its reason and the 
authenticity of its self-relationship. Conversely, stress is sought identified, mapped, 
prevented, explained, analyzed and cured along the thresholds of the subject’s orientation 
towards reality. The “detachment-strategy” seeks to re-establish an effective and authentic 
relation between the self and its outlooks and attitudes against a bewilderment caused by self-
produced “noise”, in the form of emotional disturbance and misguided attitudes. The self is 
caught up – unknowingly - in a struggle against itself, by which it can either surrender to its 
own immediate emotions or seek to identify and antagonize the forces operating beneath and 
beyond the conscious realm of reflection and reason. It is in this regard that emotions are 
thought to hold a dubious quality, which seduce and deceive without revealing their own 
presence, superimposing an impulse-ridden regime of immediacy, timidity, chaos and alarm. 
While this results in a defeat of balance, productivity and self-authenticity, it simultaneously 
produces a perverted and destructive experience of reality within the subject. Emotions make 
the self indistinguishable to itself. In the diverse and vast semantics that is brought forward to 
describe this problematic self-environment relation, the discovery of pathologies as self-
imposed pathologies is at the centerfield of both diagnosis and treatment. Stress can only be 
detected as a self-pathologization, as it is stated in the quote above: “We allow saying things 
to ourselves that we would never say to others. We evaluate and devaluate our own efforts in 
ways that would have caused labor disputes and conflicts had we only done it against our 
own colleagues” 
The stressful individual tormented and deceived by the enthrallment of its own emotions, is 
therefore offered a “field of possible action” centered on the instalment of a self-observation, 
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that can afford a social remoteness to the urgency of impulse, affect and hyper-reflection. The 
continuous and critical self-assessment that imposes itself by affective allurement is sought 
“neutralized” through another, distancing form of self-assessment, which seeks to make the 
subject accountable for the “authorship” through which it produces its own, singular and 
highly personal “lifeworld” and experiences. On the one hand, the stressful subject must 
detect how its pathology contains a unique and personal trajectory (personal traits, 
background, family situation, etc.). On the other hand, this pathology is all the while also a 
completely de-personalized and general condition, with its diagnose of emotional excess, 
inability to retrieve from the “mental” realm of work, self-production of negative and false 
beliefs etc. Together, these two variables make up a strategy that aims at inscribing the self in 
its own production of contingency, by making it examine and question its own “forces of 
will”:  
 “The point is to avoid becoming a victim of your own negative thoughts. If you find that your 
thoughts are filled with negative content, try turning your attention to what's good at the 
moment and become more aware of what's right for you. From thinking that you cannot 
manage something, move your attention to what it actually takes, what resources you have, 
who you can contact, etc. This way you may experience better internal control and greater 
influence on your thoughts and actions, while strengthening both your self-esteem and self-
image. Here is a basic question for all those who think their boss and colleagues are asking 
too much of them: Are you sure that they are actually expecting this much or is it just 
something you imagine?”(Personal og ledelse [Staff and Management], no. 6, 2008: 20) 
“How and on which tasks do I spend my time? What kind of balance do I have between the 
different arenas of my life? Do I like what I do or would I rather be doing something else?” 
(Personal og ledelse [Staff and Management], no. 2, 2006: 32). 
“Our emotions influence our ability to think and what we think. Strong, negative emotions 
like anger, despair, anxiety and self-load are more challenging to deal with than more toned-
down emotions like irritation, sadness, worry and disappointments of oneself. The strong 
emotions will surely trigger inexpedient thoughts and reactions that will increase the level of 
stress. Many will easily end up being trapped in thought patterns that turn out to be futile” 
(Arbeidsmiljø [Working Environment], no. 5, 2002: 32). 
“We must do our best to facilitate a balanced life, and we can work on how to accept things 
that remain out of our reach. Additionally, we can change the way we think about our own 
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stress, because the very way we think about our own stress makes a considerable difference. 
It cannot only decrease your sense of stress, but also the overall negative health effects 
caused by your stress. Maybe an improved knowledge on the connection between stress and 
bodily reactions might enable you to adapt another mindset on the stress you feel” (Personal 
og ledelse [Staff and Management], no. 1, 2014: 54) 
In order to overcome the allure of his or her own emotions, the employee needs to observe 
him- and herself with a distanced and super-critical gaze – that is, an observation from which 
it can isolate, distinguish, analyze and pin down the affective intrusion brought on to the core 
of its own being. This is enacted as a mode of dis-identification; what is required is an 
externalization of the emotions caught up in the self, which enforce self-criticism and loss of 
self-control. Phrased differently, the subject must turn into an abstract figure, conceive of 
itself as a “case”, assess the interplay between the self and its environment as if it was an 
external observer. In this enactment, however, the stressful subject paradoxically oscillates 
between its own inside and outside; it is over-reflective, yet not sufficiently aware of itself; 
too self-critical, but not adequately examining the critique brought on by itself. What seems 
to be the case is an antidote that seeks to enlarge and extend the sources of the pathological 
state it has set out to dissolve and put an end to.  
Among the most notable strategies in this regard is the use of so-called positive emotions and 
thoughts. When people cannot simply retract from their emotions, they must be conditioned 
and transformed into a state that brings ease rather than worry and well-being rather than 
distress. In their book on well-being, productivity and happiness at work, Ivan Robertson and 
Gary Cooper expounds the difference between negative and positive emotions. In their 
account, “much of the research on the negative effects of workplace stress supports the idea 
that prolonged experience of negative emotions depletes psychological resources and makes 
people more vulnerable to physical and psychological illness (…)” (Robertson and Cooper 
2011: 48). Negative emotions are accordingly considered to be among the main causes of 
stress as it drains individual’s ability to resist in periods facing pressure and struggle. 
Furthermore, such emotions are equated with a strong self-impact of pathological anguish 
within the subject, because when such a negative register of feelings prevail it makes people 
more susceptible to different forms of illness. Negative emotions impose a sort of expanding 
injury caused by the self, making the individual weaker and less prone to keep track of both 
itself and the surroundings, and these emotions are thus perceived as a radical self-
pathologization, causing physical as well as psychological illness.  
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Positive emotions, on the other hand, strengthens, sparkles, enhances and energizes; they 
amplify and maximize a “balanced presence” of the self in whatever turmoil or challenge the 
subject might face. This emotional register is attached to both treatment and prevention. 
Robertson and Cooper phrases it like this: “Positive emotions appear to have a protective 
effect by broadening our range of responses and behaviors and also building our 
psychological resources, enabling us to cope more effectively. As well as providing a 
protective effect, positive emotions also help people to bounce back after experiencing 
adversity (Tugade and Fredrickson 2004) and they also help to undo the detrimental effects 
of negative emotions (Fredrickson et al. 2000). One of the most interesting areas where 
positive emotions have a beneficial effect is in the promotion of flexible thinking and 
creativity. Many laboratory studies have shown how positive emotions can help people to 
think more broadly and to be more creative in solving problems (…)” (Robertson and Cooper 
2011: 48).  
Positive, “energetic” emotions are typically found in invigoration, confidence, joyfulness and 
serenity, whereas negative emotions are expressed through anger, fear, defense, anxiousness 
or resentment. A peculiar semantics of “emotional capacity” appears in the outline of this 
dichotomy, where feelings are economically and performatively coded, either as viable or 
unfeasible, all according to their potential for transaction, flexibility and investment: “The 
primary markers of physical capacity are strength, endurance, flexibility and resilience. 
These are precisely the same markers of capacity emotionally, mentally and spiritually. 
Flexibility at the physical level, for example, means that the muscle has a broad range of 
motion. Stretching increases flexibility. The same is true emotionally. Emotional flexibility 
reflects capacity to move freely and appropriately along a wide spectrum of emotions rather 
than responding rigidly and defensively. Emotional resilience is the ability to bounce back 
from the experience of disappointment, frustration and even loss” (Loehr and Schwartz 2005: 
11).   
 
The subject should accordingly train and supervise his or her own “emotional capacity” in 
order to sustain a strong defense against difficulties due to, for instance, conflicts or high 
demands at work. Emotions can be transformed into a vault of resources, acquiring the 
subject to develop, sustain and carefully apply these resources onto itself. The concept of 
positive versus negative emotions emerges in a scheme that seeks to arrange the “forces 
within the self” according to an accountability of progress and flexibility. Emotions are both 
made into a vantage point for the assessment of the performance of the self and as a vantage 
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point for the continuous improvement of the self, often appearing as analogous – as in the 
quote above - to the requirements of exercise, endurance, and enhancement found in the field 
of sports. The rather strange coupling of sports and emotions is not entirely developed for the 
purpose of metaphorical use, but can also be traced back to the stress physiologists and their 
work with sport and management in the 1960’s.  
When the concept of stress first appears in management literature in the 1960’s, several 
physiologists of note, such as Ulf von Euler, Erik Hohwü Christensen and Levi Lennart, are 
giving their advice to organizations in terms of how to prevent and treat stress. They are 
drawing on, among other things, the work they have conducted with athletes. At this point, 
stress is something that is more often related to management rather than employees – 
managers are considered particularly disposed for stress, due to their long work hours and 
great responsibility. As far as I have been able to determine, in Norway, this notion of stress 
makes its first appearance in a management journal in 1960. It is then described as a possible 
cause of cardiac arrest targeting mainly managers and functionaries: “In the English 
language, the concept of stress designates the wide range of pressure one might experience. 
A company doctor who conducts regular examinations of employees and staff in the 
organization, will after some period of time learn that functionaries – and above all those 
holding a leading position or those having climbed up the social ladder in a rapid pace – are 
working under a considerably more intense pressure and are more exposed to stress than the 
ordinary worker” (Arbeidsgiveren [The Employer], no. 11, 1960: 167). In this version, stress 
becomes an illness strictly attached to what is perceived as a specifically managerial 
vulnerability. It is considered a form of “elite pathology”. The manager’s personality and his 
specific individual traits such as underdeveloped or weak response-mechanisms is, according 
to these physiologists, a core problematic. The stressful manager is characterized by fear of 
change, by lacking the necessary skills to adjust to new surroundings, or by possessing 
unrealistic ambitions towards the organization or his own career. Stress is therefore primarily 
considered “an individual response to something, not this something in itself. It is true 
enough that organizational and work-related conditions might cause stress. But the 
personality traits of this individual is the most decisive factor for the extent to which they 
experience stress” (Arbeidsledelse og Teknikk [Occupational Management and Technology], 
no. 5, 1968: 11). Moreover, the question of health also revolves around personality, insofar as 
one always should consider whether or not one is “cut out for the job”. Thus, everyone who 
applies for a job involving management should carefully consider whether they are suited for 
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such a position – do they have the necessary skills, persistence, qualification and so forth. In 
other words, health relies on the abilities to strategically maneuver and make use of specific 
personality traits and fit these traits into the set realm of “managerialism”. To apply for a 
managerial position therefore also involves putting one’s health at stake if one’s personality 
turns out to offer a poor match with the needs and challenges posed by the job.   
The health of the manager is therefore contingent upon a specific set of “skills” contained in 
his personality and stature. Personality is linked to health in a way that assumes a certain 
character and behavior unfolding in the position of the manager, making him capable or 
incapable of sustaining well-being and “good health”. Gradually, throughout the 1970’s and 
80’s, these are problems that will be posed in similar ways towards the employee. Lennart 
Levi, a pioneer in the field of occupational stress research, points towards the individual 
differences in response to unsettling or alarming situations as a capital explanatory scheme. 
Together with fellow researchers, he conducts a number of experiments, in which subjects are 
exposed to seemingly stress-triggering mechanisms such as chords and noise. On the basis of 
these studies, it is proposed that while certain people will shrug it off without much 
distraction or effort, others might have a complete breakdown, due to variations in physical 
and psychological “stature”. Furthermore, stress reactions do not only necessarily follow a 
strict pattern of individual differences, the response will also vary with the same individual, 
depending on the time and place of the occurring event (Vern og Velferd [Protection and 
Welfare], no. 3, 1968). Against this backdrop, Levi introduces the concept of emotional 
endurance, which he relates to the ability to handle pressure, hurriedness and critique at 
work. In line with this, Levi underscores the necessity of training and exercise in order to 
adapt such forms of emotional endurance: “It is, phrased differently, not so that all forms of 
stress cause damage. In the appropriate amounts, pressure – we shall call it exercise – can 
stimulate and enhance our performance” (Vern og Velferd [Protection and Welfare], no. 3, 
1968: 44). The problem of stress is coded as a performative enactment that requires the 
subject to make use of its “inner life”, just as an athlete will make use of his or her own body 
in order to develop muscles and strengthen endurance. Stress can accordingly appear both 
vital and hurtful for the employee, and it is a matter of subtle technique and exercise to utilize 
the stress as a pathway to self-enrichment rather than self-destruction.  
The first self-help book on stress to appear in Norway, comes perhaps not coincidentally 
from the field of sport psychology. The book, “Handle stress – get fit”, offers the reader ways 
of becoming “more conscious of your negative reaction patterns” and mental exercises to 
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develop a “positive inner dialogue” (Railo et al. 1981: 18). Willi Railo, who is among the 
authors, develops a variety of methods on handling stress based on the work he has conducted 
with professional athletes. Often, he claims, “inspired, go-getting employees” will compare 
themselves and their work to the ambitions found among top athletes, but they lack the 
sufficient techniques and methods for realizing their goals.28  
According to Railo, the idea that stress stems from a mismatch between time and resources is 
a common misconception: “It’s commonly stated that “I don’t have time, I have too much on 
my schedule”. But the fact that time is scarce hardly offers a description of the problem.” 
(Ledelse [Management], no. 3 1982: 38). Stress is rather, he claims, the result of a weak and 
undetermined management of time itself or caused by a lack of “sheltering” family life: “The 
stress is even worsened because people remain transfixed on work as they come home, they 
cannot shut off the stream of impulses and take a rest. The impulses keep on working in the 
brain. These might often be thoughts on problems that were supposed to have been resolved. 
Or thoughts on worry and insecurity” (Ledelse [Management], no. 3 1982: 38). Railo couples 
this to emotional training and adaptation; the ability to mentally “retrieve” from work; to 
detect negative thought patterns; to view problems as “positive obstacles”; to plan and look 
ahead rather than back at the misery and failure of the past.  
In the semantics of emotional endurance and resilience, emotions become a sort of 
continuation of bodily conducts, that situates the “inner life” in a line between progression 
and impediment and enhancement of strength and augmentation of weakness. Emotions that, 
it is proposed, can actively be trained; they must be re-constituted. 
  
                                                          




Scarcity as resource: The performativity of stress 
As it is clear by now, stress is not only an emotional and physical state that, for instance, 
designates a certain lack of clarity or loss of balance that must be regained and refurnished 
within the subject. It is also continuously interlaced with and juxtaposed to the question of the 
employee’s productivity and performance, which is a “mechanism” so present throughout the 
field of occupational health promotion that it almost seems out of sight. Greco and Stenner 
(2013) suggests that the strive for well-being should be understood as part of a shift towards 
new ideals of entrepreneurial subjectivity emerging in the late 1990’s across different 
domains of society, and that corporate strategies of promoting well-being, resilience and 
optimism in the labor force are closely interlinked with productivity. However, as we have 
seen in foregoing part of this thesis, well-being is far from a novel concept in the 1990’s, but 
reaches back to a confrontation with “technocratic” ideals of management, already evident in 
the 1940’s. This is not insignificant, because it also implies that well-being is not only 
conjured up with a specifically entrepreneurial subjectivity arising from a neo-liberal “turn” 
of management in the 1990’s, among other things because the reference to an interlinked 
“well-being” and “motivation” has been there throughout the latter part of the 20th century. 
As we have seen previously, the “problem of well-being” is a part of a semantics that allows 
for a new difference between pathology and normality to come into play in organizations, 
which invokes the self-relationship of the employee as a primary reference.  
“Positive and negative voices” and “self-dialogue”, emotional “layers”, narrative accounts – 
all appearing within in the self, becomes key themes in the work of furnishing another 
identity, that can prove more resilient and effective in the embattlement of the self’s stress. In 
this self-transformation, at the center stage of stress management, the individual circulates in 
an inverse economy of performative resources. The act of transformation aims at turning a 
state of scarcity, for instance by way of inefficiency or simply illness, into a resource itself. A 
peculiar notion of productivity thus appears, where the state of pathology is sought to spill 
over onto its opposite state of health and thereby create a better, more improved health. The 
state of emotional “deficit” is likewise sought turned into a surplus of emotions (and 
“emotional capacity”), by which the subject can link together the resources of his or her 




“You constantly hear how bad stress is for you; it’s damaging your health, jeopardizing your 
relationships, and hurting your performance. While these risks are real, recent research is 
showing that work strain, when managed correctly, can actually have a positive impact on 
productivity and performance. So how can you take the stress you thought was killing you 
and make it constructive?” (Gallo 2011) 
“Stress is an opportunity when it enables a person to display the talents, skills, knowledge, 
and gifts with which he or she is endowed. Stress is an opportunity when one grows, learns, 
changes, and develops through the experience. Stress is an opportunity when it leads us to 
transform ourselves, adapt to changing circumstances, and live well. What makes the 
difference in whether stress is a challenge, a threat, a hindrance, or an opportunity lies in the 
eye of the beholder.  (…) the purpose of self-care through preventive stress management is to 
become more competent in managing stress; to become healthier; and as a result of that 
competence and health, to be a stronger asset for the groups and organizations in which we 
participate” (Quick et al. 2013: 203/ 204)  
“Although it’s unlikely that the pace or intensity of work will change much anytime soon, 
there’s a growing body of research that suggest certain types of development activities can 
effectively build the capacity for resilience. One approach is to focus on employees’ personal 
growth and development. When I was working at Google as the director of executive 
development, for example, we focused on helping managers create the “happiest, healthiest, 
and most productive workforce on the planet”. Investing in employee personal growth and 
development from this perspective is the first step in unleashing creativity, enabling potential, 
and supporting sustainable productivity” (Fernandez 2016) 
Work strain can be a source of “growth”, the sense of unease and perpetual demands can be 
turned into a rush of performative urge, whatever you might think constitutes an illness can 
strengthen, enhance and release a vast potential within you; energy, creativity, well-being and 
so forth. In other words, the sickness within you is what also will make you healthier and 
stronger – insofar as you are willing and capable to recognize and work on it. This pseudo-
Nietzschean promise of strength and self-change is afforded by an “intersecting” of different 
“lifeworld’s” and realms of experience. This change offers itself as an “inverse economy” 
opposite of a “zero-sum game”, whereby an increase in “effective stress management” and 
“well-being” potentially leads to improved personal relations, competence, happiness, 
performance etc. The transformation is a source of prosperity that radiates and spreads; to the 
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organization, to family life, to career, to creativity, to “personal growth”.  Stress is, as we 
have seen, on the one side a condition that revolves around the self-pathologization of a 
surplus of “resources” held within the subject, in the form of (too many) impulses, emotions 
and reflections - that are assumed to paralyze and subjugate the subject’s access to a true self. 
On the other side, this is simultaneously considered to lead to a reduction of the performative 
resources available to the subject, weakening his or her energy, creativity, decisiveness, 
collegiality etc. The problem of stress never appears alone, as a condition that exclusively 
refers to itself. Instead, the problem of stress is consequently coupled with the performative 
failure and enhancement of the self, for which purpose a variety of exercises and therapeutic 
interventions are sought deployed. The “stress problem” is in other words rarely confined to a 
singular code, but appears instead through an interplay of pathological (symptom), 
therapeutic (treatment), power (self-release) and economic (resource-enhancement) codes. 
For now, I will leave aside how this interplay of codes can be analyzed as a simultaneity of 
incongruent perspectives, but rather see how different realms and surfaces of experience are 
sought interconnected. I will take up the question of how the problem of stress interlinks 
power and illness, once reach the next chapter.  
We see then, how the subjects’ health and health, personal relationships and performance are 
challenged as distinct spheres that designate a personal as opposed to a professional domain 
(and the other way around), inhabited at different points in time and space (e.g. “nine-to-
five”). These spheres neither should nor can be separated if the subject is to acquire a 
transformation of scarcity into resource. In other words, the vast array of “personal 
experience” should instead be invoked and linked together with experiences of work-related 
“progress”, difficulties and challenges. There are no boundaries between these domains in the 
causalities leading to the state of stress, according to the imperative of self-change, and the 
state of stress can only be mastered at the level of eradicating such boundaries by, among 
other things, zeroing in on how the state of stress unites, brings together and relocates the 
realms of personal and professional experiences. The knowledge required by the subject for 
this purpose is to be found at the points of intersection between work, collegial relations, 
personal attitudes, skills and competence, family life etc.: “(…) if we do not take the total life 
context of workers into account, including family life, goals, and the personal meanings they 
see in their family as well as the working life (…), we fail fully to understand the stress and 
emotions they experience (…). Stress and family create the two most important sources of 
daily stress in modern adult life. In today’s world, where both husbands and wives often work 
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and also accept responsibility for housework and childcare, this is especially true. It is 
surprising that is has taken so long to recognize the contextual theme of a figure-ground 
relationship for these forces of stress” (Lazarus 1999: 132-133). Stress is something that must 
be viewed as an “interplay of factors” that resides just as much outside of the workplace as it 
does on the inside of it. How stress is dealt with at the workplace can therefore not be 
detached from how each employee experience demands and expectations in other realms of 
life.  
Phrased differently, managing the condition of stress requires the subject to intersect and 
connect the spheres, that otherwise might appear to be divided “externally”, but which are 
united “internally”, that is, within the supposed continuum of individual experiences. Stress is 
both generated and managed throughout the conduct of a “lifestyle”, a “self-analysis”, a 
“self-dialogue”, a “personality” and so forth. This intersection of experiences brings to mind 
what Hans Selye thought to make out the heartland of his own scientific achievements, the 
discovery of the “bio-psycho-social-being”. The backlash of medical advancements, he 
proposed, was due to the lack of perspectives of “wholeness” in the assessment of the 
individual: “Unfortunately, medical progress in recent years has not brought with it any 
significant improvement in human health. It has been highly technological, but the approach 
has not been one that keeps man in balance as a bio-psycho-social being. Medical progress 
has focused on diseased parts and interventions, neglecting the common denominator of 
stress in these “diseases of adaptation”” (Smith and Selye 1979: 1953).  
When the stressful subject is encouraged to interlink and find the “wholeness” of his or her 
experience and attune this to the complexity of “performative needs” in both work life and 
personal life, the domain of work must not be shielded from “private issues”, but instead 
sought integrated and resolved through the prism of his or her personality and all-
encompassing “lifeworld”. The stressful subject is geared to problematize its difficulties 
according to the multitude of boundaries it continuously is assumed to feel squeezed between, 
such as self/ home and family, self/ colleagues and work environment, self/ work assignments 
and work load, self/ management, self/ ambitions and self-expectations. The experience of 
“aggregated” tensions between these different realms is not something that can be left aside, 
it is proposed, once the door is shut to the office or at home; the experience of stress does not 
make itself relevant only when the employee is at work, it makes itself relevant and affects 
the performativity of all relations, also that of being a mother, a partner or a friend. At the 
same time, however, the problem of stress is linked to an employee who has overtly absorbed 
141 
 
his or her identity as an employee, which is unable to distinguish its own employee-status 
from other realms in life and which has let itself become “colonized” by work. In other 
words, there is a peculiar ambiguity concerning the pathology of an over-identified employee, 
which simultaneously must be made aware of how this pathology adds up and connects the 
different realms of his life, such as that of work and that of home. On the one hand, the 
organization says to its employee, “you are sick because you have over-identified with your 
work, you therefore need to re-learn how to shelter and maintain your privacy”. On the other 
hand, it says, “you have to refurnish an identity according to how your private life interferes 
with work and how work interferes with your private life. The stress you experience is not 
only a problem concerning your work, your private sociality spills over into the sociality of 
your work and you can therefore not distinguish one from the other”.  
 
The means of self-assessment 
“Facing the truth requires making yourself the object of inquiry – conducting an audit of 
your life and holding yourself accountable for the energy consequences of your behaviors” 
(Loehr and Schwartz 2005: 156). 
From the first efforts to present a coherent strategy for handling stress in organizations in the 
middle of the 1970’s, up to the present-day stress management, the question of “appraisal”, 
“coping” or “self-assessment” of the employee is dealt with as a core problematic. As pointed 
out previously, the self is stressed because of its “excessive self-assessment” and must self-
assess all the more. In Robert L. Woolfolk and Frank C. Richardsons influential book “Stress, 
sanity and survival”, first published in 1978, they state that “stress lies in the perception of 
events, not in events themselves. Perceiving events as threatening to our egos or thwarting of 
our efforts leads to harmful emotional arousal. This is the problem of stress – not outside 
situations or other persons, but our ideas about them and what they mean to us. Most of the 
ideas that produce stress can be boiled down to a few key mistaken beliefs about ourselves 
and the world. These beliefs are emotionally charged upon ourselves and others. They are the 
root cause of the hurry, frustration, and growing sense of hopelessness that often 
characterize overstressed lives” (2008 [1979]: 87). Similar notions of the strong link between 
individual perception and stress-arousal are at the centerfield of most stress management 
literature and tools, as it for instance is expressed in a more recent work by the stress 
consultant and psychologist Allen Elkin: “Feeling stressed is, and always has been, a two-
142 
 
part process. First you need something “out there” to trigger your stress, and then you need 
to perceive that trigger as stressful. Then you feel stressed. You empower these external 
events and situations by viewing them in certain ways. Look at something one way and you 
feel major stress; look at it another way and you feel less stress, maybe even no stress at all” 
(Elkin 2013: 187). Elkin proceeds to elaborate on what this process entails: “If only the 
external situation caused stress, everyone would feel the same stress when placed in the same 
situation. Clearly, this is not the case. A group of people will exhibit a wide range of 
reactions when exposed to the same stress trigger. What’s stressful for somebody else may be 
less stressful for you, or maybe not stressful at all. Depending on how you think about a 
situation or event, you create different feelings. You can create more stress than necessary, 
or less stress. In short, your thoughts have the power to determine the amount of stress you 
feel (…) The trick, or rather the skill, is to recognize when your stress is excessive and be 
able to identify and correct any thinking that is producing and maintaining it” (Elkin 2013: 
189).  This assumption, that stress is produced within each individual, finds its rationale, 
among other things, in a neuro-physical fact; the level of physical arousal varies between 
people responding to the same circumstances. Stress is accordingly understood as something 
created and nurtured due to an imbalanced perception, which therefore must be solved at the 
level of subjective self-inquiry. The perception of each individual is elevated to function as 
both a critical point of examination and intervention, in which the handling of stress starts by 
pointing towards a problematic self-production of stress.  
The modes of self-inquiry brought about to handle the state of stress is closely attached to the 
sense and feeling of “mastery” and “coping”, which largely consists of discovering and 
articulating “counter-realities”. Different forms of templates, through which the individual 
will be able to pin out and review his or her own emotional state, potential, patterns of 
thought and behavior, positive and negative reactions, are on the offer, but they all revolve 
around placing the subject’s inner life interfaced with his and her specific surroundings and 
circumstance. According to Robertson and Cooper, “(…) it seems clear that individuals who 
are resilient are very active in finding and using coping strategies. A failure to adopt active 
coping strategies can lead individuals into a state of “learned helplessness” (see 
Abrahamson et al., 1978) where they feel that nothing they can do will alleviate matters and 
they develop a set of unhelpful behaviors including withdrawal, resignation and even a 
resistance to reversing the negative state of affairs” (2011: 103-104). This “mindset” appears 
under the heading of “Thinking Errors”, which involve a “bias towards thinking in a 
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particular way, whatever the objective evidence suggests. Individuals tend to be prone to 
making one or more of these errors more frequently than the others. It can be very helpful to 
identify your own bias, and to learn to challenge it by checking out the evidence for and 
against these thoughts when they occur” (Robertson and Cooper 2011: 104). The authors give 
a number of examples of such errors, for instance “all-or-nothing thinking”, “magnification” 
and “emotional reasoning” (“you take your emotions as evidence for the truth”). The work of 
detecting such self-produced errors of both emotion and thought is a common feature in the 
“toolboxes” offered by stress management. More or less exhaustive lists are made in order to 
render the individual employee capable of reflecting upon the self-critique and self-demands 
through which he and she is locked in and trapped:  
Psychologist Joy Buikema Fjærtoft (Arbeidsmiljø [Working Environment], no. 5, 2002: 32): 
- “Just have to- thoughts. I absolutely need to do this or that” 
- “Exaggerations and maximizing crisis, such as “I cannot do this, this is terrible”” 
- “Reproach and condemnation”  
Psychologist Allen Elkin (Elkin 2013: 196-206) 
- “catastrophizing and awfulizing” (“how important is it? Is it really a big deal?”) 
- “can’t stand it-itis” (“is my overreacting helping in any way? Or is it making things 
worse?”) 
- “what-if-ing” (“am I over-worrying about this?”) 
- “overgeneralizing” (“look out for language that reflects this all-or-nothing thinking – 
words like “always” and “never”, “nobody” and “everybody””) 
- “mind reading and conclusion-jumping” (“simply ask yourself, “Do I really have 
enough evidence to support my beliefs?”) 
- “comparativitis” (“do I believe that the people I’m comparing myself to are really 
happier?”) 
- “personalizing” (“believing that if someone is angry at you, you deserve that anger”) 
- “emotional reasoning” (“can I trust this feeling, or is this feeling temporarily?”) 
- “self-rating” (“do I really need to have others approval to feel good about myself?”).  
 
In other words, the subject which is under the spell of its own “thinking errors” is in lack of 
sufficient distance and objective gaze towards his and her own emotions and thought. It is a 
subject completely immersed in its own immediate subjectivity, unaware of the “patterns” 
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and predispositions to which it is embedded and how its experience of reality is filtered 
through and directed by a (self-)critical mode. The stressful subject is endowed with a 
preexisting irrationality, that seeks a tragic narrative to inscribe itself in. The tragedy is the 
dominating outlook of the world and identity of this subject.  
What these examples of emotional and perceptible errors seek to offer is a problematization 
of the ways in which the subject problematizes its own reality. They are simply faults and 
liabilities of the inner life, adding to and intensifying the experience of unease, anxiety and 
stress. This problematization of the subject’s self-problematization mirrors the experience of 
stress in a specific emulating figure - a “devil on the shoulder”, appearing in a voice that 
twists and drowns the authentic voice of the self. Handling the state of stress thereby also 
means that the self must wage a battle against itself, more specifically through identifying the 
antagonistic forces which disturbs and drains the self for energy, ambition and well-being. An 
authentic voice of the self cannot be properly voiced, as long as the subject remains inclined 
to describe its world in the language of up-scaling pessimism. The reality that appears before 
him and her is the product of self-generated defeats, threats and dangers, but this fixation of 
experience can be subdued and transgressed.  
Opposed to the negative, destructive mode of thought is a “constructive self-talk” that can 
enable “constructive, forward-looking thinking” (Quick et al. 2013: 154) and “flexible 
thinking”, in which the “ability to “reframe” and control or accept thoughts, is an important 
aspect of personal resilience” (Robertson and Cooper 2011: 102). In order to enhance and 
train such modes of flexible thinking, the utilization of a “thought record” is proposed, to 







Situation Feelings Thoughts/ Beliefs Challenges and 
alternative 
Action 
What happened or 
what is happening?  
 
How do you feel 
about this?  
What thoughts are 
making you feel the 
way you do?  
Why do you feel 
like that?  
How rational are 
your thoughts and 
beliefs? 
Are there any 
Thinking Errors? 
What’s an 
alternative way to 
think about this? 
What’s your best 
course of action?  
(Robertson and Cooper 2011: 103) 
In order to detect the cause of stress, the subject must take upon itself an identity as 
emotionally seduced, “overloaded”, and biased towards a negation of its own potential. It is 
an identity furnished according to a denial of reality, because the reality cannot be accessed 
directly, but appear only through the deceptive images and voices of negation and negativity. 
While this pattern of fixed behavior, emotion and thought is clearly indexed (e.g. “thinking 
errors”, “emotional reasoning” etc.), the measures provided to release the subject from its 
own fixation is instead centered on “opening up” this identity without articulating clear 
answers. That is obviously a key point, all the while the answers to the cause and effect of 
this fixation only can be provided through the means of biographizing the trajectory of 
pathological experience – that is, by invoking the family situation, personality, work 
environment, ambitions and career path etc. of the subject at stake. By bringing its own 
fixation into question, through the means of self-inquiry, the stressful subject is encouraged 
to find alternate pathways and routes to its own experience of the world. In other words, both 




“Constructive Self-Talk Alternatives to Typical Mental Monologues”  
Situation Typical mental monologue Constructive self-talk alternative 
Driving to work on a day that will be full 






Anticipation of a seminar presentation or 
public address 
 










Flat tire on a business trip 
Oh brother, what a day this will be! 
It’s gonna be hell. 
I’ll never get it all done. 
It’ll be exhausting. 
What if I blow it? 
Nobody will laugh at that opening joke 
 
What if they ask about…? 
I hate talking to groups. 
 
I almost died. I’ll die soon 





I hate that person. 
He makes me feel stupid. 
We’ll never get along. 
 
Damn this old car (pacing around the car, 
looking at the flat tire). 
I’ll miss all my meeting. 
It’s hopeless. 
This looks like a busy day. 
The day should be very productive. 
I’ll get a lot accomplished today. 
This ought to be a challenge. 
I’ll take a deep breath and relax. 
They’ll enjoy it. 
 
Each presentation goes a bit better. 
 
 
I didn’t die. I made it through.  
The doctor says I’ll be able to get back to 
work soon. 
I can keep active and gradually get back to 
most of my old sports. 
 
I don’t feel comfortable with him. 
I let myself get on edge when he’s around. 
It will take some effort to get along. 
 
These things happen to everyone. I can fix 
it. 
Bad time for a flat (beginning to get tools 
and start working). 
I’ll call and cancel Jenkins. I should make 
the rest of the appointments. 
 
(Quick et al. 2013: 155) 
The authors continue to propose that the use of plans that can serve as “a self-affirming 
contract and a reminder of action option decisions for managing stress” (Quick et a. 2013: 
196). The plan is designed to hold the subject accountable to itself, through continual 
assessment and revision of its own voice.  
According to the authors, “the process of developing a plan should be seen as one of trial and 
success. The bottom line is whether the individual feels a sense of relief and achieves the 
feeling we described earlier as eustress. The basic question is: “When you use the action 
options outlined, how do you feel at the end of the day? At the end of the week? At the end of 
the year?” There are a number of interventions with proven success to increase a sense of 
subjective well-being along with reduced strain on the body. Individuals can be trained to 
proactively self-monitor or manage their personal perceptions to both enhance positive and 
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discourage negative displays of emotion. Constructive self-talk is a learned technique that 
replaces negative self-talk with more positive and reinforcing self-talk (Wright et al., 2007). 
Another potential avenue of change involves incorporating signature strengths of character 
into one’s daily routine, both at home and at work. As previously discussed, a growing body 
of evidence has indicated possible connections between positive feelings and well-being and 
such character strengths as spirituality, forgiveness, humility, gratitude, zest, hope and 
kindness (Peterson and Seligman, 2004; Wright and Quick, 2011). One caveat is appropriate 
here. As with any change attempt, the audience must perceive the change as authentic and 
genuine. Change attempts that are perceived as insincere and phony will eventually be found 
out, and all goodwill will be lost. The content and context of intervention are both very 
important. Being intentionally hurtful and negative on a subject that speaks to another’s 
actual or perceived core strength will never be counterbalanced by telling that person 
several times that his or her new hat is attractive” (Quick et al. 2011: 197-198).  
 
We can see two opposed selves appear in these self-assessment tools, conveying the 
juxtaposed voices of negativity and positivity, centered on the gap between the world as it 
seems (but does not have to be) and the world as it could be (but does not by itself turn into). 
In other words, there is a doubling of the self, in a present and a future, in a mode of over-
identification opposed to a mode of dis-identification. There is a set of “false beliefs” against 
one “constructive self-talk”, a set of alarming reactions and thought patterns against 
“solutions”. The variety of “positive” selves does not have any singular and defined end 
point, such as making people more “harmonious” or more co-operative at the workplace. 
Rather, it revolves around charging the difference between the self and its environment with 
other qualities than what the stressful individual currently is assumed to have available, so to 
change his or her “mindset” and “reaction patterns” from a fixed state to an open and 
malleable state. For instance, by installing a “positive voice” and an alternated attitude, the 
self is rendered with a new field of action, through which “opportunities” and “possibilities” 
appear instead of fear and apprehension. However, this enactment goes far beyond the 
suggestion of alternative options to “deal” with problems and difficulties. These acts of 
modification and shift in self-image offer, I propose, an alternation of the world, which 
promise to change the foundation of reality itself. I will describe this peculiar emergence of 
sociality in the next few pages.  
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Before doing so, we can briefly summarize the various solutions brought about to handle 
stress according to their different meaning dimensions. In the social dimension, the stressful 
individual must learn to dis-identify with both its own alluring emotional “self-knowledge” 
and its over-absorbed employee-status, specifically by learning to “let go” from work and 
withdrawing from demands at work when they tower up. In the temporal dimension, the 
stressful subject is at once trapped in the tragedies of its own past and incessantly worried 
about the future. The different self-assessment tools temporalize a new self appearing in a 
horizon of “positive” and “constructive” self-expectations. In the factual dimension, the 
actualization of self-imposed pathologies residing in a failed observation of the self (in its 
environment), serves to distinguish the pathologies of the self from those of its environment. 
Together, these dimensions can provide for a new reality to appear in front of the self, as we 













Couplings: Stress, power and self-transformation  
In the following chapter, I will discuss how stress management emerge as a technology of 
self-transformation and how this technology couples illness and power. I will first clarify 
what technology here entails, before moving on to the question of how illness and power 
comes into play in this realm.  
In the case of stress management, the question of how the self can regain and strengthen its 
own will, is, as we have seen, connected to notions of perception, assumed to be at once 
conditioned by immobility and plasticity. These two poles reflect each other, insofar as the 
immobility of the subjects thought patterns and reactions - that leads to stress – only can be 
observed and recognized on the condition of their malleability, as something that can be 
shaped differently and recast in another light. There is no opportunity to problematize and 
symptomize the fixed design of emotional and cognitive frenzy – from the position of the 
therapist, coach or the subject itself – unless this design can be re-arranged and configured in 
another form and expression. The diagnose of a self-pathology and its following de-
pathologization is, as such, founded on a zenith of change – the hope and possibility of a re-
design of the self.  Following this line of diagnostics, all human beings are endowed with a 
latent ability to imagine themselves and the world otherwise and thereby, through the sheer 
act of (re-)imagining, experience the world taking another shape. This deconstructive logic 
offers itself as a therapeutic imperative; when the world is described differently, the world 
itself becomes different – and it us up to the stressful individual whether or not and how to 
engage in the act of splitting up and reassembling the bits and pieces of self and reality in 
alternate accounts. First, reality and perception is split up, and thereafter they are sought 
molded together in a new way.  
In 1771, almost two decades prior to the French Revolution in 1789, the author Louis-
Sebastien Mercier published the novel The Year 2440, often referred to as the first science 
fiction novel ever written. In the book, we encounter a society in which all citizens have 
become authors, who spend a vast amount of their lives recording their own moral 
achievements. In this world, still centuries ahead of us, the act of speaking and writing have 
become pivotal to a degree that only an individual who is also an author can rightfully claim 
to be a citizen. Citizenship is simply realized through writing. At one point, the protagonist, 
who originates from Merciers contemporaneous Paris, spots a man fleeing and asks his 
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companion: ”I Entreat you to tell me who that man is, who wears a mask, whose step is so 
precipitate that he seems to be flying from the pursuit of some enemy? Who can he be?” 
 – “He is the author who has published a bad work” (Mercier 1797 [1771]: 29). 
In many regards, Merciers utopian depiction of a futuristic Paris immersed with writing as an 
act both liberating and binding, bears an arresting resemblance to how stress management 
relies on the self-inquiry of subjects as the vital entry point into their own reality, but also out 
of it. In the current section, I have so far pointed towards how perception functions as a key 
concept in the management and literature on stress, which revolves around a) making 
individuals aware of how they perceive themselves and their surroundings and b) making 
individuals take responsibility for their own stressful reality by revising and alternating these 
perception-patterns.  
These two molds of subjectivity, e.g. perception and responsibility, situate individuals in 
what we might call a “a network of writing” (Foucault 1995: 189). In order to take charge of 
stress and learn to cope with it, the subject has to transform into an “author”, that is able to 
re-write the script of stressful experience. The environment that surrounds each individual 
can be re-invented through realizing that the state of reality, whatever it might contain, is 
already “self-scripted” and therefore can be re-written. I refer to this enactment as a 
technology of self-transformation. In the words of Foucault, a technology is characterized by 
how it will “permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault 1988: 18). Unlike technologies strictly 
designating physical entities, like an engine, a fridge or a cell phone, technology here refers 
to a process of social modification or adjustment, that is, the aim of a change in the way we 
perceive of ourselves and others or how we do things. It is, as such, a technology of the 
social. In other words, a technology usually installs an expectation of a difference to come 
into play, for instance between how things are now and how they can become in the future. 
As Foucault makes clear, all technologies carry with them an ambition of transformation. 
However, social technologies do not share anything apart from this ambition to transform us 
in one way or another and the question of how a technology takes upon itself this effort to 
change, for instance a classroom, an organization or a population, can only be studied in its 
local and concrete emergence. In the case of stress management, we have seen how the 
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difference between perception and reality a guiding theme throughout its different templates 
allowing for increased “self-mastery”.  
The mobilization of reality versus perception, on the surface appearing as a fundamental, 
Cartesian ontology, is furnished according to a variety of different goals, such as an increase 
in productivity, well-being, self-esteem and efficiency. The therapeutic mode of self-inquiry 
revolves around de-stabilizing the motives and self-knowledge of each subject and thereby 
recreate a new, possibly more efficient outlook and sense of reality. The perception of the 
subject thereby serves to highlight how stress emerges and forms an ontological grid, which 
determines how and what kind of reality that appears in front of him or her. The promise of 
stress management entails nothing less than the possibility of obtaining a new “self”, in the 
form of another (and improved) self-consciousness and self-image.  
As we have already seen in the introduction to Luhmann’s theory, perception and 
consciousness are, from a systems theoretical position, placed on the outside of 
communication. Our consciousness remains, in its psychological primacy, unreachable for 
any “second party”, in the form of other consciousness’s or interactions. Human beings 
composite a diverse range of operations that is ultimately beyond the scope of any unifying 
term or concept, such as the “individual”. For instance, a human being will be equipped with 
a conscious realm of thoughts and emotions, biological operations of blood circulation and 
digestion and mechanical movements of fingers and eyelids. This constitutes a complex 
entirety of operations that no surrounding environment can have direct and complete access 
to. Even though this might seem abstract, it is not a deductive point. For example, one cannot 
really dispute, feel enchanted by, agree or argue with the consciousness and perception of 
another person or, for that matter, one’s own. Moreover, we often will have good reasons not 
to express what is on our mind, for the sake of maintaining an “undisturbed” interaction, 
politeness, norms, the wish to keep on communicating and so on. Most doctors will refrain 
from saying to a patient that he strangely resembles Mona Lisa before moving on to the 
consultancy, even though the option is there. In other words, it is not possible to furnish any 
points of direct connection between a system of communication and a system of 
consciousness. In continuation of this, communication itself “cannot produce or receive 
perceptions”, but remains open to a variety of communicative actualizations of perceptible 
experiences (Luhmann 2002d). We can retell a dream we had last night, but others cannot re-
dream it. In the terms of systems theory, the consciousness is operationally closed, insofar as 
its unique cognitive and sensory richness cannot by any means be replicated as 
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communication. Yet, our contemporary society offers an abundant repertoire of technologies 
with the purpose of describing, assessing and treating the inner conditions of ourselves and 
others. There is, as is the case with stress management, an array of technologies for 
therapeutic intervention appearing throughout society, targeting everything from parenthood 
to eating habits and gambling, which take their point of departure in an inner condition from 
which the subject should liberate or transgress and enable itself a form of freedom that would 
otherwise remain unreachable29. In a systems theoretical perspective, however, human beings 
are mainly invoked as communicative addresses, such as that of performers (doctor, teacher, 
politician) and roles (patient, pupil, voter), in society. In fact, to society, human beings 
remain nothing more or less than a multitude of possible addresses, such as a “citizen”, 
“social client”, “employee”, “customer”, “parent”, “marginalized” etc. The difference 
between a human being and an address is a crucial difference, because it enables a clear-cut 
analysis of how stress management revolves around a particular ambition to interconnect 
psychic systems with their environment, centered on creating a reverberation between 
perception and reality. When perception, as such, is mobilized to enable and disable specific 
forms of reality, it is akin to what Barbara Cruikshank describes as “revolutions within” 
(Cruikshank 1999: 88).30  
As a technology of self-transformation, stress management does not seek to inscribe the self 
in a strictly pre-written narrative, but rather seeks to polycontexturalize reality, by invoking 
alternate narratives (Günther 1962). The subject’s gaze is, as such, afforded a “blind spot”; a 
stressful individual does not see how it sees itself and its surroundings, it is claimed 
(Luhmann 2013a: 154). By peeling off the layers of emotional turmoil and fixed thought, 
another kind of self can emerge alongside another kind of reality. The subject should, so to 
speak, push the circularity of the world in an opposite direction, away from itself, to break 
free from the angle of a passive receiver of “ready-made impressions” of reality. Instead of 
locking itself in, in the position as a mere “subscriber” of experience, the subject is 
encouraged to instead speak out and write down its “life-world”, literally, in order to change 
the world. The acute ability of the subject to govern and fertilize the distinction between 
perception and reality takes its problematizing point of departure in the conditions of the 
subject’s self-relation, where the “futile” couplings between perception and reality is thought 
                                                          
29 See for instance (in Norwegian) https://www.bufdir.no/Familie/Tilbud_Regionene/circle_of_security/ 
30 In her study on several new social movements in the US, Barbara Cruikshank describes how these movements in the last decades of the 
20th century was built up, bearing all the hallmarks of an emancipatory quest, around the question of how to induce self-esteem among 
“marginalized groups” in society (Cruikshank 1999). 
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to make out the source of and solution to the experience of stress; the subject’s lack of will, 
failure to take charge of emotions and blurred insight and self-knowledge. Stress is, as such, 
really a consequence of a “failed organization” in the inner life of the self, requiring specific 
measures to re-establish an effective, transparent organization of emotions, will and 
perception.  
 
Couplings: Illness, power and the self 
In the beginning of this thesis, I discussed how illness can be regarded as a form holding 
together two sides, pathology and normality. When illness is communicated, it marks this 
difference, whatever its object may be, such as a failing body function or an employees’ 
absence from the workplace. The various therapeutic efforts found in stress management 
programs can be seen as a means to confront and change the way employees themselves 
indicate experiences of illness and how they (the stressful individuals) mark the difference 
between pathology and normality. Perhaps exactly because there is no doctor/ patient-
relationship to inform this negotiation of health and sickness, the concept of illness becomes 
charged with an extraordinary plasticity in these therapeutic efforts. Illness is sought 
“deconstructed”, as a solipsistic (dis)order within the self, and as a self-production of 
draining noises and shouting demands. Crucial to this practice is the notion of participants 
having become “lost” to themselves in some way or another, as we have seen, for instance 
due to a “lack of balance”, “crisis-maximization” and “negative self-talk”. This instigates a 
work on the identity, of the way individuals furnish and perform their own “selves” and how 
they require meaning of both their life-world as well as their workplace. Illness is in other 
words marked in the identity-construction of the individual, calling upon intervention and 
transformation. In this context, illness and therapy is coupled to a concept of power. To be 
more exact, illness becomes - in stress management - moulded into power communication 
when the possibility of treatment and therapy is considered completely reliant upon the 
empowering and authentication of the self. In the following account, I will shortly describe 
the form of power and then describe how power and illness is coupled in the therapeutic 





Power as communication  
Within certain traditions of sociology, for instance in the vein of Max Weber, it is assumed 
that power first and foremost constitute a relation of pure domination, between a superior and 
an inferior part (Weber 1964: 152-153). Weber famously asserts that power is executed 
forcefully, carried out despite resistance, wherein, as Robert Dahl puts it, A makes B do 
something he or she would otherwise not have done (had it not been for the superiority of A) 
(Dahl 1957: 202-203). Luhmann proposes that power must be differentiated from brute force, 
and that, in such instances of threats and possibly violence, power is disabled rather than 
effected, at least temporarily. What’s more to it, power must not be confused with any 
relation invested with, for instance, money or passion, because such relations are not always-
already governed by the prospect of sanctions, be them positive or negative. I will in the 
coming paragraph give a short account of the analytics of power offered by systems theory, 
including its requirements of accuracy in the study of how power unfolds itself.  
Luhmann understands power as an effort of influence, where A is faced with certain 
expectations from B, which resides over sanctions that might or might not come into use. 
However, instead of a one-way demand voiced from a singular source “above”, we should 
understand power in its relational capacity on both sides of the table, as a matter of a mutual 
“I expect you to expect that I have expectations to you”. Power only works, claims Luhmann, 
when the freedom to choose and act according to one’s own will is granted to both parties in 
a relationship; it is not a form of infliction that seeks to twist, bend and shut down the will of 
those who are at the margins, but on the contrary a relation which presuppose and depends on 
the accessibility and readiness of the freedom of the “other” (Luhmann 2017: 132-135). In 
systems theoretical terms, we are dealing with “double contingency”, in the form of mutual 
expectations and freedom in a relation, which likewise must be taken into consideration by 
both sides. To phrase it differently, the function of power designates the situation in which 
the possibilities to act differently are available to both sides in the relation between an 
inferior and a superior part. In the case of complete and utter “powerlessness”, individuals 
cannot be summoned to consider and respond to expectations that are directed towards them.  
An individual, for instance a partner or a pupil, can only be taken into consideration as a 
subject of love or learning insofar as they are or can be motivated by themselves to engage in 
the relation to the other partner or the school. A pupil who is considered unmotivated cannot 
learn, pedagogical principles typically claims. A partner who no longer displays any signs of 
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“interest” cannot love, at least not passionately. When we in this regard need to distinguish 
power from coercion, it is because there are no (or extremely limited) options to choose 
differently or to consider other alternatives available for a person who is coerced to act in a 
specific manner, strictly according to someone else’s preference. Coercion and obedience 
holds a direct line of action from one person to another, with no regard for the possibility of 
considerations of alternatives and adjustments on the part of the coerced. To be clear, this 
does not imply that we have entered an era that is predominantly “non-violent”, where fear 
has become obsolete or that acts of threats, bullying or abuse necessarily are less prevalent 
today than in pre-modern societies. It simply means that power as a form of communication 
relies on the absence of violence and coercion, its function loses foothold once direct force is 
applied. Violence breaks down the possibility to communicate on the premise of double 
contingency, at least as far as power goes (Luhmann 2013a: 121).  
Against this background Luhmann introduces the power-holder and the power-subject as a   
constitutive difference in his concept of power. Power is not, like Weber or Dahl suggests, 
performed on the side of a superior part against someone inferior, but emerges in the relation 
between these two parts. There is obviously an asymmetrical difference at play here, insofar 
as the power-holder holds a more favourable position than the power-subject. But the relation 
is not fixed, it is not necessarily given by institutional circumstance when or how a relation of 
power comes into being (the difference between doctor/ patient, state/ municipality or parent/ 
child is therefore not per se exchangeable with the difference between a power-holder and a 
power-subject). Neither is it a relation that remains entrenched in the same dynamics over 
time, a power-holder might weaken his or her position, so that the difference in power 
decreases; the difference between a power-holder and a power-subject is only possible on the 
condition that it can be transformed or cease to exist. We can therefore say that power attends 
to the relationality of a relation in a specific way, which puts demands on all parties involved. 
As Luhmann points out, “(…) because of his power, the power-holder himself will have 
success and failures attributed to, and suitable motives imposed on, him, whether he wants 
this or not. Thus power does not become the instrument of an already present will, it first of 
all generates that will” (Luhmann 2017: 133-134).  
To take an example, we can think of a situation where an employee on tenure is told that the 
company has a tradition for rewarding high ambitions among their staff. Now, what does 
“reward” mean? Does it imply that she might get a permanent position? Does it involve a 
raise, a bonus or promotion? Furthermore, what does “high ambitions” mean? Is she expected 
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to increase her portfolio of clients? Take on more assignments? Take initiative to develop 
new strategies in the market? The obscurity might not even be intentional on the part of the 
manager, but it puts the employee in a position where she is bound to the continuous 
interpretation of “reward” and “ambitions”. For power to come into effect, freedom must be 
granted to consider and interpret such expectations. If we hold on to the scenario, we can also 
imagine the employee asking for a contract, wherein the specific conditions for a promotion 
or a raise is explicitly listed, in which case the freedom to handle the complexity of the 
relation is pushed back over to the superior (if it succeeds). In Foucauldian terms, I will argue 
that power therefore involves a certain intensification of freedom in relations, in the form of 
expectation-intensity and interpretation-intensity (Nealon 2008: 32-51).  
In the realm of stress management, power and illness is coupled through the enactment of 
“findings the answers” to one’s disarray and pressure, as a biographical code. I will elaborate 
on what I mean by this. First, when I refer to a biographical code, I simply mean the different 
techniques that are put forward in stress management, with the purpose of making individuals 
reflect on themselves, their own “thought-patterns”, reactions, emotions, relations, 
inclinations and so forth. Phrased differently, these are techniques that caters the subject with 
questions that point towards answers within him-and herself. Second, power is folded into 
illness in a way that governs the prospects of “healing” through the self-empowerment of the 
subject, most notably by gaining a “positive” language and a revised narration of the self. The 
subject that is called into self-assessments in stress management, is assumed to be powerless, 
due to a perception and voice that cannot distinguish itself from its environment. It is, in other 
words, a subject assumed to be inauthentic. Stress management revolves around pinning out 
strategies, through which the subject can overcome this supposed state of self-imposed 
powerlessness and in this way take possession of its own voice and identity. In systems 
theoretical terms, illness is hereby observed from a power-perspective; in order to become 
“healthy”, the stressful individual has to empower itself. This coupling between illness and 
health allows for a vast number of themes to be actualized as therapeutic “issues”, such as 
responsibility, authenticity and performance. In the coming parts of this thesis, I will further 
unfold the paradoxes of this therapeutic realm against the backdrop of this coupling between 





The “other” reality 
We have so far seen how the malleability of reality is a key component in stress management. 
However, next to a reality that can be revised and alternated, there is second form of reality, 
which appears completely solid and is described as out-of-control, hectic, unreasonable and 
chaotic. Jon Kabat-Zinn, who is an influential stress expert and mindfulness guru, writes for 
instance that “even if you have a job with lots of autonomy and a good salary and you are 
doing things that you care about, even love to do, work always presents its unique challenges 
and lets you know that you are never completely in control, even if you think you are. The law 
of impermanence still applies. Things still change. You can’t control that. There are always 
people or forces that can disrupt your work, threaten your job and your role, or make what 
you said one day “inoperable” the next, no matter how much power you think you have 
accumulated. Moreover, there are usually intrinsic limits to how much you can change things 
or resist certain changes within organizations or industries, even if it objectively looks as if 
you have a lot of power and influence. Just think for a moment how difficult it is, even if you 
wanted to, to regulate Wall Stress and the global financial industry for the sake of stability. 
Even the president of the United States is unable to do it, and may not want to. Think of the 
recession in 2008, triggered and then compounded by clever people in the banking industry 
and the housing market intoxicated by the prospect of selling houses on a massive level to 
people who they knew couldn’t afford them, ultimately draining the savings of so much of the 
world’s middle class and putting so many people out of work. Balance and a measure of 
sanity may eventually be restored, but the harm to individual people can be colossal and 
lasting. And this tends to happen in cycles because the collective memory for such object 
lessons in business and finance is very short. This itself is a kind of disease, brought by the 
human mind when it loses its moral compass, as can happen so easily in work settings under 
all the encompassing pressures to “succeed”, and to “grow the business”. At the level of the 
individual person at work, job stress, insecurity, frustration, and failure can be experienced 
in any job and at any pay grade, from janitor to chief executive, from waiter, factory worker, 
or bus driver to lawyer, doctor, scientist, police chief, or politician. Many jobs are 
intrinsically stressful, as we have seen, because of the combination of low decision-making 
latitude and high responsibility. To correct this requires reorganizing the job itself or 
compensating the employees better to make it more tolerable. Yet, given that many job 
descriptions will not be rewritten in the short run to lower employee stress, people are forced 
to cope as best they can using their own resources. The degree to which you are affected by 
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such stressful circumstances can be influenced positively by your own coping skills (….) the 
level of psychological stress you experience depends on how you interpret things-in other 
words, on your attitude, on whether you are able to flow with change or, on the other hand, 
make every ripple in the way things are unfolding into an occasion for fighting or worrying 
or falling into despair” (Kabat-Zinn 2013: 503-504).  
The reality of the employee is thus ultimately unstable, unpredictable and uncontrollable to a 
degree that it, according to Kabat-Zinn, can be compared to the financial market: A pure 
force of its own, which usually escapes all efforts of regulation. The employee is left with 
scarce resources to resolve any conflicts due to, for instance, time pressure or conflicting 
demands in such an environment. Rather, the employee should learn how to handle the state 
of permanent change and accept its “fate” among the all-encompassing threats, residing in 
every corner of the workplace, such as the possibility of dismissal or continuous disruptions 
etc. The options of facing stress offered here are either to keep up with the flow or to dry up, 
by choosing dejection or seeking conflicts. In the latter case, this will supposedly sparkle 
more and stronger conflicts and an even more stressful environment. Stress and 
organizational change is, as such, usually interlinked, in which a generally increasing 
intensity and tempo in work life, is seen a premise that can both drain and gain the employee, 
depending on how it is perceived. As it is formulated in a handbook on preventive stress 
management: “Work and organizational life are undergoing dramatic change, and we expect 
that to continue and increase as we move deeper into the 21st century. Change is a major 
source of stress for people in organizations. Is that change-induced stress simply a challenge, 
or a threat, or perhaps just a hindrance? Although our mind-body system may say that it is a 
threat, maybe we need to change our minds and see the challenge and opportunity that stress 
may offer” (Quick et al. 2013: 25).  
In a similar vein, Christine, an HR-manager at a multi-national corporation that I interviewed, 
holds forth stress as closely interlinked with (lack of) adaptability to the changing 
circumstances that surrounds the employees. In addition to what is described as a generally 
hectic work environment, the company has undergone several rounds of redundancies and re-
organization over the past years. On this background, the HR-department decided to initiate 
certain measures in order to reduce stress and anxiety among the staff. Speaking of these 
efforts and how stress should be handled, Christine says: 
We’ve worked quite intensely throughout the last four years with our culture, with change of 
attitudes and processes of change and what has come out of it is sort of, well, it works better 
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to go along than to go against your tasks and your job. So we have worked a lot in order to 
get our employees not to fight against all of these changes. And you can feel it yourself as 
well, right, thinking that things were better off before all these shifts came about, but if you 
manage to stay focused and on top of things you realize that “well, things are good now”. 
Then I understand why they want these changes. I think as long as you manage to maintain 
such an attitude, then you will save yourself a lot of frustration and things like that. Because I 
think a lot of people have been dealing with that at our workplace. And if they don’t 
experience stress, then they certainly feel frustrated. 
Interviewer: So is that the reason you started these awareness campaigns? 
Christine; Yes, it was a combination of things, because a lot of different things were changing 
very rapidly and new systems were also being introduced. And people were not approving, 
they were resisting this. We found out that we had to start on scratch, in order to get people 
to understand our mindset. We started working a lot with team-work and organized 
development courses, where we dealt with our culture here, the environment at our 
workplace and that has really helped us out, to get us here, to the other end of the tunnel. 
Because if you find an employee here and ask that person where will you be in five years, 
how do you imagine this place in five years, it is not possible to give an answer, because 
nobody knows. You don’t know if you will work here, you don’t know the circumstances, if we 
will be consolidated with another company or sold again. There is only one thing that is 
certain and that is change. And if you don’t have the ability to remain curious, if you’re 
unable adapt to the speed of things and always fear the changes that are about to come, then 
this is not the right place for you. And that’s a shame, because we’ve had some people here 
that didn’t stick around too long, because they’ve realized that they just couldn’t keep up with 
it. It’s too demanding, simply. There isn’t any room for slack here. You don’t have the 
possibility to hide and be anonymous and not be seen if you take things down a notch. A lot 
depends upon you doing your job. You will be caught, sort of.   
Christine describes a workplace in a state of more or less constant transition, and where the 
employees, in order to handle these changes, has to be attuned into a similar mode of change. 
It strikingly resembles a capacity of adaptation underlined by Hans Selye himself: ”The 
increasingly rapid pace of change requires us to constantly accelerate this adaptive process. 
To survive, twentieth century man must adapt to a society in a permanent state of flux, where 
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everything is changing before his eyes…”31.  In this demanding reality, the employee is left 
with marginal space for time-outs or any kind of “mental” detours. On one hand, stress is, in 
this case, described as a latent product of organizational circumstance: unpredictability, 
perpetual change, high-speed and “no slack”. However, these possible triggers are, on the 
other hand, exclusively problematized within the context of perception, by way of awareness 
and attitudes. Resistance, fear, lack of involvement and inability to adjust; this register of 
organizational “hurdles” will be familiar to anyone who has glimpsed into a handbook of HR-
strategies. The HR-manager interprets these different mechanisms as a basic “response-
pattern” which has to be challenged and reformed, in order for employees to manage their 
own employment. By tapping into the transient mode of the organization: by staying 
“curious”, as it is phrased here, the employee can be equipped to deal with his or her own 
stressful reality. This reality, and all it might contain of hurriedness and insecurity, designates 
only the premise through which the perception has to adapt and move along. In other words, 
the (ever-changing) reality remains stable, whereas the perception of the individual employee 
must be readily de-stabilized. This division of transience and stability is present throughout 
the stress management literature, which seems to be calling upon a “discipline” of plasticity 
of the employee, which must be properly attuned to the complexity and transient mode of his 
and her environment.  
 
Suspending the tragedy: A second act 
Faced with this disturbing reality, stress management says, somehow, to the individual: When 
you experience stress, it is because you expect the world as “facts”. If you gear yourself 
towards an increased self-awareness on how you “produce” the world, you will realize and 
thereby come to expect that other realities also are possible. By different means such as self-
monitoring, “self-talk”, the use of diary or a stress plan, the self is geared towards a 
redistribution of the circularity between these two sides (of perception, on the one side and 
reality, on the other). In this regard, stress management obviously contains a strong appeal to 
a readiness of malleability, plasticity and change. However, there is another side to this coin. 
The stressful individual, absorbed in its own tragic narratives, is akin to what Roland Barthes 
dismissingly described as a “romantic author”, who only writes according to the approval and 
demand of an outer authority (Barthes 2004: 200-215). In other words, the very narrative of 
                                                          
31 Quoted from Ehrenberg 2010: 114 
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the self is pathologized. The subject who creates a “bad work”, that is, a self-seduced and 
emotional account of his own reality, cannot be conceived of as free. If he fails to produce a 
“counter-narrative” in light of his own “weak” self-observation in the past, his observations 
of himself in the present come under suspicion. To regain a true will and self-relationship, the 
subject must oppose its own “romantic authorship” so as to authentically write and speak on 
the basis of his own, singular outlook and experience, centered on self-approval and self-
demands rather than those of others. The world must be fictionalized in order to become real.  
However, “negative self-talk” cannot be equated with a self-authentic perception of reality. 
“Negative self-talk” is conceived of as the “fountain” of tragedies, but only on the condition 
of their failure to correspond with reality. The subject can only be perceived as released from 
an outer authority when the account of reality follows the expectations of two, internally 
struggling agencies within the self. In other words, there is an outer authority which can 
distinguish when and how the subject is released from an outer authority, and how the subject 
fails or succeeds in advancing its own, singular self-authenticity (I will come back to this 
paradox in the next chapter).   
The self that has made itself the source its own tragedies, must re-narrate its own world to 
suspend its own tragic fate, as a “second act”. We might say that the subject of unease at the 
present moment must turn to the narrative of himself as a “counter-structural media”: to “re-
narrate” enables a future provision of a changed self, wherein all sorts of difficulties and 
pressure no longer have to exist (Luhmann 2013a: 245). The story through which the subject 
frames itself and its own difficulties must not only be changed, this narrative is itself what 
will change his or her difficult circumstances and experiences. The self’s narration of a 
reality appearing through a positive and invigorated self-voice point towards a future which 
has diminished the pathological present and perhaps even completely transgressed it. The 
improved self of the future is mirrored in the yet-to-be transformed self of the present 
moment, but the very anticipation of a change produces an experience that is already present, 
in the form of a necessity of change granted by the transformed self in the future (Koselleck 
2006: 360). In other words, when a change within the subject is forecast as a solution to 
future problems, it also changes the relevance-criteria for how the experience of problems can 
be put into words. On the one hand, the stressful conditions can, accordingly, in its most 
radical proposition, be altered by mere imagination. On the other hand, when different 
“imaginary resources” are mobilized, the subject is already conceived of as a subject enacting 
in the self-transformation. In systems theoretical terms we can say that the failed narrative 
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and the successful narrative (of the self) are seen as equivalent solutions to the same problem, 
namely the question of how to process information and acquire knowledge of the world 
(Luhmann 2000b: 91-93; Luhmann 2002c).  
To briefly summarize the main points so far: The subject appearing in stress management is 
exhorted to inscribe and regulate itself in this social reality by other means than those offered 
by the tragic narrative. He or she contains a unique and authentic observation of the world 
which grants him or her an exclusive access to reality. Therefore, reality can only be 
understood as a singularized reality, that strictly emerges within the individual. When there 
are no ultimate external references to which the subject can attach and find a foothold, the 
subject must take responsibility for how it perceives and thereby also how it, by doing so, 
realize and create a sociality. Yet, in this “second act” there are certain expectations as to how 
the subject invokes the singularity of its inner “life-world”, by finding an authentic voice that 
can convey the tragedy of its past into a future where it is suspended. The subject is assumed 
as a triumphantly autonomous in its reason and outlook, but this can only be decided 
according to how it chooses to articulate its world of commotion and pressure.  
This brings us to the next point, which is that this problematization of the self appears as if 
the subject is detached from all “social regulation” apart from his or her self-regulation. 
Stress management assumes to see a blind spot in the stressful subject’s self-observation, but 
it does not see how this assumption at the same time creates its own social reality. We have 
seen how stress management aims to unfold alternative narratives through which the subject 
can mirror itself and take upon itself an identity as, for instance, “emotionally enduring”, 
“self-aware” and “balanced”. By doing so, another social space also emerges, that point 
towards how it is possible to interact and deal with problems at work. What the self-
transformative imperative is unable to perceive, is therefore how it inserts the individual in 
another social realm when it proposes a re-constellation between the self and its environment. 
Phrased differently, the enabling of a strengthened self-relationship also constitutes a new 
social environment. When the scheme of reality and perception is brought about and sought 
de-stabilized and re-designed, it does not “extinguish” any external reality, the outer world 
does not disappear. Of course, “everyone” knows this, also those who acquire individuals to 
perceive of themselves differently. The fact that it still remains there, is also underlined 
repeatedly in the stress management literature, as we have seen. However, the effort to make 
stressful employees take responsibility for their own perceptions, invokes a social reality 
wherein the individual is assumed to be ideally unbound by any rationality other than his 
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own. The workplace is, as such, configured a as site of prevailing individual rationalities that 


























The employee as a generalized addict: Stress and the objects of 
desire 
In the chapter that follows, I will make a short “detour” into what can be described as an 
“extreme case” of HR-strategies which cannot be generalized (Flyvbjerg 2001). It is, 
however, a case that sheds light onto how one specific organization employs the vocabulary 
of self-pathologies in order to prevent stress and illness among its employees.  
Telenor, which ranks among the biggest companies in Norway, has issued a number of self-
help exercises and advice on stress management to their employees. According to the 
organization, an efficient management of stress constitute a significant competitive advantage 
for the individual employee, in a time where work life demands increasingly more from its 
employees:  
“The busier you are, the more important it will be for you to find an efficient way to handle 
various projects, tasks, deadlines and the relations to your colleagues. Here are some advice 
on how you can handle your stress efficiently. Stress does not really need an explanation: you 
know when you are stressed out. At the same time, the knowledge on stress, what triggers it 
and how you can handle it, is almost becoming a competitive advantage in a work life where 
the assignments are increasing and the time is diminishing. If you are able to keep the 
perspective, control and progress when the heat is on, you will easily be considered a more 
valuable asset than the colleague who gets distracted, forgets things, turns up too late for 
meetings and is unable to deliver before deadlines. Stress basically consists of two things: a 
triggering factor (stressor) and an emotional and physical response. The factors which 
trigger the response can be linked to, for instance, too many tasks, the complexity of your 
assignment, distractions and interruptions when you are trying to work your way through the 
to-do list just before you have to head on home from the office. It is about being in a situation 
where we have to manage more than we are capable of and reactions such as the “fight- or 
flight”-response might be kicking in” 32  
Handling stress - in this case - revolves around how the employee can position and nurture an 
image of him- and herself as a valuable asset for the organization. In order to do so, it is 
necessary to display certain desirable features, such as efficiency and calmness. What is 




sketched out here is a protocol for a performative enactment of energy and determined will in 
a situation where the organization is in a permanent state of urgency and where the demands 
on the employee constantly increase – a situation which the stress consultant Ivar Vehler 
describes as “the eye of the hurricane” (Vehler 2010).  In Telenor’s stress management guide, 
employees are advised on how to avoid falling into – and coming out of - conditions such as 
“learned helplessness” and “self-inflicted ADHD”, resulting in the postponement of 
increasingly more work, starting off projects that are not followed up, the need for ever 
stronger stimuli of “instant gratifications”, such as incoming e-mails or “likes”, a short 
attention span, increased impatience, irritation and restlessness. These different symptoms 
constitute “a serious problem that you need to work on. And the work consists first and 
foremost of realizing that you have a problem”.  
So, an employee is trapped and has come to a halt in the flow of routines and tasks – a 
condition grounded in a cognitive and emotional fluctuations within the self. The vantage 
points brought about for monitoring and treating this condition is partly mounted on the 
semantics of addiction, in which the problematic behavior requires a more severe knowledge 
of  what “the overproduction of dopamine leads to, and why this chemical substance results 
in unfertile stress, postponements, and occasional anxiety for not being able to deliver  - or 
even getting started in the first place. It is only when we have identified this behavior within 
ourselves, which paradoxically can be understood as a form of addiction, that we are able to 
simply change it. Dopamine has a number of different function and can produce a variety of 
effects on the brain, such as the reward: when we are enacting in a behavior that creates a 
sense of a positive result, there is a small dose of dopamine released which stimulates the 
brain’s reward function. It simply feels good. The problem we encounter in our modern 
society, and in a completely technologized work environment, is that the tools we are 
surrounded by are designed to attract our attention, which in turn gives us our small 
dopamine fix. Visual stimuli, such as the small square in the corner of your screen signaling 
a new e-mail in Outlook, the number indicating a new message on Messenger or the light 
signaling three times on your mobile phone, when you receive a new text message, will drown 
other forms of stimuli that also holds important functions to us. Sounds have the same effect, 
often appearing simultaneously with the visual stimuli - and if you really have called upon 
the whole infantry, your mobile phone and tablet will vibrate instantaneously. When this 
occurs over a period, the result will be a hyperactive attention demanding increasingly 
stronger stimuli to satisfy the brain. In other words, we have become overstimulated. At the 
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same time, all these sounds, visual impressions, vibrations – as well as the updates, likes and 
e-mails appearing behind them – will result in a dopamine activity that is addictive. We 
search for increasingly shorter tasks, gratifying us instantly, at the cost of analysis, in-depth 
reading, concentration and focus. To make matters even worse, we don’t even have to feel the 
dopamine kick in every time we check our e-mail or search for likes on Facebook, in order to 
amplify this pattern of behavior. Research on what is called classical conditioning (the 
relation between a certain kind of stimuli and a type of behavior) shows that we only have to 
experience a reward as rarely as every fiftieth time in order to repeat this behavior with the 
same intensity every time”33  
Thus, employees are exhorted to codify themselves and their behavior in the framework of 
(prevention and treatment of) addiction. Concepts such as symptom and stimulation appear 
here as key themes through which the employee can scan the causalities leading to one’s 
behavior and find an explanation of a fluctuating attention and inability to perform 
sufficiently. The language of pathology is present to such a degree here that the employee is 
encouraged to – on a regular basis – “diagnose” him- and herself in order to find a proper 
“cure”.  
The source of the employee’s addiction is located in a “general condition” of our 
contemporary work life and society; the technologized sphere of omnipresent digital 
equipment, on the one hand and hurriedness and pressure of time, on the other hand. The 
message is clear: the tools and technologies that were supposed to make our lives easier and 
more efficient have invaded us. These machines have colonized our very souls; they have 
installed an instable, ever-shifting gaze in us that nourishes itself from our ability to stay put, 
endure, and gain perspective. Instead of becoming a Luddite, however, the employee is 
encouraged to struggle against this impossible, yet unavoidable condition of work life by 
waging a battle against his and her own inclinations. The employee should observe him- and 
herself as a generalized addict: Since the technologies at moment are ready to take possession 
of our attention and are yet also inescapable, both in our daily lives and at work, the 
employee resides in a “danger-zone”, where addictive behavior easily might transpire and 
take control of him or her. Therefore, the source of this addiction cannot be removed or 
diminished – the environment that surrounds us is always-already highly infectious, 
according to the organization. The careful work of prevention and treatment required by the 




employee in this situation, is instead centered on the self-management of gratification; his or 
her sense of joy and enthrallment when interacting with the technologies. Accordingly, the 
stress of the employee is thought to derive from the emotional (over)attachment to a number 
of objects that are indispensable for performing work.  
The surroundings of the employee is accordingly filled with objects of a dubious and alluring 
nature, that at any moment can infect him or her through their strange emotional appeal. They 
are objects described as noise-induced surfaces that enthrall and absorb the gaze, which 
oscillates the attention of the employee in vastly different directions in increasingly shorter 
time spans. Of course, behind these visual-auditory artefacts, there is work: the mail and 
relentless search on the internet is obviously (also) work-related. These artefacts obviously 
contain something beyond their own surface of sound and vision, which supposedly triggers 
the employee – such as possible new assignments, inquiries from clients etc. The difference 
between these symbols and what they actually contain of information is, however, not a 
dominating distinction. On the contrary, they appear to be the same, whereby the addiction of 
the employee remains unspecified, as addiction that can be fixed on work itself as well as on 
the rapid imagery of symbols appearing in front of and around the employee.   
When employees become overstimulated, they venture into a restless search for stronger 
pleasure, doomed to inhabit a sense of permanent subtraction, inflicted by unease and 
commotion. In other words, the employee that has become over-attached to his or her work 
features all the well-known symptoms of an addict; when the sense of reward gradually 
diminishes, it produces a need for ever-stronger increments. The workplace is framed as a site 
invested with affective enthrallment, full of temptations that gradually induce increasing lust 
and desire, which again calls for satisfaction within the employee. As such, the organization, 
just as society, is described as harmful, since it creates and fortify patterns of addiction, 
leaving the employee behind in a state of exhaustion and overstimulation. However, the 
objects of desire that so strongly resonates with the intrinsic need for pleasure within the 
employee cannot simply be removed or thrown out. The employee remains bound to these 
objects; they linger at the center of his or her work. There are, furthermore, neither any 
possibilities of refraining from the sources of risk in other, outer-organizational 
environments, such as the home or society at large, since the source of addiction is no less 
present there and already has unified what might previously have been separated spheres of 
privacy and work. According to Telenor, the private life of the employee has therefore 
already folded itself into his or her work life and vice versa, by way of internet or social 
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media platforms. As such, the source of addiction can appear anywhere and more or less take 
any form, such as the insipid sounds of incoming mails or vibrating phones. What is at stake 
here is therefore an organization that actualizes itself through its own problematic self-
actualization of a vast affective topography, from which the employee, for obvious reasons, 
cannot spatially isolate or retrieve. It is an organization that problematizes itself through the 
self-problematization of its employees.  
It is clear that the possibility of soberness is not really accessible in this environment, since it 
potentially always will breed and amplify addictive behavior. As a matter of fact, the concept 
of addiction as it appears here, as a precondition and omnipresent risk of the organization, is 
not directly juxtaposed to sobriety, since the aim for a complete self-sobriety in such an 
environment will prove itself obsolete. The employee should instead consider him- or herself 
a “risky” subject, which is always on the verge of a certain form of impious consumption, 
whereby a sense stimulation sets in, for instance when encountering the rapid motions and 
auditory effects that moves across the computer screen. The pathways of action rendered 
available from this seductive environment suppose the employee instead as an always-already 
recovering addict, counterposed to the excessive addict in self-fertilized overstimulation; he/ 
she must learn to detach from the sources of addiction while simultaneously retaining a 
proximity to them, work out a proper balance between attachment and remoteness, detect and 
assess triggers and problematic behavior. Put into a form, the employee as a generalized 





Hurriedness, performance and addiction is molded together in the practices of self-assessment 
and regulation brought about to the stressful employee in these guidelines. In order to handle 
this state - a constant danger of intensified attraction to the variety of artefacts found 
throughout the organization - the employee is encouraged to retract by way of spatial 
isolation and self-analysis, through the following means:  
(recovering) addiction  ┐(excessive) addiction  
       addiction ┐sobriety  
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- “Find someone you can talk to, who knows you from a work-setting and can provide 
an external perspective on the way you perform at work. To put into words what you 
find frustrating and to formulate goals that others actually can measure and assess, is 
both clarifying and committing. It feels good to talk about it.  
- Try to define in typing what kind of behavior you feel is troubling for yourself. If the 
problem consists in you making to-lists that are too ambitious, it is quite simple to do 
something about that challenge. If you, however, make lists that are fairly achievable, 
but rarely manage to pull it through, you probably need to work on your lack of focus, 
time-leaks, up-date addiction and poor boundary management. 
- Try to limit the amount of information and disruptions from day to day. Herbert 
Simon once wrote that “a wealth of attention creates a poverty of attention” – and 
something as trivial as working on a small screen with only a few windows open can 
be more efficient than working on the 27-inch screen running fifteen programs 
simultaneously  
- Use the “silent rooms” without being embarrassed, especially to begin with, when 
you are trying to change your behavior. Make sure that your surroundings are aware 
that you do not want to be interrupted, if anyone should knock on the door or likewise.  
- Imagine your attention along a scale, with “distracted” in the one end to a situation 
where you at times will experience a “flow”, in the other end. And remember that 
your attention is a muscle that needs constant exercise, which will end up dreary if 
it’s not sustained. 
- Use a simple method, such as the Pomodoro-technique in order to get going. This 
means that you work in intermissions, where you for instance can begin by working 
non-stop for thirty minutes, take a small break and then go on for another thirty. You 
will gradually enhance your ability to concentrate and substitute your dopamine kick 
with the satisfaction of having worked continuously for longer period of time and 
having finished off an assignment. 
- Check your mobile phone, mail, Yammer and other social media platforms on specific 
times, which you have already set beforehand. 
- Use your dialogue partner actively, maybe on a daily basis to begin with, in order to 
talk through your experiences and for having someone who holds you accountable for 
your responsibility”34 





As previously mentioned, the stress the employee is addressed as a symptom of “hurriedness” 
and the “urgency of now” found across contemporary work life. In the case of these 
guidelines, the problem of stress is fashioned according to two different temporalities; the 
fluctuating attention of the employee and the “structural” acceleration of work life, in which 
time becomes an increasingly scarcer resource. However, each assertion of overwork, 
exhaustion, anxiety and stress here refers itself to the non-specific addiction residing within 
the employee. In an outright manner, the organization also says: You must work on yourself 
in order to enhance your performance and stay on top of your game: “If you are able to keep 
the perspective, control and progress when the heat is on, you will easily be considered a 
more valuable asset than the colleague who gets distracted, forgets things, turns up too late 
for meetings and is unable to deliver before deadlines”35. In the next chapter, we will see 
what happens when the these notions of self-pathology, performance and responsibility 



















Self-transformation and the paradox of authenticity  
How does an employee take upon itself the therapeutic imperative of self-transformation? 
How does the distinction between perception and reality appear when it is sought indorsed 
and attached to the concrete daily life of individuals who experience pressure and stress at 
their work? How is the call for “authorship” interpreted and received among employees?  
While the different sources of empirical data applied so far have been practice-oriented, I 
will in the following chapter examine how stress management unfolds these self-
problematizations at the actual level of a therapeutic “intervention” during a stress 
management course. Up until this point, my inquiry has revolved around ideal discourses 
found in, for instance, the literature of self-help or HR-strategies. In this chapter, I will look 
into how these ideals are met and interpreted among participants throughout a stress 
management course. In systems theoretical terms, I turn from the semantics of stress 
management to the actual operation of this vocabulary. The following account is based on my 
own participatory observation of a stress management program, offered to employees 
struggling with stress at work. The observations have been conducted at an occupational 
health care provider, offering different stress relief courses to employees of both private and 
public sector. During my participation I did not bring along any recording equipment and the 
quotes that follows are based on my notes from the sessions. At this specific course there are 
nine participants in all, most of whom work in different parts of the private sector, such as 
banking, research, insurance and IT. The course runs over two months, during which the 
participants meet once a week for a session that lasts about an hour and a half. The 
participants were made aware of and gave consent to my presence as a researcher. 
Apart from a large ellipse-formed table with nine chairs and a small blackboard hanging on 
the wall, the room does not contain much else. It is small, but feels quite airy and does not 
feel packed once everyone are seated. The stress management instructor gives a short 
introduction to the concept, underlining that she is not an instructor in a traditional sense, but 
rather a guide. “This is not a concept that is very concerned with right and wrong ways of 
doing things, you yourself have to feel what is right and wrong for you”, she says.  
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In line with the dominating stress management literature, the course seeks to open up and 
adjust the fixed thoughts and reaction patterns of the course participant. In addition to the 
weekly course, the participants are encouraged to make lists of priorities and keep diaries, to 
detect their own “potentials of improvement in terms of utilizing the stress-energy”. In the 
material handed out, participants are therefore exhorted to observe and write down their own 
positive and negative emotions, how they handle resistance, both privately and at work, and 
reflect on how their gained self-awareness on these matters can be used positively. During the 
second gathering of the course, the instructor gives an introduction to what is called SOAL, a 
technique on how to “notice yourself”: 
Stress instructor: SOAL is an exercise that revolves around how to notice yourself, quite 
simply. It’s an acronym indicating the four different steps you need to take in order to notice 
yourself, when you’re in the midst of the thunder and lightning. Stop, observe, accept, letting 
go. In order to notice myself, I have to be able to set me apart from my environment. Only 
then can I start to reflect on exactly why I feel stressed or upset, “what goes on out there and 
what goes on in here?” [pointing index finger towards the head]. This is what self-esteem is 
all about, feeling yourself and your own presence. Because you will usually find that there is 
a strong mismatch between what the world expects of you, on the one hand, and the 
expectations you have towards yourself on the other hand.  And this reflection, again, enables 
me to take a conscious decision on how to respond to this situation…  
Frida: I think I get what you mean, speaking of this, but for my part, when I am in the middle 
of all this… I often tend to go and reflect a lot afterwards, I carry it with me for quite some 
time and I have problems putting it aside. For instance, during a weekend quite recently, it 
was a Sunday morning, around 10 AM, I was called up by a colleague asking about a case 
I’ve had before. And when we’re done on the phone, then I start to think all of a sudden, well, 
“could I’ve explained this case better for him, did I really perform well?” And these 
thoughts, they stick around, they can remain with me for quite some time. 
Stress coach: Well, I think a lot of these issues is about obtaining a certain distance, when 
you’ve been thinking this thought and notice that it’s bothering you, well, “now I have to pull 
out, I have to withdraw from this thought”. I think this is… This is something that you 
actually can work on and get your hands around, to avoid escaping into those old videos that 
all of sudden start to rewind in the back of your mind. It is about learning how to dispose 
unimportant thoughts, of sorting out what is useful and what is not, how to get rid of the 
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thoughts that drain you. This inner notion of unease, that is something you actually can 
change, everything else is beyond your control. See, you took a choice and picked up that 
phone on a Sunday, when you had your day off. You could also just have decided not to or 
say to yourself “I’ll call him up first thing tomorrow”. Because basically, you cannot take 
upon yourself the problems of others, you cannot solve their issues for them, they have to take 
care of that themselves. So you have to tune into the now-situation, let it go, all of these 
concerns on have you did perform or how will you perform tomorrow. You can always make 
a choice, “how do I choose to handle this?” 
The mentioning of “old videos” and the “now-situation” are noteworthy, because the 
metaphor of “videos” and “VCR” runs through parts of the stress management literature, as 
to explain a state of captivity to the past or, alternatively, as an effective means of self-
assessment. For instance, one example of the latter form can be found in a stress management 
technique called “freeze-time”, which “is based on the concept that conscious perception is 
like watching a movie, and we perceive each moment as an individual frame. When a scene 
becomes stressful, the technique allows you to freeze that perceptual frame and isolate it in 
time so you can observe it from a more detached and objective viewpoint – similar to pausing 
the VCR for a moment” (Cryer et al. 2003: 5). Perception is thus divided into two internally 
struggling agencies, between immediate perception and the awareness of immediate 
perception. In other words, in order to make individuals perceive how they perceive, one 
must provide a distinction between what and how they experience the stressful reality that 
infuses their perception. By drawing such a line, between the what and the how, the 
individual is supposed to unravel and expose the malleability of his or her own thought-
patterns.  
The point is to invoke a form of “awakening from the slumbers” of perception, through which 
the individual can obtain a distance from a specific emotional state or thought-pattern and 
monitor how it emerges. The same situation or thought can thereby be cast in a different 
narrative outline. In Woolfolk and Richardson’s classic self-help guide “Stress, sanity and 
survival”, this concept of “pausing the frame” is put adjacent to the possibilities of a self-
transformation: 
“The best way to get in touch with the threatening or hostile meanings you give to events is to 
become aware of what you say to yourself about them. The things you tell yourself about 
what is happening, what it means, what is going to happen next, and what you should do 
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about it create and maintain perceptions of infringement and threat. Your self-talk and self-
instructions stoke the emotional furnace and keep the coals glowing. In the stressful situation 
you have selected, try to become aware of the way you interpret the people and events 
involved. Determine what is the most stressful moment for you in this situation, for example, 
“Facing a deadline at work”. Often the most stressful point is anticiapating a situation while 
sitting around waiting for it to occur. Sometimes the most disturbing moment is thinking 
about an event after it occurs. Focus on yourself at that moment and become aware of the 
kinds of thoughts and images that cross your mind. You have probably been through it all 
many times. Imagine that there is a videotape with soundtrack and self-talk at that point in 
time. Replay it several times in your imagination. Write down on the left half of a half 
blanksheet […], as many things as you can of the things you say or picture yourself in that 
situation. Be specific and comprehensive. Do not take anything for granted. Many of the 
things you tell yourself that cause anxiety or irritation have become so automatic and 
familiar that it will be difficult to disconnect the public facts from the meaning you give to it. 
Be especially alert for self-talk containing the words should, must, ought to, deserve, owe, or 
any of their negative or synonyms. These kinds of rights and obligations are not part of the 
objective situation. They are meanings you give it. If you feel like something is missing from 
your picture of the situation, crystallized in your internal monologue of self-talk, then it 
probably is. Look again. Generate as much self-talk as you can, even minor variations on 
themes, until you have a comprehensive list. The thoughts and images you have written down 
reveal the perceptions of threat that trigger the stress reaction. They also provide clues, 
which, if read properly, can eventually lead you to the mistaken beliefs that are the source of 
stress” (Woolfolk and Richardson 1979: 115-116).  
What is at stake in these “old videos” and the “VCR” is a temporalization of the perception, 
which the subject is encouraged to detach from or, contrarily, to utilize as a reel for improved 
self-insight. Both of the video-metaphors are actually played out during the “SOAL”-exercise 
at the stress management course. In the excerpt from the course quoted above, one can see 
that the instructor suddenly switches from problematizing one form of temporal self-inquiry 
to another as one of the participants, Frida, gives her opinion on the exercise.  
The instructor sets off by invoking the necessity of framing our perception when we 
experience stress - to stop and observe. Frida responds to this by mentioning a recent 
situation related to her work, where she ends up being “stuck” in her own thoughts on how 
she performed, as she phrases it. The gradual set-up in the exercise, of moving on from the 
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stages of “stop” and “observe” to those of “accept” and “letting go”, does not seem to 
resonate very well with Frida’s own experiences. When Frida talks about her difficulties of 
going from a stage of “observing” herself to “letting go” of the situation, she brings about 
experiences that does not respond affirmatively to the “map” of self-transformation; she 
lingers on the moment instead of moving on. Frida seems to somehow “pervert” the self-
transformational scheme, which is pinned out for the participants. Against this backdrop, the 
instructor then points to how Frida should focus her attention on how to “avoid escaping into 
those old videos” and to “withdraw from this thought”, suggesting that she is “stopping” for 
too long.  
 
Frida and the other participants are therefore at once both “transfixed” by a past from which 
they must set themselves free and are simultaneously encouraged to zero in this past, by way 
of inquiring their own perceptive responses to events initially experienced as “stressful”.  
In continuation of this, the instructor at the stress management course problematizes the 
ability and inability to differentiate between the “interior” life of perception and thought, on 
the one hand, and the “exterior” world of demands, expectations and tasks, on the other hand. 
The subject under stress remains “un-differentiated”, unable to distinguish his or her own 
thoughts and emotions from the surrounding environment. Instead, the “self” enmeshed in 
stress is highlighted according to a fluctuating and “fluid” identity, continuously oscillating 
between alarming “images” of the world (what they demand) and its own critical self-
assessment (how I perform).  
The instructor suggests that this state of “un-differentiation” can be explained according to 
the distance between what might be called a “projected self” and an “authentic self”. She 
explains, literally, how the ability to “set me apart from the environment” is the first step on 
the way to obtain a greater self-authenticity, or, as it is phrased, of  “feeling yourself and your 
own presence”. The stressful subject is accordingly stuck within “zones of indistinction” 
(Agamben 1998: 122). Stress is thought to appear within a perception that perceives itself and 
its reality through a number of blurred and indistinct lines, between the singular individuality 
of the self and everything that surrounds it. The “projected self” is therefore a self that is not 
properly mounted on itself. It is a self that is caught “out there”, on the borders or beyond, of 
its own singularity, where it moves ungrounded and removed from the possibility of 
articulating the experience of the world consistent with an authentic voice and perception. 
Aiming to obtain both a closer proximity (to the authentic self) and a distance (to the 
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environment), the stress management course seeks to center its participants on the obstacles 
and challenges that stand in the way of such an authenticity and, furthermore, the techniques 
required to regain “access” to an authentic voice. These two selves (projected and authentic) 
and their perception-patterns, one containing an agency that only perceives through 
immediate experience vs an agency containing the ubiquitous quality of being able to calmly 
peel off the layers of meaning ascribed to the experience, is akin to the difference between 
dependent and independent self-awareness, respectively slave and master, put forward by 
Hegel (Hegel 2007 [1807]: 109-114). The different exercises and techniques applied to 
release individuals from their own aberrational perception, therefore usually installs different 
variants of this slave-master agency. The slave, in the form of an immediately perceiving 
subject, that experience the world only at the level of sudden emotions and intuition, is 
restricted by the lack of resonance and self-reflection. The slave-agency is only able to hear 
and feel his or her own enslaved “dissonance”, such as emotional self-resentment, threats, 
obstacles, physical exhaustion etc. The master, on the other hand, takes the shape of an 
awakened and rational subject that is able to provide other interpretations and meanings, as 
well as other emotional and physical reactions to the different situations that impose a sense 
of stress. The stressed out individual has accordingly either lost (or never had) a master-
agency or is torn in a struggle between the two agencies.  
 
The two-fold paradox of authenticity 
Certain questions arise, however, in the midst of these efforts to improve self-esteem and an 
authentic self-relationship.  How is the line between inauthenticity and authenticity drawn 
and made into a pivotal point of self-transformation? How can an individual be geared 
towards obtaining a greater proximity to the self? Moreover, on the opposite movement, how 
can a self drift away from what, on the outset, has been an authentic “core” of subjectivity? 
How can an authentic voice at all be re-installed in the self, if this voice only can come “from 
within”? How does a subject come under the control of forces “out there”, which 
simultaneously are merely the product of his or her own imagination?  
What appears behind these questions are, obviously, the concealment of the “voice” of the 
therapeutic intervention itself. This points to the first paradox of authenticity: The therapeutic 
intervention has to construct the authentic voice of the subject in order for the subject to 
become able to voice its own authenticity. Similarly, the unobservability of the overflow of 
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emotions that, in the shadows of conscious thought, directs the perception of the stressful 
individual must be constructed as a blind spot in order for the blind spot to be “discovered”, 
affirmed and put into use as a problem of the self. Hence, these blind spots (within the self) 
and unconsciousness’ can only appear on the communicative occasion of their supposed 
intrinsic importance and value for the employee and his or her self-relationship. What’s more 
to it, however, is how this construction assumes a specific problem laying behind the state of 
stress, which is beyond the immediate scope of the subjects themselves (unconscious 
emotions, inauthenticity, “false” perception etc.). If the opposite was the case (that specific 
forms of unconsciousness already was within the conscious scope the subject), no effort 
would obviously have to be made in order to actualize and guide individuals towards 
discovering these blind spots within themselves. The therapeutic intervention sees what the 
stressful subject is unable to see that it cannot see, but the enactment of this “superior” point 
of observation must remain very discreet, because otherwise the possibility for furnishing an 
authentic self will be jeopardized. To phrase it differently, the therapeutic intervention knows 
that the subjects lacks a form of self-knowledge, yet this insight – what this lack of self-
knowledge consists of – can only be “discovered” and articulated by the subject itself in order 
to retain its authenticity as insight and self-knowledge. This is typically done when people 
are encouraged to make themselves the subject of a self-inquiry: “how could you have 
reacted otherwise…?”. We will see, in the following pages, that there is a lot of tension 
coming to the surface when this is played out.  
When the instructor says (as quoted above): “you will usually find that there is a strong 
mismatch between what the world expects of you, on the one hand, and the expectations you 
have towards yourself on the other hand.  And this reflection, again, enables me to take a 
conscious decision on how to respond to this situation” it is, likewise, a matter of 
establishing an authentic voice that can distinguish its own singularity from the disturbing 
cacophony of self-projected voices “out there”. This points to the second paradox of the 
authenticity that is played out in the therapeutic intervention: The “inauthentic” voices that 
the subject projects from itself onto its environment (when perceiving crises and alarms), 
cannot be distinguished from an “authentic” voice that is mounted on its own, unique 
singularity. The self-transformation from a stressful to a “stress-managing” individual 
revolves around (re-) installing a voice of authenticity that can only be voiced by the same 
individual which initially has infused its own reality as stressful. It remains the same voice: 
only an “authentic” self can determine the authenticity (in the future) or inauthenticity (in the 
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past) of itself. Therefore, the act of distinguishing an authentic voice from the voices of 
inauthenticity remains a fundamentally paradoxical operation.  
 
The epistemology of choice  
The session with the SOAL-exercise quoted above pinpoints how the actualization of choice 
and expectation reverberates throughout the stress management course. As the instructor 
seeks to make clear, “you can always make a choice,“how do I choose to handle this?””.   
Put differently, the course seeks to make its participants take responsibility for their own 
perception and reaction patterns by identifying these as choices, which are guided by their 
own expectations and self-image. The stressful individual needs to debunk its notions of a 
reality infused by necessity and force, of experiencing stress as something coming from 
outside in the form of given constraints. In other words, the choice appears as a code for the 
actualization of contingency (of perception) as opposed to fixation (of reality). The stress 
management says that you always can make a choice, on how to expect and handle your 
situation differently. In fact, you are required to make a choice.  
Here it might be useful to consider how expectations can be understood in systems theoretical 
terms. Expactations are always directed towards a future that cannot be foreseen, as the future 
by definition is uncertain. As such, expectations works to build up a present capacity to orient 
ourselves and reflect upon an unknown future (Esposito 2011a: 14-15). Luhmann dismisses 
the traditional juxtaposition of factual or descriptive expectations and normative expectations 
as false, on the grounds that expectations always are factual, whether or not they turn out to 
be fulfilled. What ought to be and what actually is, is therefore not a matter of factuality, 
since both forms of expectations are real as expectations. Instead, Luhmann proposes the 
difference between normative and cognitive expectations as more adequately fit and 
empirically productive to describe societal problems of expectation (Luhmann 2014: 31-35). 
Cognitive expectations are recursively bound to the fulfilment of disappointments from 
which we might choose to learn or reflect in one way or another. Furthermore, cognitive 
expactations does not only enable us to handle disappointments, but they also make us 
capable of perceiving the future possibility of unfulfilled expectations in the present. 
Normative expectations are, on the other hand, not conditioned by learning, neither as 
"irrational" preference nor as reality-check, e.g. readjustment for future encounters of similar 
situations. On the contrary, normative expectations makes it possible for us to proceed 
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without any reflexive hesitation or capacity to learn. For example, while a newly employed 
and young co-worker might normatively be expected to deliver the report on deadline, she 
might also be cognitively expected, by her boss or co-workers, to appear energetic, young, 
playful and creative in the performance of tasks. If the employee fails to deliver the report in 
time, there might be certain sanctions involved, such as a notice. But the manager will usually 
not “learn” from the unfulfilled expectation and hereafter expect all reports to be delivered a 
week after deadline. On the other hand, if the report is delivered on time, but fails to display 
any characteristics of creativity or playfulness, the manager might feel impelled to provide 
examples of such creative solutions to the employee or simply wait to see how things evolve. 
As Luhmann puts it: “Cognitive expectations, then, are characterized by a not necessarily 
preparedness to learn, whilst normative expectations signify the determination not to learn 
from disappointments. The possibility of disappointment is foreseen – one knows oneself to be 
in a complex and contingent world, in which others may act unexpectedly – but is, at the 
outset, seen as irrelevant to the expectation” (Luhmann 2014: 33).  
Interestingly, in the stress management course, the participants are framed as caught up in 
normative expectations, because they perceive their own situation as coming from “outside”.  
They cannot, accordingly, learn anything – about themselves, their performance, their own 
sense of pathology etc. These normative expectations are sought turned into cognitive 
expectations that can radically charge the stressful individual with a responsibility for itself, 
its performance and pathology. What you perceive as facts are actually choices you have 
already made about how to perceive them, it is suggested:  
Stress coach: Stress is a sense of losing control. So what do you tell yourself, for instance, 
when you experience some sort of defeat or fear that things are about to get out of hand, 
when it’s about to get too much. When we are in a situation with a lot of strain, a very 
demanding situation, we can choose to fight or flight. You always have a throttle available, to 
accelerate speed, but you also have a brake to slow it down or stop completely, and we have 
to learn have to use these two, the throttle and the brake, in a way that doesn’t drain us for 
energy, but rather gives it back to us. The medical terms for these two functions are 
sympaticus and parasympaticus. On a certain point, if you keep your warm water flooding, 
you will run out of it, the tank runs dry at some point. And to be honest, if you choose to have 
a heart attack, it is exactly a choice you make, it is your choice to have that heart attack, 
because what is certain is that it is you who is spinning the hamster wheel, it is you who 
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decide the pace of it and if you should jump off for a while. It is no one else who is spinning 
that wheel for you.  
Linda: Well, when it comes to these things, the way we tend to talk about it, and I’ve also 
gotten the same notion when I’ve read a couple of stress management books, what I feel is 
that there are a lot of metaphors at play, such as the warm water and the hamster wheel and 
so forth, but when you are faced with your own actual reality, when you try to apply this to 
your own daily struggles and issues at work, well, to me it often remains very abstract. I feel 
that, quite often, these concrete problems can’t really be handled by way of thinking 
metaphorically. Another thing is, for instance, the more specific how-to exercises, such as 
breathing techniques. I mean, I can see that they are very useful in many other situations, but 
when I’m at work and there is a lot going on, then I think, well, “do all of these pressing 
issues just vanish if I breathe more consciously and remember that I have a choice, I can 
choose to jump off the wheel?” I mean, the deadline doesn’t disappear, the workload doesn’t 
shrink. All of these things, these pressing issues, they remain there no matter how I choose to 
consider them. I feel that these metaphors are not necessarily very applicable, they do not 
make me more capable of solving the problems or the hurriedness I face at work. 
Stress coach: Well, stress is about getting stuck in the past or getting too fixated on the future, 
on everything that is about to come. It is proven scientifically that your level of arousal and 
stress can be efficiently handled and lowered with certain exercises and techniques. When 
you are facing a threat, whatever it is, there is only one person who can tell you how to 
handle it. And there is only one person who can tell you when it’s too much, that is what this 
is all about. It’s about what you tell yourself when you all of sudden find yourself in the eye of 
the hurricane… It is about becoming present in what is happening exactly now, the now-
situation, and let go of what is about to come and let go of what happened before lunch, or 
yesterday or last year. To be honest, I can feel that there is quite a lot of resistance here 
today. And that is not bad, I think this resistance, it is telling us something about this process 
of becoming aware of ourselves. The resistance, that is you ego, it is what you are fighting 
against, it is you who are fighting against yourself, against becoming a conscious you. 
Because you are threatening your own ego by becoming aware of yourself.  




Stress coach: What do you tell yourself when you are unable to deliver before deadline, do 
you punch yourself in the face or do you tell yourself, “that is ok, I did my best”? That is at a 
very concrete level of handling things. It is about getting the proper discipline with these 
exercises, of getting a discipline with a practice, on a regular, daily basis, of stepping out of 
the stress you experience. The resistance is your motivation, you have to go into it and asks 
yourself where it comes from.  
Again the question of making a choice is brought up, because the conscious enactment of 
choosing is supposedly out of the scope of the stressful subject. There are no choices 
available in his or her conscious register, only a sense of facts, which means that the 
possibility of “control” is lost, as the instructor phrases it. The stressful individual is not 
choice-less, however, it is not a state of not being able to make a choice that has let this 
subject “astray”, but rather an unwillingness to deliberately choose and decide. When the 
instructor speaks of “spinning the hamster wheel” and that “it is you who decide the pace” it 
obviously revolves around an effort to interchange a notion of facts with that of choice, and 
to replace a sense of necessity with that of possibility. To make her point, the instructor even 
goes as far as to say “to be honest, if you choose to have a heart attack, it is exactly a choice 
you make, it is your choice to have that heart attack”.  
To choose, then, involves specifically a choice of whether or not to account for the 
responsibility you have, for how you feel and think, for your illness, for what you expect from 
yourself and for what you expect that your surroundings expect from you. The instructor 
makes use of a number of temporal figures in order to underscore the critical difference 
between making a choice and not, such as “becoming present”, the “now-situation”, “getting 
stuck in the past”, “fixated on the future”, the “throttle”, the “brake”, the “tank running dry” 
and the “hamster wheel”. The experience of hurriedness, pressure and illness is brought into 
these temporal figures, as to explain how each person can choose to take responsibility for its 
own pace, energy, performance and so on. For Linda, however, these figures and metaphors 
remain very abstract, as she puts it, as they seem both inapplicable and irrelevant for the 
difficulties and pressure she has at work. Furthermore, she also points out that the specific 
exercises seem pertinent to the range of problems she encounters, as she phrases it herself: 
“do all of these pressing issues just disappear if I breathe more consciously?”. The instructor 
responds to this by invoking a peculiar linkage between resistance and self-transformation. 
The “resistance” and disagreements voiced among the participants is entrenched with a 
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specific quality by the instructor, namely that of symptom of an authentic struggle within the 
self.  
The “resistance”, as the instructor calls it, is an inauthentic voice speaking under the pressure 
of another, emergent authentic voice; it is the “ego” feeling threatened by the increased self-
awareness that is taking place within the participant. Therefore, any resistance towards the 
exercises and the language being offered at the stress management course is considered a sign 
of progress and a step in the direction of becoming a more enlightened and authentic self. To 
oppose, reject or simply feel unfamiliar with what is taking place is not, in any direct form at 
least, met with disapproval, but rather welcomed and emphasized as an indication of a 
genuine and necessary engagement. The inauthentic self is “cracking up” because authentic 
annoyance and irritation can be heard and seen. The participants are standing on a brink of 
alternation, according to the instructor, whereby their old beliefs of a “factually” expected 
world might collapse – the “resistance” expressed among them is an expression of the 
subsequent embattlement within the self: “it is you who are fighting against yourself, against 
becoming a conscious you”. When resistance is, as such, framed as a struggle between 
authenticity and inauthenticity it obviously has certain consequences for how the participants 
can express themselves and the stress they face at work. If one seeks to criticize the 
therapeutic imperative of authenticity and self-transformation, the critique itself is tapped into 
the problem of authenticity and self-transformation as a point of struggle and alternation 
within the self. On the one hand, the expression of affect and “opposition”, whatever form it 
takes, is viewed as a self that is taking upon itself the self-inquiring schema of authenticity 
and inauthenticity. On the other hand, the expression of an “affirmative” authenticity remains 
under the suspicion of whether this emerging authentic voice actually is genuinely chosen 
and voiced authentically.  
The temporal dimension of stress is grounded in the assumed pressure upheld in the two 
temporal axioms, surrounding the individual, of the past and the future. The past casts its 
shadows over the present, in the form of disappointments. The future, on the other hand, 
appears as a threat (with its deadlines, workload, etc.). Stress is assumed to be equally 
motivated by the presence of these two haunting temporalities, which the subject is sought 
equipped to discharge him- or herself of. The haunted individual is, according to the 
prevailing theories and how-to-literature on stress, torn apart between the two temporal 
horizons, which splits the attention and somehow blocks the entrance to the present situation. 
The past is a ghost that can reappear in front of the individual at any given moment, and 
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sends him or her off to emotionally disruptive states of remorse, regret, self-pity, anger and so 
forth. These are, for instance, the videos that keeps rewinding in the back of the mind, as the 
stress coach phrases it in a quote above. The future, however, entails a somewhat different 
function, as a possibility of a disaster that is about to take shape. On this basis, stress is 
described as being perceptually locked up or nailed to these two temporalities, more or less 
detached from the present. The question of temporality therefore adds yet another layer of 
discrepancy (upheld within the employee), that must be balanced out.  
Stress coach: It is each and every one of you who are in charge of this process, and managing 
stress is a lot about taking ownership to the problems you face, of saying, “how do I deal 
with this problem”… 
Marianne: But let’s say that you have a case that is about to come up, and you… and you 
have to deliver on this, it is very important and there is a lot at stake, because there are a lot 
of people, of other people who completely depend upon the quality of the work you do, so it is 
not just about me, how I feel about myself in such a situation, it involves other people… But 
at the same time you might have other things that are pushing you as well, other things you 
should deliver… many other things… So what do you say to yourself then, you can’t just say, 
“oh well, I think I’ll just slow down today, take it a bit easy, since it’s been a bit much lately 
and then I can just go home and be satisfied with what I’ve accomplished, even though I 
didn’t manage to get the things done”  
Stress coach: Yes, that’s one way of putting it, but then I must ask who is, at the end of the 
day, responsible for you? Who is responsible for your stress? That is no one else but you. It is 
you who decide if you’re going to continue to run around like a headless chicken or if it is 
better to take a time-out, a deep breath. It is only you who can do anything about that and it 
is you who have to take that responsibility.  
There are seemingly few limits for what can be made into a problem of authenticity. During 
the course sessions – which also can be witnessed from the quotes – the instructor 
continuously switches between addressing vastly different issues such as illness, work load, 
performance or difficulties with superiors or colleagues. However, the way in which these 
different issues are addressed and how they are problematized remains “un-switched”, 
because they are incessantly molded into the same problem of language, the authenticity of 
the self and the contingency of perception. What appears in these efforts to biographize 
pathology, to alternate the distinction between reality and perception and to furnish an 
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authentic self, is not, as it might seem at first sight, an overt effort to radically singularize the 
world of the self. This might come across as somewhat counterintuitive all the while the 
authentic singularity of the subjects inner “life-world” is at the centerfield of the 
transformation from the state of stressful to “stress-managing”.  Yet, it is not the 
individualized individual which is the telos of the self-transformation being offered to the 
stressful employee; the instructor cannot simply ignore the reason why these people have 
showed up at a stress management course in the first place. They are there because they have 
experienced long-term stress and pressure at work, in some cases resulting in illness.  
Therefore, upon closer examination, the authentic self is always interfaced with some form of 
specific, often work-related threatening reality. The stressful employee is confronted with an 
unmanageable reality, due to his or her own unwillingness to perceive it otherwise. The 
authentic self is merely the means, albeit highly paradoxical, to obtain a subject capable of 
managing reality rather than to become sick, to feel at unease or saturate itself in open 
antagonisms and resentment (towards management or colleagues). Against this background, 
the participants are sought to inscribe themselves in an alternate field of social relations 
within the organization they work, including for instance the perception of their work load 
and experience of illness; that is the aim of their self-transformation. Thus, the incessantly 
underlined difference between perception and reality does obviously not extinguish reality, 
but instead doubles reality (Luhmann 2000a: 5-8). In this way, stress management serves to 
unfold an alternate reality in which the subject can mirror itself throughout specific 
performative “capacities” when faced with pressure, exhaustion and stress, by obtaining an 
“emotionally enduring”, “self-aware” and “balanced” self:  a self that is conscious of how it 
produces reality as it perceives this reality – and thereby must take the ultimate responsibility 
for how it has created reality itself.  
The stress management course appears to be neutral. It does not take place at work or in some 
kind of work-related context, such as teamwork or coaching. The service is provided by a 
third party, that does not have any affiliation to the organizations wherein the different 
participants work, apart from the fact that they offer different forms of health-related 
programs to a variety of workplaces, such as psychological counselling, “lifestyle-changes”, 
weight-loss and nutrition courses and ergonomic guidance on how to facilitate the workplace. 
The individuals who are present might or might not have been encouraged by colleagues or 
managers to take part in the course, but it is not a part of any prevention or treatment that has 
been formalized between the employees and their employers. In other words, no one is there 
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because they “have to”. There are no sanctions involved if they fail to show up. The stress 
management course invokes itself as a realm of informality, where, for instance, difficult and 
“touchy” subjects concerning the work environment, the relation to managers or colleagues 
and work assignments can be taken up and assessed in a friendly and congenial atmosphere. 
It is against this background of informality and congeniality – where no direct bonds appear, 
between the facilitator of the stress sessions and the workplace – that the participants are 
invited to step into a neutral ground and see things, most notably themselves, in a different 
light. In the previous part of this thesis we have seen how the subject is assumed to be 
wrapped up in a tragic narrative of him- or herself, without access to see how it has 
tragedized itself – and we have seen how the stress management course partly revolves 
around rendering the individual tragedizing visible to the participants. Perhaps exactly 
because of the supposed neutrality of stress management, the confronting enactment of 
making the employees take responsibility for how they perceive their conditions at work, can 
remain sheltered in its own therapeutic imperative, as if it has no other agenda than to 
enlighten the self. Yet, it is hard to imagine, even if it is not unthinkable, a manager standing 
in front of an employee telling her that the incessant demands she experiences, might as well 
find their solution if she only starts to think about them differently.  
Pedersen (2008) has shown how stress management also revolves around creating 
attachments to the workplace, a form of commitment in which the self at once responds to the 
needs of the organization, but also learns how to detach and “cope” with the demands and 
expectations posed by the workplace. The stress coach can enable a linking between the 
difficulties in the organization with the tragic self-relationship of the employee, exactly 
because she appears to be neutral; merely a “guide” as she herself phrases it. I am not, 
however, suggesting that the stress coach is supposed to be understood as some kind of 
ventriloquist for what in reality are the dubious intentions of the management. The problem is 
rather that the stress coach cannot conceive how she so effectively can call upon an alternated 
account of reality, directly linked to the workplaces of employees, exactly because she has no 
formal link to this workplace herself. The “neutral” realm of stress management makes it 
possible to demand a transgression of fixed thought-patterns that would, had they been 
articulated by a manager or an HR-director, most likely also appear as confrontations related 
to manifest differences, between, for instance, a superior and an employee at work.  
 In a newsletter sent out by the Corporate Health Service provider, it states that the stress 
management course aims at helping you, the stressful individual, to become “more present 
186 
 
here and now. This will contribute to reduce your stress and to enhance your capacity”. 
Furthermore, it says that “there is an ever-increasing amount of scientific evidence that 
indicates that stress in its various forms is the real trigger behind most of what we refer to as 
diseases and we are all in need of tools that can help us regain and maintain a balance in our 
lives”. The employee is called upon as the carrier of a symptom, which is conspicuously 
vague, in the form of his or her imbalance. Behind this imbalance, however, there is a very 
concrete causality afforded between “stress” and “diseases”.  
In this thesis, the observation of the health, illness and stress of the employee has so far 
departed from various programmatic efforts of intervention; the sanatoriums in the 
mountains; the instructions for enhancing bodily energy through exercise; the monitoring 
brought about to safeguard the body at work; the efforts to improve the wellbeing of each 
individual employee. These efforts of intervention have in common the articulation of the 
illness and health of the employee and, furthermore, the rise of the perilous problem of his 
and her stress. While the red line in the inquiry in the foregoing parts have been the 
subjectification of the employee’s health and well-being, I will in the following account 
target the “self-knowledge” of stress and ask how employees themselves identify with their 















Stress and the self at work 
In this part, I will turn away from the analytical disposition of the problem employed in the 
previous pages. So far, we have identified certain traits in the emergence and development of 
a) workplace health promotion and b) the problem and management of stress. In the 
following section, however, the empirical locus does not start out from the point of 
managerial concern and conduct, or from the therapeutic problematization of employees’ 
self-relationship. Instead, the observation is turned towards the experience of stress and 
pressure at work, as it is conveyed among employees’ themselves.  
The aim is not to present some sort of “bottom-up” account of the state of stress vis-à-vis the 
managerial problematics found in the previous sections of this thesis. Instead of investigating 
a possible correspondence (or absence, for that matter) between stress policies etc. and the 
self-management of stress, I set out to investigate the phenomena of stress – not in direct 
relation to specific policies or therapeutic efforts, but as a surface of experience and discourse 
among employees. The following account is based on 21 interviews carried out between 
October 2013 and April 2016. Of these interviewees there were five males and sixteen 
females, aged between 28 and 52, all of whom identified themselves as “knowledge-
workers”, and with one exception all held a bachelor or master’s degree from a university or 
college. A majority of the informants work in private sector (18), for the most part banking, 
IT, consultancy and research. Some participants have been recruited by reaching out to 
various HR-departments who, in the case of successful contact, conveyed an invitation (to all 
their employees) to anonymously participate in the research project. Others again have been 
recruited through “word of mouth” or through posters being hanged up in Bergen and Oslo. 
The interviews were done by me alone or along with another researcher and were conducted 
as individual and confidential semi-structured talks lasting on average between 70 and 100 
minutes, which then were recorded and transcribed. All quotations have been translated from 
Norwegian to English. 
Based on Steinar Kvale (2007), the interviews were carried out by following the informants’ 
own observations on how they have experienced stress and pressure, and how they related 
this to their daily work, work environment, collegial relations and relations to managers 
(among other things). In addition to their self-assessments and attitudes, I have also sought to 
gain information on their concrete “everyday-routines” at work, how they interact with 
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colleagues and management in tense and pressured situations and how conflicts how been 
handled, by themselves and managers. The interviews will therefore be read as 
“symptomatic”, centering in on the interviewees variety of experiences at work and their own 
views and considerations. The reason for this is that I have sought to gain knowledge on the 
specific situations that have left them with a sense of unease or stress, in order to discuss their 
stressful experiences on a more general note. I have therefore mainly been interested in a) 
how their everyday practices and experiences at work relates, in their own opinion, to their 
stress and b) how stress, at a phenomenological level, is experienced as such. The informants 
have been recruited based on their experiences with work-related stress, as a strong negative 
impact in their lives, of which about half of the interviewees reporting on stress leading to 
sickness leave.   
What I want to gain insight into is how stress is problematized by those who have 
encountered it as a source of tension, pressure and sickness. We have seen, in the previous 
part of this thesis, how the discourse in management- and how-to literature as well as the 
practice of stress management brings about an ideal balanced subject capable of mastering 
new, demanding surroundings. As such, parts of workplace health promotion and stress 
management revolve around utilizing and enhancing certain forms of “self-mastery” (such as 
self-assessment, efficacy and performance, “emotional conduct”, social competence). What I 
also ask in the following section is how individuals respond to the strong notion of stress as a 
matter of advanced self-mastery and as a problem that needs to find its solution in the inner 
vaults of themselves.  
When the point of observation here is moved from different forms of problematization of 
employees (found in management literature, stress management etc.) to the self-assessment of 
individuals, it is also an epistemological move that requires some further consideration. The 
move is motivated primarily by an effort to “dig out” another tenet of the problem at stake 
here, which is not only contained at the level of semantics and “programmatic” practice (such 
as self-assessment strategies, stress management courses), but also appears at the level of 
individual self-assessment. Based on Foucault’s notion of the subject, I will argue that, in the 
case of the “stress problem”, it makes sense to continue and broaden the scope of inquiry to 
also include individual experiences. For the purpose of analyzing the management of stress 
and its interlinking of illness, power and the self, I have tried to carve out how these 
employees are made into subjects of an “inner reference” in the foregoing pages. However, 
subjects are not entirely constructed from above and beyond, it is also something that takes 
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effect from the “inside” of human beings. As Foucault notices, “(T)here are two meanings of 
the word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own 
identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that 
subjugates and makes subject to” (Foucault 2000: 327). In this section, I will therefore attend 
to how individuals turn themselves into subjects when it comes to such an increasingly 
charged identity as that of work (and what happens when this leads to pressure, conflict, 
illness and so forth). To paraphrase Foucault, I turn the attention from a set of “dividing 
practices targeting the subject” (for instance, stress versus balance, authentic speech versus 
self-subjugation) to the modes in which people recognize their own identity as employees 
(Foucault 2000: 326-327). The point of observation no longer departs from the external 
efforts of intervention, but instead poses the question of how the problem of stress (and other 
work-related issues) is “internally levied” among the employees themselves. Because I am 
dealing with a set of individual interviews, the following pages does not follow the same 
“strict” criteria of an analytical strategy which underpinned the previous parts of this thesis. 
Instead, as already noted, I seek to grasp how individuals identify with work and how they 
participate or oppose to such a discourse of identity and how their concrete environment of 
tasks, managers and colleges can relate to their experiences of stress and illness.  
In continuation of this, the questions I want to follow here is not primarily whether the 
interviewees consider stress to stem from their own lack of strength, capacity, discipline etc., 
but how the experiences of stress and illness unfolds at the level of meaningful ascription. For 
instance, when interviewees experience stress as a result of their own inability to prioritize 
etc., what kind of “status” is attributed to this stress, as opposed to the stress they experience 
as “coming from above”, e.g. the organization? Furthermore, are the various accounts of self-
imposed stress conceived of as distinct from the stress thought to derive from “above”, or do 
these two reference-points, the organization and the self, “mold” into the same substance, 
when work can be related to engagement, passion and self-realization?  
Obviously, the ambition here is not refurnish the division between cause and effect brought 
forward by both the physiological stress research and practices of stress-management. The 
primary question at stake is therefore not what really is the cause of stress. Instead, I will try 
to move along the explicit discourse of the interviewees and ask a simpler question: How is 





The discourse on stress among the research participants moves across and in between a wide 
range of different registers of emotional, physical and cognitive experiences. For some, the 
experience of stress is linked to a sense of severe physical exhaustion, while others again 
denote stress more as a general condition surrounding them, which they struggle or fail to 
keep on an arm’s length. Some also hold forth stress as a part of their strive towards a work 
life balance, where the schedules and demands of family and work become entangled and 
sometimes collides. In other words, the concrete application of the concept of stress and the 
actual experience of it among employees ranges from that of a certain pressure on the 
practical arrangements of family life and work to inner pathological turmoil or a potentially 
“infectious” circumstance at work. Underneath these differences in personal experience, there 
are some strong commonalities between the different interviewees, most notably the 
experience of “losing oneself” in one way or another. Several interviewees describes the 
experience of stress in existentially threating terms as a “black hole”, a “darkness” or a 
“bang”. But what is exactly this experience within the “black hole” and how do they describe 
reaching that point of all-pervasive numbness or dissolution? 
Peter, a man in his late forties, describes himself as someone who has “worked his way up” in 
a corporation where he eventually was made a regional director. He describes the work 
environment he has been a part of as hectic and ambitious, characterized by the fact it is a 
regional firm, which over the course of a decade and a half grows into a significant 
international corporation. Peter refers to the term “mania” in order to describe his experience 
of and attachment to work, a term he relates to a sense of losing sight of himself, of simply 
becoming blind. During our conversation, he describes a series of episodes in which he 
encountered an acute sense of such “blindness”, where his body simply collapses or all of a 
sudden, he becomes unable to solve what usually would be simple tasks.   
“It was the first Tuesday after the Pentecost. I was going to do a presentation in Oslo that 
Wednesday, so I choose not to go in on the office and just sit at home on this Tuesday in 
order to get it done. While I was sitting at the kitchen table, writing on the computer, my 
fingers just fell down all of a sudden, on the keyboard and there were all this letters that just 
paced across the sheet. And I just wondered: “Whose hands are these?” And then I fainted. 
Ehh, and then I woke up on the floor and I just took a sip of water and got back to work. The 
presentation was finished until Wednesday. So you might say that you are blinded by this, I 
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think you are. I think you’re in a mode of autopilot and there is just full throttle! A lot of 
times I have sat myself in the car to drive off at work, in the middle of the night, at 2.30 AM. 
And I might have gone to bed around half past ten, and then I can’t sleep any longer until 
2.30, because then there is something that just keeps spinning around my head and I think 
“Well, I’ll just get off to work and fix it”. And then I’m at work at 2.30 in the middle of the 
night, but might not be at home until half past four the next day. So I think it blinds you, yes, 
either that or you work so excessively that you become unable to “catch” yourself”  
Peter refer to several similar incidents. Due to lack of sleep over a long period, he faints as he 
is on his way out from a plane, heading for an important meeting. After having been 
examined by medical personal at the airport, he decides to go straight to the meeting, despite 
being urged to immediately seek a thorough physical examination at a hospital. On the 
question of why he actually choose to go into a meeting, in situations like these, where he 
obviously is experiencing some sort of breakdown, Peter says: 
“I have thought about that on a number of occasions, as to why I didn’t pull out, or seek any 
help. I must have been very blind. I have experienced these things time and over again. Once, 
I was in Bergen and I was going to drive to Oslo, a trip I’ve done so many times I should be 
able to do it in my sleep. But this was in a period where I was working extensively, I think I 
worked the clock around several times prior to the trip. And I was going to Oslo, but once I 
was about to reach the city, I simply couldn`t find my way around. I was on a detour. And I 
ask a guy at a gas station if he knows the way and I drive off in the direction he points out to 
me. But after a while I start to think “I’m in the wrong direction here. I’m turning around!” 
Then I turn, just to discover that, eventually, I am back where I first went wrong. After 
several detours I manage to get back to Oslo, but I couldn`t really remember how I got there” 
Again, Peter reaches for the term of blindness in order to describe why he decides to go into a 
meeting, when he is advised to seek immediate medical help. In this context, blindness 
denotes a paradoxical state, as a sense that signifies a non-sense, or a sense of something that 
cannot (or can no longer) be sensed. On the one hand, he speaks of a particular blindness that 
makes him unable to “see himself” and makes him overlook certain conditions that, in the 
rearview mirror, should have alerted him. However, the blindness to which he refers, also 
invoke a lost experience. As can be seen from the quote above, Peter explains the blindness 
that makes him lose sight of himself by referring to episodes where he literally goes blind, 
where he faints or loses basic skills. This blindness unfolds in a realm of lost experience: 
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These encounters with a “force” so strong that his body becomes unable to run its most 
elementary operations, momentarily disabling his vision, his ability to speak and orient 
himself, is for the most part only recollected in small fragments and more or less erased from 
his memory. For the most part, Peter refers to it as experiences recollected by his body, which 
“recalls” how the stress permeated his basic senses and numbed his ability to perform 
elementals tasks, such as typing or driving. Another striking expression conveyed in Peter’s 
account above, is the alarming phrase “to pull out”. He speaks of not being able to pull 
himself out of his work, as if he was trapped inside a building on fire, almost as a form of 
self-imprisonment. 
When the blindness “hits”, he simply becomes paralyzed. For Peter it seems hard to offer any 
explanation as to exactly why and how things could get out of hand. When he interprets his 
own experience of psychic and physical turmoil due to the stress at work and how he let 
things get out of hand and how he did not reach out for help, he does it through the “prism” 
of his own personality which, according to himself, is prone to become fixated on certain 
things. When trying to explain his experiences, Peter reaches for his own lack of sense of 
himself, of becoming obsessed and having disproportioned “values”, in such a way that his 
job became the main source of well-being and contentment.  
 
In a similar vein, Lisa, a research consultant in her early thirties, describes an experience of 
everything turning “pitch black”. As Peter, she also describes her work environment as 
ambitious, buzzing and hurried, and a workplace that “infuses energy”. Prior to her 
experience, she has worked intensely for several weeks: 
“We were going out to have seven meetings that day, I think it was, and I got down there and 
then everything turns pitch black. I didn’t know where I was heading or anything, so I just 
had to pullover and call our secretary and say that, well, “I think I’ve become sick, 
somehow”. Then I called my doctor and she asked me to come down right away, because they 
thought that it could be something very serious. But after she conducted some tests on me, she 
told me that I needed to take some time off, “you need to go home and sleep”. So that’s how 
it all started. There I was, “bang!” I was completely overloaded. I was on sick leave for 
about half a year, I think. After two or three months I started to see a therapist and I started 
to try to unravel everything, how it came about, and they helped me get me back on my feet 
again.” 
On being asked how things were before the bang occurred, Lisa says: 
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“Well, it was busy, very busy, I knew that. I didn’t sleep well and I was very stressed. And we 
had tried to hire someone, but it didn’t work out so… well, it was so busy, I could feel my 
pulse going up and I felt the stress, but it didn’t occur to me that I was coming that close to 
hit the wall, I didn’t even consider it an option. But when I arrived at my doctor’s office that 
morning I was just sitting there, screaming and laughing in turn, I was completely gone. And 
that was when she told me that “you just have to get home right now and go to sleep, and we 
can pick up on this later today or tomorrow”. But it was a very peculiar experience, because 
there were all of these physical manifestations of it as well. I got reactions on my skin, and I 
gradually started losing my hair, I lost a lot of weight and didn’t get any sleep. Yes, it was all 
of these typical… I became very forgetful, didn’t recall any names anymore. I could wash my 
hands and discover, later, that I kept the water running. The door on my fridge was open half 
of the time. After a while, after a week or so on sick leave, I went to my parent’s place and 
just stayed there for a couple of months. So it was very “bang” just all of a sudden” 
Both Peter and Lisa describe experiences of strong physical and mental reactions. In order to 
depict their experience of a breakdown, they invoke metaphors and sayings that refer to basic 
experiences of deprivation, such as “pitch-black darkness” or blindness. 
For some interviewees, the experience of stress is described as something that suddenly 
creeps into their bodies, as an unexpected and sudden reminder of their own vulnerability. 
Karen, for instance, explains how the stress in certain periods simply “makes my body react 
instantly”, without being able to detect any “triggering” signs in advance. Vivian, on the 
other hand, says she initially had a quite strong “suit of armor” against stress, but after a 
series of personal incidents, her tolerance for stress gradually deteriorated. After that, stress 
has become a “button that is switched on, and then I lose the ability to think straight”. In a 
vein similar to Peter and Lisa, Vivian also experience stress as a sudden emotional and 
physical rush that completely detaches her from a state of “normal” functioning, a state which 
blurs her mind and sets her apart from her immediate surroundings.  
Despite the descriptions given above, of being brought to an existential verge, stress is 
usually not experienced as a disease, but a peculiar state that materializes itself in their bodies 
that they both are aware of and not. Peter and Lisa speak, in this regard, of having worked 
themselves to a point where the body stops to function properly, where “alarm bells” goes 
off, and yet they feel unable to change the situation. How are we to explain such seemingly 




Within the field of sociology in general and particularly within Critical Management Studies, 
stress and anxiety is often placed alongside the new “spirit” of autonomy, individualization 
and authenticity that is assumed to permeate ever greater parts of present-day work life 
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Ekman 2012). Some observers have placed the phenomena of 
stress at a pathological intersection between self-doubt and self-realization, fueled by a so-
called “entrepreneurial” subjectivity put forth as an ideal across different domains of our 
society, including the organizations of work life. Accordingly, it is pointed out that the 
excessive demands of self-fulfillment produced within contemporary organizations is “an 
important stress factor behind the numbers of mental fatigue diagnoses” (Thunmann 2012: 
56). I consider this research to hold significant accounts of the consequences and effects of 
contemporary work life. However, the prevalent diagnosis of neo-liberalism found in much 
critical research on contemporary work life tends to function as a magic formula, in which 
everything finds its natural explanation once it is said out loud. What I find troubling is not 
the critical assessment of neo-liberalism, but that the label of “neo-liberalism” itself 
occasionally leads researchers to “leapfrog” across the urgent analytical question as to exactly 
how neo-liberalism produces anxiety, self-doubt and stress among employees today. Perhaps 
the formula of neo-liberalism is too easily brought forward when analyzing the current 
regimes of managerial practice, in such a way that all forms of anomaly (such as stress and 
work-related illness) can appear as a pathological “outcomes” of a supposedly increased 
individualization and neo-liberalism, without providing the necessary level of clarity on the 
pathologies themselves, how the organizations handle them or how they are experienced by 
employees. To give an example, it is suggested, that among stressful employees, certain 
discourses are “markedly absent, such as political persepctives that highlight the need for 
social change. Instead, desires for change are directed away from the socio-political sphere 
and turned inwards. Social critique is transformed into self-critique, resulting in a prevalence 
of self-doubt and anxiety” (Scharff 2016: 198). I find readings such as these problematic for a 
number of reasons. First, they tend to produce an ideal state – in this case the ideal of a well-
founded political or social critique – that is found to be absent among the research 
participants. This point towards a peculiar form of historization, which assumes that 
employees, on a general note, previously advocated social critique, whereas they now only 
find “biographical explanations” to their own experiences of unjust, pressure, exhaustion etc. 
This is not to say that there previously might have been, as Ulrich Beck claims, a sort of 
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collectively engaged experience of social misery among workers, leading to politically 
motivated struggles, which by now obviously has disappeared (Beck and Williams 2002: 
164). There is, however, never rarely any patient, empirical analyses put forward to support 
the thesis of a simultaneous rise of individualism versus the fall of political collectives (and 
how this help explain why we what we do), only a “goes-without-saying”-sense of general 
decay. Within Critical Management Studies, the idea that “social critique is increasingly 
replaced by self-critique” therefore often tend to produce an already set narrative of alienated, 
de-politicized individuals due to the arrival of an alienating, de-politicizing neo-liberal 
regime (Saleci 2010: 31). In other words, these analyses tend to tautologically revolve around 
what people (stressful employees) do not say and do not do and then hold this absence 
accountable for the de-politicizing of individuals within a current neo-liberal regime. Second, 
in continuation of this, what is “found” and brought into light in these articles, tend to lose 
sight of the actual sense of pathological and stressful experience among employees, while 
analytically “favoring” these employees’ lack of a particular agency. Third, the research also 
tend to lack an interest to pursue the strong ambiguities expressed among employees on the 
experience of workplace stress, which I find to be among the conspicuous and consistent 
issues brought forward by interviewees. By ambiguities I refer to how, for instance, 
employees voice dissatisfaction and critique of the management and organizations, but 
similarly also often sustain a strong critical assessment of themselves and their own 
performance and achievements. I suggest that the attribution of stress, as it is expressed 
among the interviewees, is therefore not solely found in a mode of “interiorization” of 
conflicts, in which “structural” antagonisms are seamlessly transformed into an individual 
project, that are contained and sought resolved within the self (Lazzarato 2013: 187). There 
is, in other words, not necessarily an either-or for the interviewees, between voicing critique 
of poor management and problematic work environments, and conveying a strong sense of 
stress as a “self-produced” problem. Perhaps it is even possible and more clarifying, at least 
in the case of a number of the interviewees in this case, to say that both the critique and self-
critique voiced by employees often stem from a strong identification with the workplace as 
such. In the next few pages I will describe the way in which the informants seem to recognize 





Work as identity  
The topic of attachment to work resurface throughout many of the interviews. As we have 
seen, Lisa, for instance, speaks of work in very vital terms, as something that infuses energy 
and makes her crave for more. Similar views appear among other interviewees. Siri, an 
economist in her forties, states at one point that if she didn’t have any family to take care of, 
she could easily end up “working all the time, just eat, sleep and work”, because it gives her 
so much joy. She expresses a strong identification with the firm, in which she is hired:  
“When I am offered the opportunity to take part in it [developing strategies etc.], everything 
is more fun. For me, it makes my work more than just work, it becomes a part of you. My 
work is great part of who I am as a person…  And, well, I am myself influencing the 
organization and the work is a part of my personal development. Because when you spend so 
many hours at work, it becomes a part of you. And I am very much like that, when you are 
working with numbers you can basically do anything, but the things is to identify with and 
feel that you are a part of this house, even though I haven’t taken part in everything, but there 
is a “we” and this is not just a place you work, this is actually a “we”.” 
Mona, an ambitious solicitor, poses the problem somewhat differently: “Well, I think it is 
pretty hard to work only eight hours a day. I try, but… I had this period were I was very 
exhausted last year, I got a coach and I was challenged: “Now you’re going to work only 
eight hours a day for two months straight”! And then, to just leave after eight hours, not 
working on Saturday, not working on Sunday, that is incredibly hard, it is extremely tough! 
And I have had periods, especially when I was single, when I didn’t manage to distinguish 
between, well, people used to say “oh, it’s you who is ASAcorp”, if I was at a party, and then 
it turned out like that, “I am ASAcorp”. But then, no, “ehh, ASAcorp is a firm and you are 
only a small piece of that” - that is what I have been practicing” 
Karen speaks of a similar experience: “I feel that [having this job] sometimes can be a bit 
double-edged, because you sometimes get so excited and dedicated and concerned with how 
important this is that you can easily forget yourself and your own wellbeing, when do you 
reach a point where it is enough? I guess that is the greatest challenge. And I see that among 
many of my collegues as well, there’s many very committed people who are on the verge of 
becoming completely exhausted. We consider our work important and then it’s easy to just 




What Karen and the other interviewees describes as dedication and commitment holds a 
strangely infectious quality that simultaneously provides a “drive” and threatens to consume 
you from within. The commitment, dedication and sense of purpose adds up to a “joker” with 
two faces, a face of destruction and a face of construction (Serres 2007: 67). However, it is 
not given when the “joker” appears as destruction, there’s no hint in advance, apart from 
occasional “wear and tear” on the body or small “scratch marks in the back of your mind”, as 
Lisa puts it. Mona speaks, in somewhat ironic terms, of “being” the corporation and having to 
struggle with herself not to become completely immersed in the identity of the organization 
she feels such a strong bond and commitment to. All of the quotes above indicate work as 
being a potential “trap”; the cost of commitment is hard to realize when work also is such a 
strong source of excitement, recognition and meaning, as Karen point towards.  
On the one hand, we have the testimonies of a strong personal commitment and sense of 
well-being that is realized through work (and which might become a “trap”). On the other 
hand, there are also many who point towards a sociality at the workplace, which indirectly 
leads to a pressure to “deliver” and perform at work, in a pace and in a volume that they 
might not be comfortable with. This is not necessarily directly related to managers who 
demand stronger performances. The work environment previously described by Peter and 
Lisa, for instance, will probably sound familiar to many people working within so-called 
knowledge-based professions, where ideals of employee “autonomy” and “flexibility” are 
valued as significant qualities. Peter indicates a very competitive work environment, where 
his own mere presence at the office the morning after a very late night at work gives him a 
sense of victory and where people are “showing off” by turning up in the office during 
weekends or holidays. At the same time, he never experience any pressure from his managers 
to go beyond the regular working hours or demands of increasing workloads. On the contrary, 
Peter describes a work environment where both the demands of work and preconditions for 
advancemwent rarely is explicated.  
The condition of fluid and indeterminate organization has been described as key features of 
modern work life, in the transition to a so-called post-industrial society, accompanied by a 
proliferation of knowledge-based work (Bell 1974). The transition has, according to some 
observers, undermined traditional notions of authority and transgressed the explicit division 
of labor found in the disciplinary mode of organization at the height of modernity (Foucault 
1995). The supposed demise of hierarchical and rigid top-centred forms of steering within 
organizations has been handled thoroughly in both management literature as well as 
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sociological and organizational studies. Rather than to exercise traditional control and 
surveillance, management now aims to facilitate processes and support the self-fulfilment and 
autonomy of each employee (Thompson 1998; Goleman 2000). The time of clearly guiding 
management principles and strict division of labour is thus said to be long gone (Gibson and 
Vermeulen 2003). What has emerged instead is a salutation of autonomy, conviviality, 
multitasking and spontaneity as prolific qualities of the employee and organizational 
environment. According to Boltanski and Chiapello (2005: 97), these are qualities taken 
”directly from the repertoire of May 1968”. In the flexible organization, employees are 
encouraged to bring along their personality to work and to put it at stake; the employee 
should reflect upon how his or her personality is being performed in the organization 
(Townley 1995). The tools of the management of involvement in organizations range from 
the use of dialogue schemes and team-building exercises to play (Andersen 2008). It has been 
proposed that the engaged and autonomous employee gets locked up in an image of a free-
willed identity, which really is out of their control (Deetz 1998: 168). On a similarly critical 
note, Richard Sennet (2006) and Zygmunt Bauman (1998: 101-102), suggests that the 
autonomous and flexible working environment first and foremost renders possibilities of new 
and sophisticated forms of employee surveillance. The function of workforce in management 
has come to represent far more than a set of competences to fulfil specific, given tasks in the 
organisation, as employees’ potential “meta-competence” has become a predominant virtue: 
the competence to develop his/ her own competences, setting goals and articulating visions 
for the future of the organization (Andersen 2007, 2012; Du Gay et al. 1996, Donzelot 1991: 
280).   
Instead of entering a realm of pre-defined authority and set work-tasks, the employee’s 
conditions of work is in contemporary work life increasingly confined to a space of 
negotiation and self-development. To take responsibility in such a realm does no longer 
simply imply conscientiously solving a number of set work tasks. On the contrary, such an 
attitude towards work might easily seem rigorous and “out of tune” amongst many people in 
knowledge based organizations today. In line with this argument, one might say that the 
expectations towards what and how work is fulfilled is sought to remain open to such an 
extent that both the individual employee and the organization continually can add new 




The stress of solitude and managerial withdrawal 
In continuation of this, some interviewees adduce the conflict between retaining a strong 
independence in their fulfilment of work, on the one hand, and a sense of being “left alone”, 
on the other hand. The sense of being alone is not only a negatively connoted experience. 
Among the interviewees, the sense of solitude can designate a physical “fact” (sitting much 
alone in the office or at home), as well as a structural condition of the organization and a 
“management problem”.  The physical “fact” of solitude at work is described by Lisa as a 
result of a very lax organization, where there are few demands coming from above, in terms 
of when the employees have to be present in the office. When she arrives at work well before 
noon, they are often no more than ten people at the premises, despite counting a staff of 43. 
Not all colleagues find this particularly troubling, according to Lisa, who point out that such 
flexible arrangements make things much easier on her own part, with the whole “family-
logistics” that must be taken care of every day.  
Yet, she also describes her position as that of a “lone rider”, which is a label she would put on 
most of her colleagues, due to the highly individualized work tasks and lack of constraints on 
their presence. As long as the work is done, nobody really cares where they are. In addition to 
sitting alone most of the time, Lisa also feels that the possibilities for developing new projects 
and finding “common ground” with other colleagues are suffering because of these flexible 
arrangements. During the interview, Lisa keeps lurching back and forth between endorsement 
and suspicion of the flexibility “regime” at her work, which both allows for easygoing 
arrangements in her private life, but also situates her in a solitary enactment with the work, 
with quite few options of collegial support when things “tightens”. This again leads to 
another form of pressure, which Lisa describes as being stressful at times.  
The sort of flexibility she describes seems to be quite unusual when considering the group of 
interviewees as a whole. None of the others speaks of a work environment similar to that of 
Lisa, where no one really takes notice of whether or not people show up at the office. While 
most of the interviewees describe relatively “loose” demands on when they have to be 
present, they do not describe a similar lack of plain and simple interaction with other 
colleagues on a daily basis. The most common feature of flexibility characterizing the work 
environments of the interviewees leans more towards a freedom of tasks than of presence. 
How they fulfill their work and the specific content of their tasks are often rather malleable 
and non-specified, of which many of the tasks are temporarily, based on specific assignments 
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or projects. Considering the quite diverse background and workplaces of the interviewees, 
these structural conditions (work hours, how to fulfill tasks etc.) found in their work 
environment can sometimes seem to remain beyond generalizability. However, while the 
work environment of Lisa seems to be characterized by a far-reaching and quite untypical 
form of “laissez-faire”, there are nonetheless certain strong resemblances with the other 
workplaces in this regard, as it expressed among most of the interviewees.  
This brings us to another kind of solitude, namely the loneliness of the work itself, as an 
ongoing enactment. What just above was described as Lisa’s lurching back and forth between 
endorsement and suspicion of the flexibility in her organization, can be found throughout 
many of the accounts put forward by the interviewees. The flexibility that, according to 
organizations, is designed to promote autonomy and self-fulfillment seem to rely on a certain 
disentanglement of the relation between employee and superior. To phrase it like a question: 
How are demands articulated upon employees in an environment where they themselves are 
expected to find and develop their own “projects” and where the specific content of their 
position rarely is explicated?  
The flexibility does not by any means seem to dissolve the relation between employee and 
superior as such, but seem to entertain a certain “wooliness” in terms of how the different 
tenets of work is specified. Vivan, for instance, expresses a sense of diffusion of 
management: “There is no manager as such at our workplace. There is a manager for the 
whole section, but that covers so many people that we don’t know him”.  
Further into the interview, she outlines how this leads to a lot of uncertainty on her part.  
Vivian: “I feel that I do know who makes the decisions here” 
I: “And that is something you feel induces stress, somehow?” 
Vivian: “Yes, because I never know what is about to come. And what this job is actually all 
about” 
I: “Is this something you experience a lot?” 
Vivian “Yes, a lot of times” 
 
Instead of being addressed as an individual with bonds of specific obligations, that are 
supposed to be fulfilled according to explicate demands (issued and continuously assessed 
from above) the employee is now expected to increasingly rely on techniques of self-
assessment and “self-enrolment” in work. Work becomes a project itself, as a rarely defined 
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“entity” under continuous construction (Jensen 2009: 120-121). Another informant, Marie, 
repeatedly uses the word “freedom” to describe the upside of her job. On being asked what 
she associates with freedom, she says that “well, it is working with the kind of assignments 
that I find relevant for my area of expertise, not just doing anything. I am put here to do a 
job, even though I don’t have a job description, hardly, I don’t know if anyone of us has such 
a thing. It’s back to this thing again, somebody would like something. The freedom consists in 
me doing my own things”. Marie associates freedom almost immediately with the absence of 
a job description and of not having a set list of tasks. Freedom is connoted as a project that 
involves creating her own position. 
In many so-called “flexible” jobs (to various degrees), the specific content of work as well as 
the job description, tasks, work hours, and even the workplace itself has become a matter of 
the single employees’ own preference and interest. This again relies on a whole new plane of 
self-reflection and self-regulation on the part of the individual employee. The question I have 
tried to bring up during the interviews, is if and how this new expectation of individual 
engagement can intensify certain type of conflicts or difficulties at work, while others might 
be tuned down? The “wooliness” echoed in the often unformal or random procedures of 
feedback and acknowledgement, which was described by Vivian, are examples of reoccurring 
conflicts, among several interviewees. In two cases, interviewees describe feedback and 
acknowledgement as being close to non-existing. Many others also bring up the frustrating 
experience of lacking a counterpart that can give feedback or occasionally provide more 
specific requirements as to how their job could be performed.  
Marie describes her position as having been completely “invented” by herself from the very 
first day she came into the organization. According to her, she was appointed to a vague area 
of responsibilities when she first entered the organization, which she has since developed and 
clarified. On being asked whether she experience any regular feedback at work, Marie says:  
“Ehm, in the form of “maybe you can take charge of this as well”, which is an indirect 
response implying you do a good job. That was our former director, though. But there is not 
much asides from that, no. You get a bit discouraged, especially if you are in need of a 
specific feedback on “should I go in this or that direction?”, like I am doing with this 
strategy now, where I try to draw out some topics and questions, “should we do it like this or 
like that, do you want to emphasize that part?”. Then I have just been told that, well, “you’re 
best suited to figure that out”. And than I’m just deadlocked, now I’ve tried three times to get 
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a response without any luck, I am going to throw in the towel and say “someone else have to 
take care of that”, because it is simply beyond my imagination what they want”  
Marie conveys a strong sense of not being “seen” and properly acknowledged in her 
organization, despite having put down an enormous effort to build certain parts of it up. 
While she often has a completely packed scheme, her colleagues or managers does not really 
take notice, among other things because a lot of her work involves “out of the house”-
assignments. Thus, the primary recognition she experience is an occasional new assignment, 
which might lead to an even heavier workload than what she already has. Yet, she is far from 
obliged to take charge of the projects that managers or others propose to her. In the quote 
above, Marie outlines what seems to be a form of protest against the lack of feedback from 
the management, where she simply passes over the task to someone else. Her “silent” 
objection is aimed at the silence of her superiors, who does not provide any responses and 
decline to involve themselves. Put differently, one might say that Marie describes a 
frustration of being rendered without any counterpart that can offer a discussion and 
arguments for or against.  
On the one hand, Marie is trying to involve her managers and colleagues in a strategic 
priority, which she considers important for the organization. In a peculiar form of negotiation, 
Marie’s manager points towards her particular competence, in order to “warrant” authority 
(to make the decisions on the strategic priority), which is a move she does not care for. As 
she explains it, the whole point is to try to create a sort of resonance throughout the 
management on this specific issue, not to be “rewarded” with the exclusive authority of 
solely taking charge herself. The conflict at stake here, as interpreted by Marie, does 
obviously not revolve around unreasonable demands being put forward or of an employee 
being overruled by a superior. It rather seems to be the opposite problem, where an employee 
fails to require a feedback from the management and is instead left with an unintended 
surplus of authority and responsibility. Yet, on the other hand, Marie also employs the same 
means of “mute tactics” herself. In the set-up she depicts, the conflict taking place is not 
really allowed to be played out as a conflict, as she never bring forward any explicit 
dissatisfaction. “Conflict” remains just one out of several possible interpretations of the 
silence surrounding both of the involved parties. Her superiors does not want to be involved, 
unknown why and Marie reacts by handing over the task to someone else, but it is not 
brought to the surface why she does so.  
203 
 
This can be considered a symptom of the flexible arrangements themselves. When there are 
no manuals at hand, making it clear who is in charge of what, the questions of delegation, 
authority, responsibility and feedback can easily become points of negotiation, which might 
be intentionally sought to remain unfixed (from the organizational point of view). While this 
mode of “fluidity” might designate, more or less precisely, the forms of flexible arrangements 
and the possible undercurrent of disentanglements (of authority, delegation, responsibility, 
content etc.) accompanying them in the “flexible” organizations, the question of how the 
incommunicability of conflict itself seems to be such an intrinsic part of the experience of 
stress must be considered more carefully. In other words, when the “mute tactics” and 
(occasionally) incommunicability of conflicts is such a prevalent characteristic of how work 
and stress is linked according to several interviewees, how can we understand these 
testimonies of struggles and predicaments, that are not “allowed” to become conflicts because 
they remain unspoken?  
 
The intersection between the responsibility of the employee and the demands voiced by the 
management often does not constitute a primary division of authority at the workplace, 
according to most of these interviewees. In other words, there is not anyone telling you 
exactly what to do next, or how you could have resolved that task more effectively. 
Furthermore, in several of the organizations, the very question of who the “manager” is 
becomes re-configured from one task or assignment to another (in the form of, for instance, a 
succession of “project managers”).  Yet, the division between employee and management 
remains intact, even though it might be unclear from day to day. Some of the interviewees 
point to instances of different forms of “managerial withdrawal” as a source of great 
frustration, due to both the uncertainty involved (of how they perform, if it could have been 
handled differently etc.) as well as the lack of recognition. This is, by some, held in direct 
continuation of their experience of illness and stress at work. Despite a workload that at a 
certain point made her ill and take sick leave due to stress, Marie’s experience of 
discouragement in the organization stems mainly from the lack of acknowledgement, 
according to herself. In other words, Marie is more concerned about the heavy workload not 
being seen and recognized by her managers, than about the workload itself. It is as if the load 
literally gets heavier when she does not receive any attention or recognition by a manager or 
co-workers.  
At the same time, we can also see that Marie, like most of the other interviewees, alternates 
between pouring out frustration over her solitary position in the organization and 
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continuously highlighting the necessity of retaining a strong independent position. In other 
words, the sense of unease when someone actually do intervene “from above” seems to be 
just as commonplace as the frustration of “managerial withdrawal” and being left alone for 
most of these interviewees.  
 
Expectations as self-expectations 
When asked about what kind of expectations they experience in their everyday work life, 
several interviewees immediately relate it to their self-expectations towards the fulfilment of 
work. To a certain extent, their testimonies of expectation are in line with what the stress 
management coach, encountered in the previous section, describes as “your responsibility 
and no one else’s!”. As such, expectations are seldom explicated without conjuring up 
themes of personal responsibility and performance at work. In continuation of this, the 
interviewees’ reflections on these themes are often directed towards boundaries which, as 
they express it, rarely are definitely set, in the form of explicit demands or expectations on 
work hours, workload, initiative etc. Several interviewees express a wish for an organization 
that can somehow can restrain their own desires for work, but not to a degree that would rein 
the possibility of unfolding their self-expectations at work too strongly. Peter, for instance, 
proposes more strict regulations as a means to make boundaries more visible: “Well, the 
freedom I have at work is amazing on several levels, because you can basically do whatever 
you want. But at the same time, if you’re a “yes-man”, you will end up working at all waking 
hours. But if you actually had some restrictions on this, saying you shall not receive an e-
mail after four o’clock, you shall not work after four o’clock… these things should actually 
not be necessary”. For Peter, as he explains it, the possibility of saying no to work often 
remains beyond his options, because he is so inclined to take care of anything that turns up at 
his desk. In his case, the boundaries that regulate hours and workload remain unreachable, 
even beyond the possibility of actual confrontation, because they are not there to begin with, 
as he perceives it. In other words, what he finds deeply troubling is not so much the fact that 
work hours, for instance, occasionally are converging into his private life. It rather seems to 
be that he remains unable to make his work distinct from everything that is not work in his 
life. Peter experience his work environment as abundant with self-regulation, where he solely 
decides when, how much and to a certain extent even where to work. However, in spite of the 
wish for a more “old-fashioned” and regulated organization, Peter interprets his experience of 
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ailments provoked by work load or overtime exclusively as an “internal struggle”, which has 
unfolded at the level of conflicting self-expectations. He clearly blames himself for having 
“faded out” and becoming “blind”, and points towards his own personality traits, such as “the 
yes-man”-syndrome, as an underlying and omnipresent explanation for his extremely 
consuming experience and encounter with stress. For him, the illness due to work is to some 
extent considered a repercussion of his own personality, rather than a consequence of a 
“culture” or environment at his workplace.  
Others, however, do not report the same kind of experience of a negative and complete 
absorption of work, as Peter does, but highlight freedom as a defining positive feature of their 
work. For instance, several interviewees point towards the freedom to organize the workday 
as they like, or to choose what kind of projects they would like to prioritize, as intrinsic for 
their own engagement with work. Freedom is therefore usually brought about as a specific 
kind of “self-involvement” by the interviewees, an involvement that holds the possibilities to 
take charge of tasks, projects, resources etc. Ane, for instance, states very clearly that the 
freedom she has available at her work is very important to her: 
 “To me, this is sort of the freedom: How do I solve this? How do I organize it? I like that 
very well. To have that much time for myself, or to make these decisions on my own, it really 
appeals to me. There is no one else telling me what to do. Other find that very distressing, but 
I find it appealing, to take care of things myself”  
Still, Ane holds forth that her freedom is “relative”. On the one hand she finds it very 
intriguing to be in charge of her own time, that she can plan projects and have money and 
resources available to do so. It gives her a sense of confidence, she says, to feel that she is 
solely responsible for the quality of what she delivers, and that there is not really anyone else 
to blame if things get “jammed up” and she fails to deliver in time. She speaks of this 
freedom in terms of a “positive stress” and a strong motivation to perform well. At the same 
time, the work also requires her to be in a steady flow, where the option of taking things 
down a notch rarely is present. In such instances, where she simply cannot keep up with the 
flow, the freedom “switches”, according to Ane, into pure responsibility: “But once you 
cannot provide that extra effort, it just becomes an incredible load. Then the freedom turns 
into just responsibility”  
Freedom is thus only an ideal insofar as it works “with” and not “against”.  Ane considers the 
freedom she has at work to be a kind of fuel, which enables her to hold a steady pace and 
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enhances her performance, but at the same time this freedom can turn against her and make 
her even more drained and exhausted than she would be otherwise. For her, the problem is 
that the freedom she praises functions just as “effectively” as a motivation as it does in the 
opposite direction, when it becomes a fuel for her own exhaustion and stress. Freedom holds 
a similarly peculiar quality among several interviewees: In periods where they cannot keep 
track with the pace or flow at work, the freedom implodes into excessive demands, which 
they are not able to satisfy. There is in other words always a shadow hunting their freedom, 
which, when it eventually surfaces, threatens to turn all their positive connotations of 
personal initiative and self-regulation into a sense of mere duty or responsibility. These 
“shadows of freedom” are conveyed very differently. Some speak of the “boring” part of 
autonomy, while others denote freedom as a “privilege” that comes at a certain price. 
However, the “shadows of freedom” is something all the interviewees brings about during 
our conversations.  
Expectations towards self-performance are also put forward and explicated as intrinsic for the 
experience of a meaningful job, a career or “self-development”. The various expectations 
towards work, and the sense of freedom and responsibility attached to them, are conversely 
allocated to the two “spheres” of organization and individual. During the interviews, which is 
evident in the stories of Peter and Ane, it becomes apparent that these two references of 
expectation continuously enmesh and are, to a certain extent, interchangeable. For instance, 
the lack of clear-cut responsibility is considered a problem, while it at the same time is 
viewed as a precondition for the possibilities of self-development and (in some cases) self-
control. The question of responsibility is at once sought to remain negotiable, open and un-
fixed, while the actual attribution of such qualities are also put into question by several 
interviewees, who voice disregard for a flexibility that “tends to only work the wrong way 
around”, as Mona at a point phrases it. The point of interest in this case is not to show how 
the interviewees contradict themselves, but how they express and deal with the contradictions 
and ambiguities that seem to be intrinsically linked to the experiences of freedom and 
responsibility and thereby also their understanding of stress. These ambiguities go beyond a 
contradiction between the two opposing ideals outlined above (in the form of a “clear-cut” 
division of responsibility on the one hand and unrestrained possibilities of self-fulfillment and 
freedom on the other hand). However, there also are some forms of pressure which are seen 
as more legit than others. In the following pages, I will take a closer look at a certain “ethics 
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of exhaustion”, which seems to be at play in the justification and self-interpretation of stress 
among the interviewees.  
 
The ethics of exhaustion 
When Max Weber described a concurrence between a protestant ethics of vocation and 
specific modes of capitalist enterprise (by Weber entitled “spirit”), he did so with reference to 
a number of canonized theological treatises and writings, produced at the time of and in the 
aftermath of the Reformation (Weber 1995). This was an ethics that, more than anything else, 
revolved around the rewards inherent to the very act of work itself and the equally 
unrewarding state of idleness, through which the waste of time was considered the worst of 
all sins.  
The present interviewees often persistently allude, not to an ethical stance on the “salvation” 
of work itself, but to an ethics of exhaustion and pressure that finds a foothold once it 
corresponds with a sense of “personal fulfilment” and “higher purpose” or “sacrifice” on 
behalf of colleagues. This is typically related to overwork or having tasks that exceed their 
capacity. In other words, ethics (albeit never explicated as such) is primarily introduced by 
the interviewees when the topic of conversation relates to how their work intervenes into their 
private spheres, or, for instance, when they reach points of severe physical and psychological 
tiredness. Although, what concerns idleness, none of the interviewees exhibit any kind of 
“condemnation” or disregard for the state as such (or for people unemployed) but confronted 
with the hypothetical prospect of not being financially dependent on work, almost no one 
could imagine quitting their job. For some, this was simply due to imagined horrors of 
boredom, while others spoke of the necessity of a purpose, despite experiencing the job as 
difficult and even unrewarding at times.  
The reason I choose to introduce the notion of ethics in this context is mainly due to the 
“ethical” position taken by so many of the interviewees themselves throughout the 
interviewees, without really having been asked to. However, this was something that I only 
discovered after having read the interviewees both two and three times, because it was not 
really on my mind to begin with, but underneath a lot of the reflections on workload, time 





Karen, for instance, describes herself as very ambitious and the kind of person who always 
has “very high expectations to herself”, both as a student and later working as a consultant. 
She considers her work environment to be infused with “dedication” and people who 
genuinely cares for their work place. When asked about what kind of expectations she 
experience in the organization, she says:  
“Well, I think we are many soulmates here [laughs] in this work environment. There is no one 
who take things very lightly, you do your things properly. And that is an expactation in the 
whole organization actually, that things should be done properly. So I feel  that we all want 
to contribute and build this organization, we want what is best for it”  
Karen invokes a communal spirit in order to describe her work environment, even alluding a 
somewhat sacral language. She considers herself to be a part of a work environment in which 
they seek to do what is best for the organization, evoking a sense of “higher cause” and 
affiliation with a devoted community.  
For Siri, both the expectations concerning work-hours and the specific work load are “grey-
zones” which, for her, remain undetermined. She describes how she always has the 
possibility to ask for less work, but says at the same time says that she has never voiced any 
such need towards her superior, despite experiencing considerable weariness at work 
sometimes: 
“[…] But I really like my job and I like to feel that what I deliver is good and well done, so I 
don’t really mind working. But of course it feels better to bring along work at home if I really 
want to, rather than because of a deadline. And if I absolutely have to get things done I can 
also manage that for some periods, but if you sit and always feel that you have to get things 
done, then things can get a little bit… Well, I am a very relaxed person, so when I go from 
work I “switch off” and “switch on” again when I go back to work”  
On being asked how many hours she works during a week, Siri laughs and says: 
“No, I don’t want to know. Because there is something about the way you work here, so, I 
think if I had looked at the number of hours, well, I might have been able to perform more 
efficiently, but then that would have had some sort of consequence at home. So you might not 
work as efficiently as you could, but the whole of your life adds up, somehow. So I haven’t 
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“clocked down” my hours and I don’t want to think about that. As long as it is not too much 
of a hassle for me and as long as I think it is ok” 
But when you sit at night and work, do you consider that to be overtime? 
“No, with a position like mine there is a responsibility in terms of what needs to be done and 
to me that is very clear. It is my responsibility to let people know if I am unable to finish my 
work and to say no, if I am unable to take any more tasks. And that is fully recognized. So I 
am the one in charge of that”  
So you have experienced situations where you had to say no? 
“No, I can always manage it somehow, but I have experienced that I had to jostle for some 
deadlines, that reports were sent out a bit later than what they’ve supposed to. I only have 24 
hours a day as the rest of us and we all have to sleep”  
In a similar way, several interviewees often express a clear distinction between justified and 
unjustified forms of stress, pressure and workload, and these distinctions are very often 
rooted in an inner motivation, such as what feels engaging and not, and the pressure that 
comes from “within” opposed to pressure due to problems “on top” of the organization and 
poor management decisions. What is considered the causes of stress, such as a high and 
intense pressure at work or a disproportionate workload, is therefore in some instances 
regarded a necessary evil or sometimes even a positive example of unrestrained enthusiasm 
or self-sacrifice for the greater good of the organization.  
Throughout these interviews I found, in other words, two different forms of justification 
revolving around either a communal spirit or an individual desire. These justifications were 
often brought about when the interviews tuned into the contradictions between (expectations 
of) clearly set boundaries and (the expectations of) being able and free to define the content 
and execution of work individually. In line with this, as we will see in the coming pages, the 
interviewees also often invoke their own personality as an explanation for the stress and 







“I have a stressful personality, I guess…”  
Many of the research participants invoke their own personality as a vantage point for 
assessing their sense of wellbeing or performance at work as well as the “failure” of over-
performance leading to stress. Peter, in a way that is typical for many of these interviewees, 
voices concerns for his “inability” to step things down and detach himself from work and 
says that his work at times have been “omnipresent”, partly due to technology. 
“I have always worked a lot. And that is my weakness, I have always, well, I become very 
obsessed and then I basically can’t stop working. Because I find it so interesting. This hasn’t 
bothered me, really, but at some point I have worked so much that I can’t see the forest for 
the trees”  
As such, they do not only link their personality to a determining “path”, leading up to the 
education and work they have or, alternatively, should have chosen instead. The personality 
is also something that often is affiliated with the experience of stress and illness in relation to 
work. As such, the notions of personality traits and suitability is actualized as a lens, through 
which the interviewees consider how they are able to deal with disruption or pressure at 
work.  
Vivian considers her life to have come to a halt, because of her “tragic choice”. While she 
could have been perfectly fitted for many other careers, her decision to venture into an 
academic career has been an unforeseen, but somehow still predictable tragedy. For her, the 
tragedy consists in not having considered her own personality when initially embarking on a 
career: “I have trained myself to a job I am unfit for, because it is so stressful”. Vivian 
considers her personality to “stand in the way” for her performance at work, because she so 
easily becomes emotionally distracted by even minor occurrences that gets her off track.  
As we have seen in a previous paragraph, Vivian also display the opposite view on her own 
personality, stating that she initially has been good at handling stress and pressure at work 
and that this tolerance simply lowered at some point. The theme of a “tragic” destiny is 
something Vivian brings up when we are discussing how she reckons the future will look 
like, considering she is still on sick leave when the interview is conducted (due to stress, 
among other things). The prospect of going back to the same stressful working conditions 
makes her feel at unease, she says, and points towards her own inability to cope with the 
stress: “I am afraid that it is too stressful, that this work is too stressful for me and that I have 
to find something else”. When specific prospects of the future are brought about Vivian starts 
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to conjure up her own personality, which she considers to be fragile and emotionally 
disruptive, as destined for another kind of work. Similar views are proposed by other 
interviewees as well, without putting the same emphasis on a “tragic destiny”.  
Karen also invokes the topic of personality, when the interview turns towards expectations to 
work in general: “It’s in my personality, I guess. I am always doing my best. And everything 
is fine as long as I feel that I have done my best. The result is not always optimal, it’s not, but 
I don’t feel there’s any consequence when that happens, apart from thinking that I might try 
to do things another way next time”  
Karen: Now I can handle the stress a lot better and somehow manage to be more of a 
“master in my own house”, in terms of handling my situation properly. Maybe because I am 
not a rookie anymore, in work life. 
So you think not being a rookie anymore is the most important thing?  
Karen: I think it matters a great deal that I myself manage to take charge and not only let the 
job control everything. You have to take measures yourself. With the framework I am 
provided now, where I am, I feel that I can take certain measures and that is absolutely fine. 
In my previous job, I felt that there was not really any accept for that, because it wasn’t 
really in line with the work environment and the market conditions at the time. So I think it’s 
a very important aspect that you feel that you have the space to mark your own limits 
Karen compares her old job to her present one, in which she is able to take charge and 
control. As she describes it, stress accounts to a regular and recurring experience at both her 
former and present work, and she considers it an indistinguishable part of the work 
environment and the career she has ventured into, signified by a heavy work load, strict 
deadlines and an expectation of employees pursuing their own projects. In such an 
environment she must be in a position to prioritize, and sometimes also say no to work tasks, 
a possibility she associates with both personal experience and the specific work environment 
that surrounds her. Conversely, Karen interprets the stress that eventually made her ill in 
terms of not being “properly equipped” and sufficiently experienced to handle the pressure at 
work. She speaks of handling stress as an ability, which coincide with and is conditioned by 
personal experience and a sense of authority, which can enable her to mark the limits. 
However, the inability to handle stress is also associated with a sense of lack of support in the 
surrounding work environment. Stress is thus ascribed to a temporal dimension of personal 
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experience and a social dimension of fluctuating market mechanisms and an unsound work 
environment. 
Vivian, on the other hand, keeps returning to what she describes as her “perfectionism”. She 
experiences this as a trait that she now has overcome. She points to the perfectionism as a 
burden that remained with her from childhood well into working life, but that she now is 
relieved from it. However, this perfectionism is a recurring point of conflict in her working 
life, because her manager keeps bringing up perfectionism as a barrier that stands in the way 
for her wellbeing and performance. Vivian says that “I do not think that I am an ambitious 
person, not at all. I was a perfectionist when I was younger, but I thought that I’d gotten rid 
of it. That is also one of the things with my manager, she keeps implying that this is the 
reason I am so stressed, that I make too much out of everything. I should do things easier, but 
I don’t feel it is like that. I just feel that I do what I have to do.” In other words, Vivian’s 
personality is not only an explanatory scheme she provides herself, in order to pinpoint her 
severe difficulties at work. Her personality becomes the center of a peculiar negotiation 
between her and the closest manager, as a source of dispute and assessment of the general 
conditions of her work. Vivian does not consider “perfectionism” as a meaningful 
explanation for how or why she experiences stress. As she sees it, the stress derives from both 
her own poorly equipped personality, which is unable to handle hurried working conditions 
as well as a lack of resources to support and fulfil her work. In her own words, the stress she 
experiences, is the result of a “doubled deficit”: her own lack of personal resources as well as 
a lack of support from the surrounding work environment. Her manager, on the other hand, 
considers Vivian’s stress to derive from an opposite direction. In his opinion, Vivian is 
stressed due to a surplus of expectations, which is impossible to realize. The scene is at once 
puzzling and striking, but perhaps not all that unfamiliar: The very personality of an 
employee becomes the center of a negotiation of workload and pressure.  
One could think that someone like Vivian, who sees her own personality as the source of so 
much turmoil and pressure at work, perhaps would opt for a more simple vocation, if she had 
the chance, at least hypothetically. During the interviews, the participants are shown a picture 
depicting a factory with a large number of people working on assembly lines, slaying fish. 
The intention of this was to trigger some reflections on the relation between different forms 
of work and stress. The responses were far from as unanimous as I initially had imagined but 
ranged from appraisal to complete dissociation. Some interviewees thus responded they 
considered the assembly line work to be more important than their own work, because 
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producing and providing food has a greater impact on people’s lives than writing reports. On 
the other hand, many interviewees also suggested such a job would easily tear on their 
wellbeing, because of the stress and strains attached to it. When confronted with the image, 
Vivian exclaims that the work looks awful and that it cannot be anything but “death” to be 
confined to work in such a place. Asked if she thinks this might be a less stressful kind of 
work, she says that “As long as I don’t collapse, I’d rather have the freedom”.  
Summing up shortly, throughout these interviews, stress appears as a part of a work-life 
discourse through which a number of different problems and issues are raised and interpreted, 
such as severe illness, hurriedness, responsibility and self-fulfillment. Once the topic of stress 
is introduced, it tends to make individuals reach for their own personality traits, or their own 
failed or successful prioritizing as key explanatory schemes. In other words, the topic of 
stress – in many cases – makes individuals bring forward their whole “inner life”, mobilizing 
it as a primary source of encoding the vast range of difficult and positive experiences at the 
workplace as well as the source of possible solution to these difficulties. Based on the 
knowledge gained in the aftermath and reading of the interviews, the point has also been to 
display the diversity of experience that is attached to the notions and experiences of stress at 
work, that also includes a vast number of personal issues, such as conflicts with colleagues or 
superiors, workplace bullying and other experiences of poor work environments.  
On the one hand, the notion of “personality” seems to serve the function of allocating both 
the disappointments and “biographical disasters”, but also their exposition and clarification, 
to a realm of self-assessing individuality. On the other hand, the notion of “personal 
fulfilment” and “community” at work is voiced as an ethical stance, which can “legitimize” 











This thesis started out from a quite simple puzzle regarding how the phenomena of stress in 
work life today is attributed with strikingly contradictory qualities, as at once a source of 
productivity and sickness. This point of departure then led to trailing the history of the very 
notions of health and illness in organizations and how the problem of stress emerges and 
becomes the center of such commanding attention at the present moment. In other words, my 
own initial irritation of how things are dealt with for the time being, eventually grew into an 
archive consisting of hundreds of articles, treaties and books as well as interviews with both 
employees and managers. Furthermore, it has brought me into an examination of such diverse 
fields as medicine, physiology, therapeutic intervention as well as self-help literature and HR-
strategies, with the intention of understanding how the language afforded to us by health 
promotion and stress management has been developed.  
In the latter part of this thesis, I have analyzed the accounts given by employees themselves 
on their experiences of stress and work, in order to see how they respond to the questions of 
responsibility and performativity that pervade the self-help literature and HR-strategies. 
When explaining the stress making them sick, many have pointed towards a “shadow of 
freedom” at work, with a lack of feedback or lack of possibilities to prioritize and negotiate 
work, often related to work environments that renders them without a clear counter-part to 
negotiate with. Others point, in relation to this, towards the dangers of “grey-zones”, in which 
work load and work hours become very fluid and undetermined, where they are never off, but 
almost always somehow at work, for instance by checking up on e-mails and calls throughout 
the day and evening. What is most striking is in these accounts, however, is the difficulties 
and challenges many report on, related to making their work less invasive in their lives, 
despite a work life that already is strictly regulated, by law and contract, in terms of work 
hours. The stress many of these employees report on is centered between demands of self-
realization, on the one side and the challenge, on the other side, to negotiate the materiality of 
work, such as the mentioned work hours, workload, and responsibility. The thesis explores 
what measures are taken by the organizations themselves, when their employees become sick 
due to their work and how their illness is perceived, from the organization’s point of view, as 
a problem to both the organizations and the employees. 
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Hopefully, it is by now clear that stress is not only a bodily reaction, but also a concept that 
carries a history with several peculiar lineages, reaching back to sanatoriums and medical 
diagnoses long gone. Moreover, the way stress is currently dealt in contemporary work life is 
not a merely a fashionable tendency or, for that matter, simply a practical solution to the 
issues and challenges faced by the individual employee. Stress, as it made into a problem in 
work life, inscribes itself in a long trajectory of health promotion that has become 
increasingly concerned with the individual’s sense of well-being and attachment to the 
workplace. These are qualities that “everyone” can agree on, who would want less well-being 
at work? For this reason, they might also be very hard and challenging to oppose or withdraw 
from, once they are on the offer. As I have tried to show in this thesis, when the employees’ 
(in)ability to meaningfully attach to their work is made into a pathological threat, it also 
comes at a cost. We might call this the cost of acquiring meaning, which can be, as we have 
seen in the analysis of a stress management course, a much more ruthless and dramatic 
exercise then what it might sound. Before we go further into this, I will shortly summarize the 
historical background in the development of health promotion at work. 
From around 1920 we see that health revolves around disciplining the behavior of workers, 
so that they do not put their own or others’ health at risk. A lot of effort is put into developing 
a “safety conscience” among employees, in which their bodies are seen in direct continuity of 
the environment of machines and production. Health has a negative appearance, as an 
absence of disease, injuries and accidents. At the same time, the body (and mental capacity) 
of the worker is also seen to carry the destiny of organization, so that his physical capacity is 
equated with the productivity of the organization. From around 1937, this boundary between 
the healthy body and the organization changes, when a number of “hygienic” initiatives 
disperse throughout the field of health promotion, in which the concern for the individual’s 
private life is installed as a premise for obtaining and nurturing “healthy bodies”. Several new 
concepts appear in order to handle the need for a continuity of healthy conducts from the 
sphere of work to the private domain of the employee, such as “lifestyle” and “employee 
hygiene”. The body is hereby temporally intensified, because its potential illness is sought 
prevented throughout all hours of the day. In the period ranging between 1940 and 1980, the 
“humanness” of the employee is discovered and made into a pivotal precondition for health 
promotion. Up until this point, the employee has been considered a “human material”, from 
which the emerging human semantics presents itself as a radical and abrupt break. The health 
and illness of the employee now becomes “symptomatic”, wherein physical illness, for 
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instance, can appear as tangible symptoms of an inner state; loss of meaning, dissatisfaction, 
maladjustment or emotional turmoil. The organization now also starts to consider itself as a 
source of pathologies in a new fashion, such as ruthless management or asocial work 
environments. In relation to this, the advocates of a new “human factor” proclaims that illness 
can only be prevented through taking the emotional life of the employee into account. When 
ideals such as satisfaction, thriving, well-being, contentment, the human factor, productivity 
and community assembles into a new semantics of health, there are likewise also new threats 
emerging when and where these ideals fail to be realized, such as passivity, negativity and 
conflict-ridden attitudes. From around 1980 onwards, we see that the vocabulary of health 
promotion is increasingly problematizing the employee’s relation to the workplace as a 
particular kind of self-relation, charged with emotions that can pose a considerable danger 
towards the employee’s health. Several interventionist programs are therefore launched to 
map the attachment and sense of well-being and unease of the individual employee and to 
make the employee handle his or her emotions more strategically, including programs such as 
the personal interview, breathing exercises and stress management courses. In these exercises 
and tools, the pathologies of work are located in the conflicting emotions of the self. As it 
typically is phrased: “The point is to avoid becoming a victim of your own negative thoughts” 
(Personal og ledelse [Staff and Management], no. 6, 2008: 20).  
This brings up the question of what happens, at the practical level of health promotion, when 
the relation between work and illness is semantically interlinked through a therapeutic lens of 
self-assessment? Asked differently, how does stress management center in on the self-
relationship of employees who have experienced illness and pressure due to their work? To 
answer this, I have analyzed how stress management requires a management of language, and 
how the notion of the self as self-pathologized demands a reclamation of the way in which 
people speak of themselves and their surroundings. Both in the “how-to”- literature on stress 
and in the stress management course, we most commonly find two steps that are pinned out, 
according to which stressful individuals can transform their pressure into “balance” and 
“regain” themselves. The first step consists in making the subject realize how it has inscribed 
itself in a tragic narrative; how you are thinking too much, driven by emotions and having too 
negative feelings, and how you have become trapped in the demands and expectations posed 
by yourself. The next step consists in a second act of “suspending the tragedy”, through 
which the individual is sought equipped with an authentic voice in order to release itself from 
its own negation. In this manner, the subject is called upon to detach from and exorcise the 
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story of itself and the language it has, it is claimed, immersed itself in and become a captive 
of. To suspend the tragedy, stressful individuals must engage in acts of re-writing the plot of 
themselves and their work, as if the reality they experience could be authored differently and 
thereby simply become different.  
My analysis of these steps, that seeks to guide stressful individuals towards a self-
transformation, follows two key points. First, I have shown how stress management assumes 
individual’s stress as a case of self-imposed emotions and thoughts that must be disentangled 
from the actual situation at work. However, these enactments of therapeutic confrontation 
also produce a sociality when it holds a up a mirror of persistent “what-if’s” against the 
concrete experiences that has led these employees to a stress management course in the first 
place; “what if you just say no”; “what if you don’t listen to your own negative voice in that 
situation” etc. The individual still retains his or her workload, responsibility and expectations 
at work after the sessions of stress management are over but is now asked to see things from a 
different angle or disengage with negative emotions as if these things then would become less 
demanding, uncomfortable and stressful. In other words, stress management brings about a 
realm that encourages employees to re-invoke their experiences of work through a different 
language, on the premise of these experiences’ plasticity, which are then supposed to spill 
over into their future experiences. Second, I have shown how stress management through 
these language-exercises emerge as a technology that enables a coupling of power and illness. 
Stress management assumes individuals that no longer can handle their own surroundings 
because they are disempowered; they do not have the means, by way of “emotional capacity” 
and language, to see things differently and script alternate accounts of their own experiences. 
Illness thereby becomes contingent upon a transformation, from scarcity to surplus, from 
alienation to authenticity, through the enactment of “empowering” language. I have shown 
how the themes of responsibility, authenticity and performance in this coupling becomes 
opposed to illness in a striking fashion, that requires individuals to cancel out their own self-
image in order to become healthy and balanced.  
To shortly sum up, the “problem” of stressful employees, rather than to be understood as a 
singular event, is a part of a movement in which health promotion at work have become 
increasingly centered upon employees’ emotions, such as their attachment, satisfaction, 
thriving and well-being, which comes to serve as an explanatory index and a primary source 
of mapping, prevention and intervention in the health of employees. If we are to capture this 
movement in a single sentence, one might call it the pathologization of emotions. This 
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involves a therapeutic vocabulary that centers in on the self as the cause and effect of both 
illness and health. It is assumed that employees’ self-relationship, on a general note, now 
constitutes the main risk towards his or her own health, but also its “redemption” and sound 
development. In stress management, the individual is encouraged to look at itself with a 
distanced gaze and turn itself into a case to find the “real” causes of emotional conflict and 
disturbance, that supposedly appear underneath his or her illness or general sense of anxiety 
or stress at work. But the enactment that must be set in motion in order for the subject to 
reach such a state of authenticity and self-recognition, presuppose a self that has lost itself in 
one way or another. The employee is thought to have inscribed itself in a tragic narrative of 
itself and the resolution to this state can only come about by engaging in different forms re-
narration and speech acts, so as to create a new world wherein the possibilities to act are 
radically altered and changed. This “revolution within” is, phrased differently, thought to 
initiate an alternation of the previous constraints and disturbances that has led the subject to 
its misery in the first place. I have looked upon the paradoxes unfolding in this process.  
The immediate paradox of this intervention is how stress is both considered harmful and 
productive, and how the state of scarcity, on the part of the employee, is sought turned into a 
surplus of “positive” energy, well-being, and productivity for both the individual and the 
whole organization. On the one hand, the individual here becomes an all-encompassing 
address of transformation and plasticity, supposed to reside over immense resources of 
change by the mere act of imagination; imagining its own outlook differently, re-adjusting its 
own voice, expectations or sense of responsibility. On the other hand, the individual can only 
become the object of such a transformation by, first, inscribing itself in a set and self-
tragedized storyline, in which it has lost its own true self. The subject is encouraged to turn 
itself into a source of superior power on the condition of its self-inferiority.  
The employees’ state of turmoil, tiredness or stress can thereby be suspended provided he or 
she can be enabled another voice to describe itself and its surroundings. Stress management 
centres in on different forms of language-exercises, that appear to offer improvements of the 
employees’ conditions at work. Language is itself framed as potentially harmful and as a 
source of pathological intrusion, where the words used to express the experience of reality are 
thought to directly possess this reality. Employees are therefore called upon to take 
responsibility for how they think and speak, and thereby how they “create” their own world. 
In continuation of this, language becomes endowed with the quality of a counter-structural 
media, that can bring about a resilience against the various difficulties the employee might 
219 
 
experience at his or her work. The language of employees is by this means sought to be 
closely interknit with the conditions of the sociality of work; how they experience their work 
loads, work hours, tasks, responsibility, relations to clients, managers or colleagues. From 
this situation, a peculiar relationship emerges between the employee and the organisation. It 
is assumed that the language of the employee creates his or her own very reality, but this also 
situates the employee in a new form of sociality, that seeks to reconfigure his or her relation 
to the organization, strictly on the part of the employees’ imagination and language. The 
pathologies of work can thereby be located in a “failed” ability to imagine and put the 
surroundings into words differently. 
This thesis is written as a contribution to the sociology of organizations. With the 
historicizing of the concept of illness in organizations, I have sought to make it less clear and 
obvious how illness, and particularly the case of stress, is dealt with in contemporary work 
life, as an individualized pathology that requires an incessant work on the self. Moreover, I 
have also sought to challenge the preconceived narrative which often tend to guide critical 
studies of health, work and organization, where the current “individualization” is framed as a 
novel emergence, involving new power regimes leaving behind a “golden era” of collective 
“action” and solidarity. The historical account shows that the employee’s health throughout 
the 20th century, has been strictly assessed in his or her individuality by the organizations, but 
we see a number of shifts in this regard, from an individualization of the body and cognitive 
capacity to an individualization of emotions, language and authenticity. The reason I choose 
to bring this to the surface, is because it also points towards the necessity of not taking 
anything, as far as the sociological study of our recent history is concerned, for granted. If we 
accept the narratives “out there”, whether they are handed over to us by assumptions, 
common-sense or guided by our own political sympathies, the result can only materialize into 
journalism and not sociology. This brings me to a closing remark. It seems clear to me, after 
conducting this study, that “balance”, “well-being” and “authenticity” is something that 
organizations want their employees to “invest” in, as a form of prevention. They become 
expectations that lay themselves on top of other expectations, which it is no reason to believe 
makes it less demanding or pressuring to fulfill one’s job. Within the field of organization 
studies, there is by now fleshed out a whole edifice of studies that seek to detect a lack of 
balance, well-being and authenticity as “health threats”, but these studies rarely engage in the 
question of what this teleologies are an answer to. One could ask with what concepts do we 
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problematize and study social reality, in this case the interlinking of work life and health, and 
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